Biofictions by Gill, Josie

Biofictions
Explorations in Science and Literature
Series Editors: John Holmes, Anton Kirchhofer and Janine Rogers
Explorations in Science and Literature considers the significance of literature 
from within a scientific worldview and brings the insights of literary study to 
bear on current science. Ranging across scientific disciplines, literary concepts, 
and different times and cultures, volumes in this series will show how literature 
and science, including medicine and technology, are intricately connected, and 
how they are indispensable to one another in building up our understanding of 
ourselves and of the world around us.
Forthcoming titles
Imagining Solar Energy, Gregory Lynall
The Diseased Brain and the Failing Mind, Martina Zimmermann
Narrative in the Age of the Genome, Lara Choksey
Fictions of Prevention, Benedetta Liorsi
The Social Dinosaur, Will Tattersdill
Series Preface
In spite of the myth of the ‘Two Cultures’, science and literature have always 
been shaped by one another. Many of our most powerful scientific concepts, 
from natural selection to artificial intelligence, from germ theory to chaos 
theory, have been formed through the careful – and sometimes careless – use 
of written language. Poets, novelists, playwrights and journalists have taken 
up scientific ideas, medical research and new technologies, exploring them, 
reworking them, at times distorting or misjudging them, but always shaping 
profoundly the wider culture’s understanding of what they mean. This intimate 
and productive relationship between literature and science generated a steady 
stream of insightful scholarship and commentary throughout the twentieth 
century and has grown into a substantial field of study in its own right since 
the turn of the millennium. Where the idea of ‘Two Cultures’ does still have a 
hold, however, is in academic disciplines themselves. In schools and universities, 
we study science and arts subjects in different classrooms, taught by different 
people with different expectations. Literature and science studies has, so far, 
been largely a sub-discipline of literature, with only rare contributions from 
or addressed to scientific experts. In a world of ever-increasing specialization, 
failure to communicate across these disciplinary divides risks failing to appreciate 
the contribution that the study of literature can make to our understanding 
of science, medicine and technology, the uses that science makes of images, 
narratives and fictions, and the insights that scientists can bring to bear on 
literature and on culture at large.
Explorations in Science and Literature aims to speak across this divide. It has 
a particular mandate to bring the insights of literary study to bear on science 
itself; to consider the significance of literature from a scientific point of view; 
and to explore the role of literature within the history of science. The books 
Explorations in Science and Literature
therefore examine the complex interrelations between science and literature 
in cross-disciplinary ways. They are written equally for scholars and students 
of literature and for scientists and science students, but also for historians and 
sociologists of science, as well as general readers interested in science and its 
place in culture and society. By showing how each field can be enhanced by a 
knowledge of the others, we hope to enrich scientific as well as literary research, 
and to cultivate a new cross-disciplinary approach to fundamental questions in 
both fields.
The series will encompass topics from across the physical, biological and 
social sciences, medicine and technology, wherever literature can inform our 
understanding of the science, its origins and its implications. It will also include 
books on literary forms and techniques that are informed by science, as well as 
studies that consider how science itself has been articulated. Along with literature 
in the broad sense of written texts, books in the series will also consider other 
cultural forms including drama, film, television, and other arts and media.
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Is race a biological fact or a fiction? At the beginning of 2018, scientists working 
with ancient DNA in the UK and the United States offered two very different 
public responses to this long-asked question. In the UK in February  2018, 
Channel 4 aired the documentary The First Brit: Secrets of the 10,000 Year Old 
Man, in which geneticists at the Natural History Museum and University College 
London sequenced the DNA of Cheddar Man, a 10,000-year-old skeleton that 
is the oldest to have been found in Britain. Focusing on the question of what 
Cheddar Man looked like and where he came from, model-makers reconstructed 
the head of the man using information derived from his DNA to reveal that 
the person the programme dubbed ‘the first modern Brit’ had dark skin and 
ancestors who came from the Middle East.1 Overturning the previously held 
scientific assumption that Cheddar Man was white, the scientists then compared 
Cheddar Man’s DNA to that of modern-day Britons in order to answer the other 
question posed by the programme, ‘How Cheddar Man are we?’2 The answer, 
the programme’s narrator playfully informed the audience, is that according to 
the DNA ‘we’re all a little bit Cheddar Man’.3 It was a finding which, combined 
with the man’s dark skin, led one of the scientists interviewed to conclude 
that ‘these imaginary racial categories that we have are really very modern 
constructions … that are not applicable to the past at all’.4 With its suggestion 
that some ancestors of modern white Britons were black, the programme and its 
participants positioned race as a modern social construct, a genetic fiction, and 
situated their findings as a means of fighting against racism. The First Brit opens 
with a montage of images of people with varying skin colours against the London 
skyline while the generic sounds of parliamentary debate play as the narrator 
claims ‘there’s been a lot of talk lately about Britain; about who belongs and who 
doesn’t’.5 The programme’s scientific findings are then offered as an intervention 
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into the contemporary debates about immigration which are evoked by these 
scenes, science becoming the justification for a national reassessment of ‘our 
notions of what it is to be British’.6
Yet only a month later the idea put forward by The First Brit – that 
contemporary racial categories are ‘imaginary’ – was challenged by Harvard 
professor of genetics and ancient DNA expert David Reich. Reich published an 
article in The New York Times in which he claimed that ‘it is simply no longer 
possible to ignore the average genetic differences among “races”’.7 While Reich 
acknowledged that ‘it is true that race is a social construct’, he argued that this 
widespread assumption had become a scientific ‘orthodoxy’, to the degree that 
it was no longer being questioned for fear of reviving scientific racisms of the 
past.8 Geneticists now need to recognize, he contended, that ‘differences in 
genetic ancestry that happen to correlate to many of today’s racial constructs 
are real’, a fact that could be used to ‘improve health and save lives’.9 Future 
research in genetics and on ancient genomes would likely make it indisputable, 
he claimed, that not only physical but behavioural traits differ across ‘human 
populations’ and ‘it will be impossible – indeed, anti-scientific … to deny those 
differences’.10 What Reich’s statements amount to is an affirmation of the genetic 
basis for race: his claim that racial groupings and widely recognized patterns of 
genetic variation can be correlated with each other reinforces the idea that race 
is biologically real (even if it is somehow also, as he paradoxically claims, a social 
construct). While coming to the opposite conclusion of the scientists involved 
in The First Brit, Reich similarly framed his claims in anti-racist terms, stating 
that he had ‘deep sympathy for the concern that genetic discoveries could be 
misused to justify racism’, but that scientists articulating a genetic understanding 
of race are in fact needed to counter those who might misuse this understanding 
‘as “scientific proof ” that racist prejudices and agendas have been correct all 
along’.11 Reich was no doubt writing with the knowledge that ‘those who might 
misuse’ have become increasingly vocal in the United States which, as in the UK, 
has seen a resurgence of the far-right and a rise in attempts to use science to 
assert the biological reality of race and, consequently, to justify racial inequality 
and racist violence.12
These contrasting conclusions about the genetic status of race drawn from 
studies of ancient DNA offer a snapshot of the opposing scientific positions 
which have characterized debates about race in the biosciences across the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The rise of DNA sequencing 
techniques in the  1970s and subsequent research on human genetic diversity 
overturned the post-war scientific convention that race was ‘an illusory object 
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constructed by bad science’,13 and thus an inappropriate object of scientific 
investigation. Instead, major genetic research projects in fields including 
biological anthropology, population genetics, genomics, pharmacogenetics and 
epigenetics have made highly publicized discoveries about the nature of race. 
These include the African Eve hypothesis (1987), which traced the origin of all 
humans to a population in Africa approximately 200,000 years ago; the Human 
Genome Diversity Project (HGDP), begun in  1991, which sought to map 
human genetic diversity through a focus on isolated populations believed to be 
vanishing; the Human Genome Project (HGP), the draft of which was completed 
in 2000 and which famously affirmed that human ‘races’ are genetically more 
similar than they are different; the development of BiDil, a drug approved 
in 2005 to treat heart failure exclusively in the African American population; 
and the study of the intergenerational effects of slavery in epigenetic science in 
the first decades of the twenty-first century. Race is explained variously across 
these developments as constituted in the genes, or as not constituted in the 
genes, as a socio-political construct, as determined by self-identification and 
as a biological effect of environmental circumstances, to name only some of the 
genetic reasoning which has characterized recent interventions into the race 
debate. Yet, while differing significantly in their conclusions about the nature of 
race, what has united these diverse positions and studies (and is demonstrated 
by the examples from the field of ancient DNA) is scientists’ insistence that their 
research and its conclusions are anti-racist, and is research carried out for the 
benefit of people once dehumanized by racist science.
There is no scientific consensus as to whether race is biologically real, and 
the array of genetic standpoints about what race means and how it functions is 
such that it might seem that science has lost any ability to answer the question 
of whether race is fact or fiction. And yet, the opposite is true: regardless of 
whether geneticists argue for the non-existence of race, biologically, or for 
its genetic reality, genetic science has become the ultimate authority on race, 
the final arbitrator of race’s meaning, as politicians, doctors, public officials, 
academics and journalists turn to science as a means of getting to the ‘truth’ of 
race. Those uncomfortable with the findings of the Cheddar Man documentary 
sought to counter them with recourse to a scientist who emphasized that 
Cheddar Man’s dark skin colour was only ‘probable’,14 while in an open letter to 
David Reich protesting against the unacknowledged politics of his genetic racial 
realism, a group of scholars from the natural sciences, medical and population 
health sciences, social sciences, law, and humanities asserted that Reich was 
wrong because a ‘robust body of scholarship’ has shown that ‘geographically 
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based genetic variation’ is ‘not consistent with biological definitions of race’.15 
The fictional or factual status of race has become something to be determined 
by genetic science, the question of whether race is real one to be answered at 
the molecular level, by the genes. As Chris Stringer, a palaeoanthropologist 
interviewed in the Cheddar Man documentary, asserted in his discussion of 
the findings, ‘we’re not just conjuring this up out of nowhere, we really do have 
scientific data’.16 Science is presented as an objective, neutral authority through 
which the public can be reassured they are getting the facts about race. What 
matters in these debates is not only whether race is a biological fact or fiction, 
but that the facts of science can be upheld over the ‘made up’ ideas about race 
that exist more widely in culture.
This book is about the role of the conjured up, the imaginary and the fictional 
in the formation of racial ideas in contemporary genetic science. It contends 
that, contrary to the common assumption espoused by Stringer that the concrete 
findings of science are the opposite of the imaginary, fiction is integral to 
contemporary scientific conceptions of race. The fictional, understood inclusively 
as narratives and stories about race in literature as well as narratives formed in 
the political, social and cultural spheres, is intimately and inextricably bound up 
in the formation of scientific fact, shaping and impacting upon the development, 
expression, transmission and ultimately the public understanding of the new science 
of race. This relationship between fiction and science encompasses more than the 
way popular science writing has long employed literature, literary language and 
metaphor as a means of communicating scientific ideas to a wider public, something 
which Reich does in his discussion of race. Writing about the significance of the 
‘genome revolution’ for creating ‘a new understanding of human difference and 
identity’, Reich cites Alex Haley’s 1976 historical novel Roots as the inspiration for 
modern-day root seekers who have ‘realized the potential of the genome’ by using 
genetic ancestry testing to create narratives of African ancestry, much as Haley did 
in Roots.17 This is true enough, but far from simply inspiring black Americans to 
use ‘the new science of the human past’ (as Reich subtitles his book), I contend that 
Haley’s novel played a significant role in shaping the development of that science: 
the narrative structure and tone of Haley’s tale of his African ancestry informed 
emerging ideas in biological anthropology about the relationship between ancient 
African ancestors and modern-day humans that were crystallized in the African Eve 
hypothesis. As I will discuss in detail in Chapter 1, Haley’s novel and its television 
adaptation did more than assist scientists to communicate their findings about 
ancient human ancestry; it provided a formally conservative account of African 
origins, which was itself influenced by earlier anthropological writing on Africa, 
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that operated as a narrative model for the racialized conceptions of genetic ancestry 
promoted by scientists such as Reich today.
This is but one instance of the way in which race in genetic science is what 
I name biofiction: an idea constituted through the complex entanglement of 
scientific and fictive forms, the dynamics between which produce the dominant 
racial imaginaries of Britain and the United States in the contemporary era. 
This book is about how contemporary fiction explores, actively participates 
in, and might inform, the biofictional formation of racial ideas in genetic 
science. It examines novels by Alex Haley, Kazuo Ishiguro, Zadie Smith, Colson 
Whitehead, Salman Rushdie and Octavia Butler which illuminate how race, 
racism and racial identity have come to be increasingly understood through 
the lens of genetic science and medicine. Rather than simply contesting or 
challenging scientific visions of race, the novels both intervene in and respond 
to the language, images, theoretical frameworks, methodologies and narrative 
structures deployed by genetic science. I argue that these novels develop their 
own biofictional narrative forms that incorporate scientific stories, discourses 
and methods, as a means of highlighting the imbrication of the factual and 
the fictional in genetic racial formations. In so doing, the novels enable us to 
apprehend how genetic science functions narratively, rather than neutrally or 
objectively, within the racialized contexts in which it is embedded. They also 
help us to comprehend how the avowed anti-racism of contemporary genetics is 
narratively constructed, and thus not impermeable to the older racial scientific 
ideas and contemporary socio-political racisms which press in upon it. These 
contemporary fictions demonstrate that the question is less about whether race 
is real or imaginary, than about how it could ever be conceived as either, given 
that genetic facts and cultural fictions of race are mutually informing; together 
they create the stories about history, ancestry and kinship, as well as racism, 
illness and the environments in which these arise, which characterize our 
understanding of race today.
It is a commonplace that the idea of race, as it developed across the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, was constructed and defined across disciplinary 
lines from a combination of scientific, philosophical, historical and literary 
discourses.18 As Robert J.C. Young notes, racial theory emerged in the era of 
British and European colonial expansion when racism knew ‘no division between 
the sciences and the arts’.19 Racial ideas flowed, ‘from the natural sciences to 
the humanities and vice versa’,20 the formation of race across academic fields 
contributing to what W.E.B. Du Bois identified as the ‘continuous change in the 
proofs and arguments advanced’ for its existence.21 These changing arguments 
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included (but are by no means limited to) Immanuel Kant’s claim in ‘Of the 
Different Human Races’ (1775) that ‘we only need to assume four races in order 
to be able to derive all of the enduring distinctions immediately recognizable 
within the human genus. They are (1) the white race; (2) the Negro race; (3) 
the Hun race (Mongol or Kalamuk); and (4) the Hindu or Hindustani race’;22 
Johann Blumenbach’s naming of ‘five principal varieties of mankind’ in 1795 as 
Caucasian, Mongolian, Ethiopian, American and Malay, of which the Caucasian 
was the most handsome, beautiful and becoming;23 and Arthur de Gobineau’s 
division of races into white, black and yellow (1853).24 Such theories contributed 
to an emerging science of race which was ‘inextricable from the need of 
colonialist powers to establish dominance over subject peoples and hence justify 
the imperial enterprise’.25 The science of race was integral to the politics of 
Empire, and its emergence coincided with what Michel Foucault identifies as 
‘an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation 
of bodies and the control of populations, marking the beginning of an era of 
“biopower”’.26 The emergence of biopolitics – when the state began to exercise 
power over life itself, bringing birth and mortality rates, health, longevity and the 
whole biological existence of populations into its purview – required, according 
to Foucault, racism, as a means of fragmenting the field of the biological that 
power controls.27 Racism provided the state with justification for killing when 
functioning in this biopolitical mode, and ‘biological theory’ became ‘not 
simply a way of dressing up a political discourse in scientific clothing, but a 
real way of thinking about the relations between colonization, the necessity for 
wars, criminality, the phenomena of madness and mental illness, the history of 
societies with their different classes, and so on’.28
Given that the emergence of the concept of race is widely accepted to be the 
product of the intersection of the scientific, political, social and cultural spheres, 
it is somewhat curious that a comparable understanding of how contemporary 
scientific concepts of race have been formed and informed by political, but also 
cultural and literary discourses, has been largely absent from critical analyses 
of race in the humanities and literary studies. Prominent critical race scholars 
have instead often simply accepted the claims of geneticists – most often the 
idea promoted by the HGP that race has no biological meaning – and have 
approached genetic science as an objective, anti-racist authority on race because 
its findings support their own long-held views.29 In 2016, philosopher Kwame 
Anthony Appiah claimed in his Reith lecture on ‘Colour’ that race meant 
nothing in ‘scientific terms’.30 In an interview preceding the lectures, he stated 
that ‘if you try to say what the whiteness of a white person or the blackness of a 
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black person actually means in scientific terms, there’s almost nothing you can 
say that is true or even remotely plausible’ and that ‘if everybody grasped the 
facts about the relevant biology and the social facts, they’d have to treat race 
in a different way’.31 Biology and science more generally become conduits for 
the ‘truth’ about race in this formation, scientific facts neutrally authoritative 
despite the fact that Appiah spends a greater part of the lecture discussing how 
in the eighteenth century ideas about race emerged across disciplinary lines. 
Examining a range of thinkers and figures, he states that ‘ideology – enlisted 
by forms of domination from slavery to colonization – does help explain 
why … scientists … made extraordinary efforts to assert the continuing reality 
of race’ and he acknowledges in his discussion of English literary critic Matthew 
Arnold that ‘literary history was part of the scientific study of race’.32 Yet he then 
almost immediately switches to consider ‘the rise of modern genetics’ which he 
argues represents a period when ‘race and science became untethered from each 
other’ because science has shown that ‘the vast majority of our genetic material is 
shared with all human beings’.33 The possible cultural and literary entanglements 
of this scientific racial idea are left unexplored.
Henry Louis Gates Jr. makes a similar move. Reflecting on his life’s work in 2008, 
he noted that he had begun his academic career exploring ‘pseudoscientific 
theories of race in creative and philosophical writings in the Enlightenment in 
Europe’,34 before explaining his more recent endorsement of genetic ancestry 
tracing technologies on his television shows including African American Lives, 
in which African Americans, often celebrities, use genetic information and 
historical records to recover their ancestral roots. For Gates, genetic science is 
‘deconstructing the typological categories of racial purity … through the results 
of the genetic admixture tests that we administer to the subjects in the series, 
even if these tests are in their infancy and even if their precision may only 
increase after more individual genomes are sequenced’.35 Genetic testing, despite 
its imprecision, is where the real answer to race lies, revealing ‘the fiction of race 
through scientific evidence’.36 While Gates acknowledges that ‘we also need to 
interrogate the limits of genetic constructions, or models, to account for their 
social valences’,37 this is work which he has yet to do. Instead, he positions science 
as the final arbiter of questions of racial ancestry; ‘If the database reveals an exact 
match with a person of, let’s say, Yoruba descent, then the subject – indisputably – 
shares a common ancestor with that person. This is not an opinion; it is a fact.’38
Paul Gilroy goes further in attempting to unpick the origins and basis of 
racial thinking in contemporary genetics. He is wary that we must keep ‘the 
pathological problems represented by genomic racism’ in view, as well as ‘the 
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contingencies of truth-seeking, the pressures of institutional location, the active 
power of language to shape inquiry, and the provisional status of all scientific 
enterprises’.39 Yet, in Against Race (2000), the main evidence he marshals to 
support his suggestion that humanity might now be in a position to move 
beyond race is the ‘DNA revolution’, which he claims has caused a crisis in racial 
thinking and offers a way to ‘free ourselves from the bonds of all raciology’.40 In 
agreement with many geneticists working on questions of race, he asserts that 
contemporary genetics is far removed from older racial thinking in science: for 
Gilroy the new scientific focus on the molecular level, rather than on physical 
morphology – the ‘bones, skulls, hair, lips, noses, eyes, feet, genitals’ which 
preoccupied racial scientists – means that race is now signified at a different 
scale, skin colour being replaced by the cellular, so that if race has any meaning, 
it is now contained within the body as an internal, rather than external, marker 
of identity.41 Published in the same year that the mapping of the human genome 
was announced to worldwide acclaim, it is unsurprising that Gilroy’s highly 
influential book on race sought to harness the racial findings of that project. Yet 
Gilroy’s position pays little attention to the ongoing role of physical appearance 
in many genetic studies of racial difference, examples of which I will discuss in 
this book. The stresses and frameworks of earlier racial science have not always 
been left behind.
These intellectual positions articulated by scholars working across the 
disciplines of philosophy, critical race studies and cultural studies (but who 
each have academic origins in literary studies), have been highly influential in 
literary scholarship. Invocations of contemporary genetics are now common in 
literary analyses of race, where scholars frequently maintain that race is a fiction, 
a sociocultural phenomenon that ‘bad science’ once made biological, but which 
contemporary genetics has shown to be biologically meaningless. Considering 
biological understandings of race to be redundant and disappearing, literary 
analyses of race focus on culture as the nexus of racial meaning and read 
race in contemporary fiction as resistant to scientific explanations. Recent 
examples of this stance in literary criticism include the following formulations: 
‘race is a social construct which assigns non-necessary meanings to common 
phenotypical features of humanity … There is no genetic basis for race’;42 
‘In discussing “white” and “black” readers, texts, and authors, then, I refer to 
identities that are ideologically (rather than biologically) “real”’;43 ‘The project 
of contemporary British fiction … is a two-fold exercise: first, to deny the 
primacy of biology … second, to use the “unreality” of race to explore the idea 
of communities and relationships in which race is not seen’.44 Race is considered 
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real only in the sense that ‘the reality of race lies in the experience of the racial 
subject, the experience of racism’.45
To be clear, it is not that literary critics or critical race scholars are wrong 
about the genetic status of race. Rather, the problem is that the critical position 
which can be summarized as ‘genetic science has proved that race is fiction’ not 
only fails to recognize the existence of long-standing, contrary contemporary 
genetic standpoints on race,46 but fails to interrogate the social and cultural 
environments which gave rise to the genetic view that race is not real. This is the 
point made by Jenny Reardon in her analyses of the work of critical race theorists 
who, she argues, turned in the 1980s ‘to scientists and historians of science to 
legitimate their claims that race had no naturalistic meaning’.47 Reardon contends 
that ‘rather than continue to subject scientific ideas about human biological 
diversity to critical analysis, most critical scholars of race have embraced Gates’s 
view that, biologically speaking, race is a fiction. Rather than interrogating how 
claims about the biological meaninglessness of race emerged and how they 
shape and are shaped by broader social, political, and technical contexts, most 
scholars of race merely enlist these claims to bolster their argument that race 
is mere ideology’.48 Reardon’s scholarship has been dedicated to exploring how, 
‘instead of viewing these claims through a frame that opposes science’s truths to 
society’s ideologies’, we might ‘reread them through an analytic frame that draws 
into view the mutual constitution of natural, social, and moral orders’.49 This 
is an approach to race which I contend might be extended to literary studies, 
expanded to include literature as a central element of the cultural orders which 
shape and are shaped by the formation of racial ideas in genetic science.
Biofictions addresses the socio-political, cultural but most significantly 
literary contexts in which racial scientific ideas arise, reading contemporary 
fiction alongside, rather than in opposition to, genetic science, in order to 
apprehend the biofictional constitution of race. In the following sections of this 
introduction I explore how the idea of race as a social construct gained ground 
in the  1970s when anti-racist activists, alongside humanities scholars, social 
scientists and some scientists, began to argue that scientific ideas were deeply 
political and thus socially constructed, rather than separable from politics as 
many scientists believed. While this led to the widespread understanding that 
race was a political, rather than biological, concept, this stance resulted in a 
movement away from anti-racism and towards a fight against the concept of 
race itself. The ironic consequence of this was that the separation of science and 
politics returned. For with the erasure of race, the possibility of racism could 
also be erased, meaning that scientists were able to begin positioning themselves 
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and their work as non-racial, and beyond the influence of social and political 
racisms (regardless of their view of the biology of race) – a stance seemingly 
endorsed by critical race theorists who positioned certain genetic ideas about 
race as truth beyond social or political influence.
I offer the concept of biofiction not only as a description of the constitution of 
race in science but as an approach which necessarily rejects the separation of the 
scientific from the socio-political and the fictional. Yet my approach does not 
represent a return to some of the constructionist approaches of the 1970s, which 
could be characterized, as Donna Haraway contends, by an ‘appropriationist 
logic of domination’, whereby criticism of science and its values set itself apart 
from the very social construction it identified in science.50 That critical tendency 
simply reversed the traditional view that nature is the truth underlying culture, 
rather than accounting for the fact that ‘evaluation is also implicated, bound, 
full of interests and stakes, part of the field of practices that make meanings’.51 
My biofictional approach instead understands that in order to comprehend the 
mutual constitution of the natural and the cultural, it is necessary to bring the 
disciplines which examine these entities – science and literary studies – together; 
to recognize, while also approaching critically, the value of both scientific and 
literary theorization. For, following Susan Merrill Squier, in order to ‘discover 
the sources and significance of the new [biomedical] forms emerging in our era, 
we must engage in the same kind of boundary crossing that characterizes the 
new biotechnologies’.52 Biofictions draws upon recent insights from the genomic 
sciences concerning the entanglement of biological and cultural factors in gene 
development and expression, as a means of thinking about race in contemporary 
fiction. At the same time, it builds upon the work of literature and science 
scholars and sociologists of science to argue for fiction, specifically the literary, 
to be included in the expanded understandings of genetics for which they 
advocate. That is, for literary conceptions of the biofictional formation of race to 
be recognized for their involvement in, and capacity to impact, the new genetics 
of race; for fictional narrative to be understood as a site where the imbrication of 
biological fact and fiction is ultimately laid bare.
The genetics of anti-racism and colourblindness
In the early  1970s Francis Crick, one of the discoverers of the double helix 
structure of DNA, became involved in a transatlantic argument about the use of 
race in scientific research. Arthur Jensen, an American educational psychologist, 
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had published a paper in 1969 which argued that black people had a genetically 
lower IQ than white people, a finding which he used to criticize educational 
programmes designed to provide support for schoolchildren from deprived and 
low-income backgrounds.53 Jensen’s paper prompted another scientist, William 
Shockley, to call on the US National Academy of Sciences to make research 
into IQ differences a priority. Crick became involved in the affair when some 
members of the Academy wrote a letter to their President which was critical of 
Shockley’s views on race and human genetics (Shockley was motivated by his 
belief that rates of reproduction among groups with lower IQs, which included 
black people, were too high). Crick decided to support Jensen and Shockley, 
threatening to resign as a Foreign Associate of the Academy, eventually signing 
a resolution on the right of scientists and academics to pursue research into the 
role of inheritance in human abilities and behaviours. In February 1971 Crick 
wrote a strongly worded letter to Dr John Edsall, a biochemist at Harvard, saying 
that he was ‘very distressed’ at discovering that Edsall had signed the letter to 
the President of the National Academy against Shockley’s proposal. Crick wrote:
Unlike you and your colleagues I have formed the opinion that there is much 
substance to Jensen’s arguments. In brief I think it likely that more than half 
the difference between the average I.Q. of American whites and Negroes is due 
to genetic reasons, and will not be eliminated by any foreseeable change in the 
environment. Moreover I think the social consequences of this are likely to be 
rather serious unless steps are taken to recognize the situation … Would you and 
your colleagues please state in detail why they think the arguments put forward 
by Jensen are either incorrect or misleading … the most distressing feature of 
your letter is that it neither gives nor refers to any scientific arguments, but 
makes unsupported statements of opinion. This, I need hardly remind you, is 
politics, not science. The voice of established authority, unsupported by evidence 
or argument, should have no place in science.54
Crick’s letter and his involvement in the affair provide a snapshot of the political 
culture of the early 1970s in the United States and in Britain, which saw both 
the questioning of the objectivity of science and increasing activism around 
the issue of racial prejudice. Despite arguing for the separation of science and 
politics, Crick’s concern with the ‘serious social consequences’ that might ensue if 
genetic racial differences were not recognized is demonstrative of the very ‘non-
scientific’ thinking against which he is reacting, a point that Edsall made in his 
reply to Crick.55 Social scientists, humanities scholars, as well as some scientists 
themselves, were increasingly arguing that science could not be separated from 
the social and political conditions under which it was produced, and the use of 
Biofictions12
race in science seemed to epitomize this. As part of their campaign for racial 
equality, anti-racist organizations began to criticize scientists directly for using 
race in ways which were considered far from neutral.56 The work of scientists 
was increasingly understood to be socially constructed and race was similarly 
conceived as a social construct, while sources of racism were located in political, 
social and indeed scientific institutions.57 The argument for inherited racial 
differences in IQ which situates whites above blacks, what Stephen Jay Gould 
called an ‘argument as old as the study of race’,58 was made new in the Jensen 
case. However, Jensen and his supporters were in the minority as other scientists, 
most famously Richard Lewontin, used the latest genetic information available 
to refute Jensen’s arguments and to reassert the idea at the heart of the  1951 
UNESCO Statement on Race, that race had no real genetic significance.59
Lewontin’s ideas initially bolstered the growing anti-racist movements of 
the  1970s and  1980s, as well as academic sociological and cultural theories 
on the social construction of race. In Britain, anti-racist practice began to be 
institutionalized following the Race Relations Act of 1976, which made racial 
discrimination in employment, education and public services illegal. Although 
race was not considered by many activists to be a biological fact, its power as a 
social reality which produced racism justified the need for its continuing usage 
as a way of analysing inequality. However, it was the idea that race is a social 
construct, rather than genetically real, which would eventually contribute to 
the decline of the anti-racist movements of this period. For, as David Theo 
Goldberg has shown, ‘In the wake of whatever nominal successes, anti-racist 
struggle gave way … to anti-racial commitments at the expense of antiracist 
effects and ongoing struggle.’60 The fight against racism gradually became a 
fight against the idea of race itself, as anti-racist campaigns were deemed to 
have largely achieved their goals and science had proved that race, as biological 
difference, did not exist.
In the UK, attention began to shift from popular and structural forms of 
racism to more subtle aspects of cultural stereotyping and discrimination which 
constituted ‘the new racism’.61 The  1980s and  1990s witnessed a turn away 
from political blackness as a form of synchronized action among the victims of 
racism, and a turn towards more complex ways of fixing and instrumentalizing 
culture and difference, a development which made anti-racism less politically 
focused and thus more difficult to organize.62 In its place, multiculturalism 
became the predominant way of conceptualizing the state of race relations in 
Britain, questions of ethnicity, identity and culture coming to dominate the 
agenda, rather than inequality and racism.63 While in the wake of the racist 
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murder of Stephen Lawrence in  1993 the Race Relations Act was amended 
in 2000 to include a duty on public authorities to promote race equality, attitudes 
towards race were beginning to shift. The Labour government’s response to 
the Northern riots in  2001 was to emphasize ‘community cohesion’ as a new 
framework for race relations, a framework which, as Claire Worley has shown, 
involved the negation of racialized language in favour of the more ambiguous 
language of ‘community’.64 This political movement away from race was publicly 
confirmed with the disbanding of the Commission for Racial Equality in 2007, 
an institution which was subsumed into the newly created Equality and Human 
Rights Commission. Under the Equality Act of  2010, race became one of 
several ‘protected characteristics’ within a broader framework of human rights, 
a movement overseen and endorsed by Labour politicians and policymakers 
who believed racism was no longer a significant issue and that government 
policy should reflect a British society that had apparently transcended racial 
discrimination and inequality.65
In the United States, the public and political consensus on race was also 
beginning to shift at the end of the twentieth century, premised on the belief 
that racism had been defeated, that the civil rights movement had successfully 
ended racial inequality, and that there was thus little need or justification 
for affirmative action or other colour-conscious policies. The initially naïve 
concept of colourblindness, which had been put forward as an antidote to Jim 
Crow during the civil rights movement, had by the late 1980s developed into a 
conservative ideology characterized by the belief that ‘if racial inequalities in 
income, employment, residence and political representation persist … it is not 
because of white racism. Rather, the problem is the behavior of people who 
fail to take responsibility for their own lives’.66 Re-situating race as an issue for 
individuals, rather than for institutions, colourblind policies were increasingly 
adopted as US government policy into the 1990s and 2000s, as race became a 
banned consideration in public employment across several states, and courts 
dismantled affirmative action programmes designed to desegregate schools, 
erasing racism as a factor in the lives of the US citizens.67 The election of Barack 
Obama in  2008 only seemed to reinforce the legitimacy of these moves, as 
commentators in the media, politics and academia rushed to claim that the 
United States was now a post-racial society.
This gradual disappearance of race from policy and political dialogues in 
the UK and United States initially gained traction from scientific ideas about 
the biological non-existence of race, which high-profile scientists and projects 
continued to promote.68 However, it was the denial of the significance of racism 
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at the heart of colourblind ideology that also, ironically, enabled the growth in 
research into the genetic basis of race at the same moment in time. Invocations 
of colourblindness enabled genomicists to position their research as beyond 
the influence of race and racism, as the ‘color-blind metanarrative of human 
genetic sameness’ operated to ‘inhibit scientists’ ability to critically assess 
the racialized cultural and ideological considerations contained within it’.69 
Geneticists’ presupposed ‘antiracist investigation into the biology of race’70 was 
seen to make the use of race ‘safe’ in their hands, and liberal-minded scientists 
erected what Dorothy Roberts calls an ‘imaginary wall … separating racial 
science from racial politics’.71 This ‘imaginary wall’ meant that geneticists could 
begin to once again invoke genetic understandings of race, and, as evident in 
cases such as the development of the racially targeted drug BiDil, to invoke 
their own anti-racist beliefs as a defence against the charge levelled at them 
that their invocations of race risked a return to racial (racist) science.72 Even 
if such geneticists were and are motivated by anti-racism, the idea that racial 
difference is genetic also began to be simultaneously invoked by political 
conservatives in the United States as alternative evidence that affirmative action 
schemes should be dismantled, on the basis that inequality could be explained 
by genetic difference.73 Genetic definitions of race came to be increasingly used 
‘to explain why stark racial disparities persist despite the abolition of official 
discrimination on the basis of race’74 even though it is more evident than ever 
that discrimination persists.
The reinvigoration of genetic investigations into race at a moment when 
genetic science was also denying the biological existence of race is a situation 
which is both the product and enabler of the denial of the persistence of 
racism in the UK and US public spheres. The current era is characterized by 
what Goldberg calls ‘racism without race’;75 an erasure of the possibility of 
racist beliefs and practices on the basis that race itself does not exist and on 
the understanding that racism has been consigned to the past. Experiences 
of racism become unnameable, as it becomes increasingly unacceptable to 
even speak in racial terms. In the UK the former head of the Commission for 
Racial Equality, Trevor Philips, suggested that the term ‘systemic bias’ should 
be adopted to talk about racial discrimination,76 while even the fascist English 
Defence League avoid speaking in racial terms about what are overtly racist 
beliefs.77 In the United States, Donald Trump has claimed that he is not a racist 
and is ‘the least racist person’,78 while instituting some of the most racist policies 
the United States has witnessed in recent times.79 The language of genetics has 
been characterized by a similar reflex, for not only do geneticists consistently 
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deny the possibility of racism, but the term ‘race’ itself is often avoided (as I will 
discuss further in Chapter 2), in favour of terms such as ‘population’, ‘ethnicity’ 
and ‘ancestry’ which nevertheless continue to signal and to correspond with 
older racial categorizations.
New developments in genetics have tended to fit comfortably into this 
emerging racial schema and have harnessed the commercial possibilities of the 
downplaying of racism in favour of the promotion and bolstering of identities 
which are racial in all but name. Racial minorities (or perhaps formerly 
racialized individuals as the commentators who deny the significance of racism 
might have it) are encouraged to focus not on racism as the central and defining 
experience of being raced, but on identity. For example, Black Britons and 
African Americans (nearly always the populations at the forefront of scientific 
investigations of race) have been encouraged to trace their ancestral roots 
using the genetic ancestry tracing technologies which have emerged from the 
Mitochondrial DNA and Y Chromosome analysis developed in the African Eve 
project and the HGDP, respectively. Such technologies focus on carefully selected, 
individualized lines of ancestry which have encouraged the idea that knowing 
‘who you are’ is about ‘genetic differences’, genetics appearing, as Catherine 
Nash contends, ‘neutralized, just a means to something else, to knowledge of 
ancestry, something positive, rewarding, meaningful but politically neutral’.80 
Where once such scientific racial interventions were considered to be politically 
charged, they now assume a political neutrality which has been largely accepted 
by the populations at which genetic technologies are aimed, as well as by some 
scholars of race in the humanities.
Indeed such developments – the denial of the possibility of racism, and the 
celebration of individual ancestry tracing which makes race an issue of personal 
identity, rather than collective experience – are racial arrangements that have been 
accepted and to a degree promoted in some scholarship on the new genetics of 
race. Such scholarship views these developments not as evidence of a renewed 
(false) separation of science and politics as I do, but as evidence of new kinds 
of interaction between the scientific and the socio-political which supersede 
older binaries between biological and social definitions of race. Alondra Nelson, 
for example, attempts to ‘triangulate’ the binary between biological and social 
understandings of race through an examination of genetic genealogy testing, the 
users of which, she contends, utilize genetic results in ways that are meaningful 
to them to construct their identities.81 Genetic genealogy testing is not reducible 
to a form of genetic determinism or racial realism in Nelson’s view, but operates 
complexly as it is also applied to a range of political and social efforts to bring issues 
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of inequality into view – reconciliation projects which she argues shape race in new 
and innovative ways.82 Nikolas Rose argues in a similar vein that the new genetics 
of race ‘is intrinsically linked to the delineation and administration of biosocial 
communities, formed around beliefs in a shared disease heritage, demanding 
resources for the biomedical research that might reveal the genomic bases of 
these diseases, and mobilized by the hope of a cure’.83 Black and minority ethnic 
communities’ apparent embrace of race-based medicine and genetic ancestry 
tracing makes them ‘active biological citizens’, ushering in a new biopolitical era 
where race is located between biology and culture: ‘race now signifies an unstable 
space of ambivalence between the molecular level of the genome and the cell, 
and the molar level of classifications in terms of population group, country of 
origin, cultural diversity and self-perception’.84 Catherine Bliss comes to a similar 
conclusion through an investigation of how genetic scientists integrate their own 
political beliefs into research on race. She contends that geneticists approach 
race through an anti-racist lens, ‘drawing on their own experiences, memories, 
and racial values’, in effect ‘biosocializing’ in the way that minority communities 
had previously been understood to do.85 For Bliss, this means that we need to 
‘rethink the character, aims, and implications of scientific knowledge’ as scientists 
are ‘expanding the definition of biology to include social factors’.86 Genetics 
is infused with social meanings which in turn are being shaped by science in 
these accounts, in which social theorists seek to work with, rather than against, 
new genetic discoveries and practices. Rejecting critical approaches which link 
recent developments in genetics with older racial science as a form of outdated 
‘sociocritique’,87 these stances take the anti-racist outlook of contemporary science 
as a given, and understand genetics to be a non-deterministic science, far removed 
from the determinism of racial ideas in science past.
Such accounts usefully bring to the fore the ways in which the idea of race 
is being shaped in novel ways across social and scientific lines in the twenty-
first century, going further than the aforementioned critical race theorists in 
recognizing how contemporary science is actively determined and informed by 
the social, and acknowledging that genetics has not left biological conceptions 
of race behind. Yet these approaches to race differ from that which I will propose 
in this book, as the conceptual frameworks they employ to understand the 
interconnections of science and society draw upon a model of hybridity which, 
when deployed in relation to questions of race, is potentially limiting. Nelson’s 
triangulation of race between social construction and biological reality, Rose’s 
vision of race as occupying an ‘unstable space of ambivalence between’ science 
and culture, and Bliss’s understanding of race as a ‘hybrid of molecular science, 
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social epidemiology, public health and bioethics’,88 each has a tendency to 
conceive of race as the hybrid product of pre-existing entities (at their broadest, 
‘science’ and ‘society’). Science studies scholar Bruno Latour proposed the 
concept of hybridity as a means to overcome the modern distinction between 
nature and society, hybridity describing how ‘all of culture and all of nature 
get churned up every day’, and the ‘imbroglios of science, politics, economy, 
law, religion, technology, fiction’ that he argued characterize modern societies 
but which such societies attempt to separate out into ‘pure disciplines’.89 In a 
highly influential move, Latour viewed the work of the critic as being the work 
of hybridity; to re-tie the Gordian knot by crisscrossing the divide between 
nature and culture, to understand how these entities are networked.90 Around 
the same time the concept of hybridity was being theorized and developed 
in postcolonial studies, where it came to describe the fusion of cultures that 
results from ‘third world migration’; ‘the hybrid strategy’, Homi Bhabha writes, 
is ‘a space of negotiation’ which is ‘neither assimilation nor collaboration’ but 
in which hybrid agencies ‘deploy the partial culture from which they emerge 
to construct visions of community … that give narrative form to the minority 
positions they occupy; the outside of the inside: the part in the whole’.91 Hybridity 
came to signify the unsettling of notions of essentialism and, as Pnina Werbner 
has noted, ‘in the postmodern imaginary, hybridity invades whole areas of 
sociological discourse, subverting and conflating long-established classes and 
categories’.92
Yet hybridity can be a problematic concept, not only for its tendency to imply 
that the objects, entities and ideas of which a hybrid consists are somehow 
pure and separable from each other in the first place. The use of hybridity as a 
means to describe purportedly new formations of race in genetics is particularly 
problematic because ironically it recalls the very history of racial science that 
these theorists so consciously seek to avoid. The concept of hybridity was used 
extensively by nineteenth-century racial scientists to describe racial mixing and 
became central to debates about whether different races were different species, 
the test for different species being whether the progeny would be infertile, a 
charge often levelled at mixed-race populations in the colonies.93 The lack of 
attention paid to this racialized history has resulted, as several scholars have 
shown, in the repetition of ideas and structures from past racialized discourses 
in contemporary theorizations of hybridity.94 For Robert J. C. Young,
The question is whether the old, essentializing categories of cultural identity, or 
of race, were really so essentialized, or have been retrospectively constructed as 
more fixed than they were. When we look at the texts of racial theory, we find 
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that they are in fact contradictory, disruptive and already deconstructed … in 
deconstructing such essentialist notions of race today we may rather be repeating 
the past than distancing ourselves from it or providing a critique of it.95
For Young, contemporary theoretical and conceptual invocations of hybridity 
cannot be separated from the roots of the idea in racial science. Yet when Bliss 
states firmly that ‘genomics does not mark the reemergence of a prior science of 
race; rather, it is devoted to a new understanding of race’,96 or when Rose claims 
that whereas race in the nineteenth century was understood at the molar level – 
in terms of visible, physical characteristics – the molecular scale of the new 
genetics creates a complexity which is simply not deterministic in the way that 
racial science was,97 Young’s point is missed. While the mechanics of measuring 
race might have changed, these claims do not take account of the fact that race 
(in science) has never been wholly deterministic, essentialized or biologized. 
As recent studies have emphasized, the non-deterministic nature of much post-
genomic biology has a precedent in the non-deterministic way that race emerged 
in the work of Darwin and the mid-to-late Victorians.98 In a similar manner to the 
repetition of the ‘already deconstructed’ discourses of racial theory, contemporary 
theorizations of race as being ambivalently in between biology and culture 
reiterate the ‘ambiguities, contradictions and discrepancies’99 of racial theory in 
nineteenth-century science, ambiguities and ambivalences built into the concept 
of hybridity from its inception in racial science. Far from providing a new, radical 
framework for conceiving of race and its relationship to the biosciences, the hybrid 
model of an ambivalent in between race risks having the same impact as older 
discourses on race where the ‘ambiguities … manifest within particular racial 
theories and racialised medicine are more likely to strengthen than weaken racial 
discourses’.100 The critical privileging of questions of identity over an engagement 
with the social and political struggles of the people whose experience hybridity 
is supposed to describe, simply repeats, rather than challenges, the tired focus 
on the politics of identity, at the expense of an engagement with history, which 
characterized postcolonial formations of hybridity.
A biofictional approach
How can we conceive of the contemporary biofictional nature of race in a way 
which recognizes the complex imbrication of biology and culture, scientific 
fact and fiction, but resists re-inscribing the artificial separation of these 
entities? How can we move beyond these dichotomies while accounting for 
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and acknowledging the history of the race concept, which has never been 
either wholly biological or cultural? How can we keep the realities of racism 
and racial inequality in view, recognizing that, as Dorothy Roberts puts it, 
‘just as we cannot apply the same old sociocritiques or paste the same label 
of eugenics on contemporary biopolitics, nor can we uncritically assume 
that the new biocitizenship necessarily fosters individual life and choice 
and necessarily intervenes on the consequences of inequality, rather than 
legitimizing inequality’?101 This book proposes a biofictional approach which 
situates contemporary fiction as key to comprehending how the current racial 
formations dominant in the UK and United States (namely the movement from 
anti-racism to an anti-racialism which obscures racism while making race an 
issue of personal identity rather than collective experience) are the product of 
entanglements of scientific fact and fiction, neither of which can be conceived 
without the other. For, as Donna Haraway has long maintained, ‘both science and 
popular culture are intricately woven of fact and fiction’.102 As Amade M’Charek 
has argued, facts and fictions are not pre-given entities; a previous fact might 
become fiction and vice versa, fictions being partial truths in the sense that they 
are both made and made up.103 Facts cannot be privileged over fiction (as they 
have often been) in this relational understanding because fiction is part of truth-
making, and facts are fluid and unfixed as they materialize in different ways 
over time.104 I contend that an examination of contemporary novels enables an 
apprehension of the overlapping, mutually constituting facts and fictions of race 
which circulate across the boundaries of genetics and literature, illuminating, in 
Caroline Levine’s terms, how ‘forms migrate across contexts’, how ‘aesthetic and 
political forms may be nestled inside one another’ and how ‘each is capable of 
disturbing the other’s organizing power’.105 Rather than simply contesting socio-
scientific racial formations, or reinforcing a social constructionist paradigm, 
contemporary literary engagements with race underscore that ‘science is not a 
single origin, with literature, or sociology, or economics, or philosophy as its 
interpretative followers’,106 but that racial forms emerge from the entanglement 
of literature and science in ways which highlight both historical precedents for 
contemporary racial formations and continuing racist realities.
While the interwoven relations of facts and fictions (literary, cultural and 
social) have preoccupied postmodernist literary criticism for some time, my 
approach draws upon emerging insights in post-genomic biology, in which the 
relations between biology and culture are being reconfigured in ways that, I 
contend, might act as a model for thinking about the relations between genetic 
science and literature. Where once the gene was understood as a fixed, stable 
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entity, and the discourse of classical genetics was dominated by the idea of ‘gene 
action’ which gave causal priority to genes in the development of characteristics, 
post-genomic science has revealed the genome to be ‘an exquisitely sensitive 
reaction (or response) mechanism’, in which genes are embedded in and acutely 
responsive to their environment.107 This environment includes not only the 
immediate cellular environment, but the environment external to the organism 
(or human), the ‘complex socio-cultural environments’ that humans construct 
and engage in.108 For Evelyn Fox Keller, any sense of a binary between genes and 
their wider environments therefore becomes obsolete; she writes:
Not only is it a mistake to think of development in terms of separable causes, 
but it is also a mistake to think of the development of traits as a product of 
causal elements interacting with one another. Indeed, the notion of interaction 
presupposes the existence of entities that are at least ideally separable – i.e., it 
presupposes an a priori space between component entities – and this is precisely 
what the character of developmental dynamics precludes. Everything we 
know about the processes of inheritance and development teaches us that the 
entanglement of developmental processes is not only immensely intricate, but it 
is there from the start.109
We must abandon, Keller contends, the ‘mirage of a space between nature 
and nurture’ (terms which she has demonstrated correspond, although not 
un-problematically, with biology/culture distinctions), in favour of a relational 
understanding of genes and their environments which acknowledges that 
neither can be understood in the absence of its apparent opposite.110 This new 
conception of the gene, together with other theorizations of complexity and 
entanglement in science, has been highly influential within the humanities and 
social sciences, prompting calls for a renewed understanding of how remapping 
the borderlands between nature and culture requires a concomitant rethinking 
of the borders between the corresponding disciplines which study these 
objects.111 Recent theorizations of the ‘bio-humanities’,112 the ‘bio-social’113 and 
the ‘biocultural’114 seek to do just this, to articulate not only how the humanities 
can ‘add to our understanding of biology itself ’115 (in the case of the first) but 
how moving towards what Keller terms a ‘biocultural synthesis’ would mean 
admitting the biological into social (and in this case literary) theory.116 The 
challenge is to develop an approach which in Gillian Beer’s words can ‘find ways 
out of the circle of current presumptions … to create knowledge or fresh insight’, 
for ‘all description draws, often unknowingly, upon shared cultural assumptions 
which underwrite its neutral and authoritative status and conceal the embedded 
designs upon which describing depends’.117 In the case of some sociological 
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work on race in contemporary genetics, such presumptions include the long-
embedded impulse to triangulate and hybridize binaries which never existed in 
the first place, an impulse which Levine contends can distract attention from the 
way that power operates.118
The biofictional approach to race proposed here brings contemporary genetic 
narratives of race, biology and culture into dialogue with a broad range of fiction 
published in the UK and the United States from the 1970s onwards, responding 
to Squier’s call to craft new ways of making sense of the configurations and 
assemblages of relations produced by new biomedical developments.119 
Following Squier I understand (fictional) narratives as offering ‘an alternative 
to the impossible attempt to distinguish nature from culture, science from 
society’ and instead as ‘a site where we can productively consider their mutual 
imbrication and cogeneration’.120 Each chapter considers a different genetic 
intervention into the race question in relation to a work or works of fiction 
originating in the UK or the United States where these scientific developments 
took place. Chapter  1 explores the African Eve hypothesis (1987) and Alex 
Haley’s Roots (1976); Chapter 2 the Human Genome Diversity Project (1991) 
and Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go (2005); Chapter 3 the Human Genome 
Project (2001) and Zadie Smith’s White Teeth (2000); Chapter 4 the development 
of BiDil (2005) and Colson Whitehead’s Apex Hides the Hurt (2006); Chapter 5 
the rise of epigenetics (c. 2008) and Octavia Butler’s Kindred (1979) and Salman 
Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses (1988). The novels range widely in style and genre, 
differ in their approaches to race and their authors’ level of engagement with 
genetics. Where Smith, Ishiguro and Whitehead make reference to recent 
racial developments in genetic science through novels which adopt realist, 
science fictional and satirical modes, the novels of Haley, Rushdie and Butler – 
ranging in genre from family saga to magic realism and fantasy – contain no 
overt references to contemporary genetics. These latter novels were published 
before the developments in genetics alongside which they are considered took 
place, and thus cannot be considered to respond to or interact directly with a 
particular scientific idea. Instead, each of the six novels evinces different kinds 
of relationships to science: for example, where Chapter  1 explores how the 
narration of African ancestry in Roots came to shape the structure and tone of 
popular science books on human origins in Africa, Chapter  3 examines how 
the comic form of White Teeth operates as a rebuttal to attempts by scientists 
to delimit the meaning of race and the significance of literature in discourses 
surrounding the Human Genome Project, while Chapter 5 more speculatively 
explores how fantastic representations of racism in Kindred and The Satanic 
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Verses might aid understanding of the epigenetic effects of racism on the body. 
The inclusion of two novels in the final chapter reflects this chapter’s aim to 
consider how fiction might be actively and critically engaged as a means of 
thinking through the implications of an emerging strand of genetics: it offers 
more than one example as a gesture towards the multiple and specific possibilities 
that contemporary fiction affords for scholars across disciplines grappling with 
the import of race in (epigenetic) science. Together, the chapters evince a range 
of possible entanglements between concepts in genetics, scientific discourse, 
fictional narrative, literary criticism and sociological discourse, biofictional 
assemblages that move us away from understanding these relations through 
sociological triangulation models of race, and which go beyond Beer’s ‘two-way 
traffic’121 model for the relations between literature and science.
My approach reflects the fact that racial forms know no generic boundaries; 
race is an idea which is portable across time, space and context, and while always 
historically inflected and determined, race confounds attempts to delimit its 
boundaries through types of literary categorization (by either style, temporality, 
or the racial or geographical origins of a writer) rooted in the institutional patterns 
of nineteenth and early-twentieth-century English departments.122 The creation 
of race in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries occurred not only through 
exchanges between scientific and literary texts but through literary scholarship, 
which has continued to attempt to distinguish aesthetic patterns of difference 
between writers on the basis of racial background. This study makes no such 
taxonomic attempt, but in reading different kinds of literary texts alongside 
one another it aims to demonstrate how the formation and transmission of 
racial ideas call into question not only the internal disciplinary organization of 
English studies but the boundaries between science and literary studies; for race 
unsettles the presumed stability of both scientific truth and literary hierarchies 
of knowledge. Following this, Biofictions reads scientific writing and narrative 
including research papers, popular science and journalism, as well as racial and 
genetic theories, alongside the novels as a means of illuminating how stories about 
race emerge across the generic boundaries of these different texts. I work with 
an expanded definition of science as ‘an evolving set of technological, material, 
narrative, and affective practices’ in which the boundaries between the lab and 
science journalism, scientific commerce and fiction, collide to produce genetic 
narratives, metaphors and language.123 What Deborah Lynn Steinberg calls the 
‘spectacle of science’ is not an artefact which can be tacked onto ‘real science’ but 
a core part of scientific cultures and scientific work.124 Contemporary scientific 
culture is characterized by a range of practices and forms which influence how 
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scientific ideas are received by both scientists themselves and the wider public; 
science, like fiction, functions narratively and operates agentially within the 
wider sociocultural context in which it is embedded.
I consider genetic science to be inextricable from what Stefan Timmermans 
and Sara Shostack call ‘gene worlds’, that is ‘the social worlds in which genes 
flourish, which include the political, financial, and professional contexts that 
enable genetic knowledge’.125 However my approach calls for literature to be 
considered and included as a key element of the ‘gene worlds’ from which 
scientific ideas emerge; for fiction to be acknowledged and interrogated alongside 
sociocultural considerations; for the definition of genetics to be expanded to 
include not only the social or cultural, but also the literary; perhaps, even, that 
fiction be considered a part of the wider environment without which, it is now 
understood, genes cannot be conceived. In this, I join a growing number of 
scholars who have sought to understand how cultural representations, including 
the fictional, are involved in the production of genetic knowledge and the 
creation of a biomedical imaginary.126 My focus on fiction alone is designed 
not only to highlight the narrative origins and histories of the contemporary 
sociocultural – scientific entanglements that produce race concepts, but to 
centralize narrative form as key to comprehending how processes of racial 
formation occur. For while the novels range widely in style, context and their 
level of engagement with genetics, they each develop narrative forms which are 
informed by (often older, racial) scientific theories and methodologies, forms 
which highlight continuities between the interdisciplinary creation of race in the 
past and in the present. For example, in Chapter 2 I will explore how Never Let 
Me Go evokes a Darwinian theory of human (racial) unity through a narrative 
which emphasizes facial expression over physical characteristics as a means 
of thinking differently about contemporary understandings of race in genetic 
ancestry tracing; while in Chapter 4 I examine how Apex Hides the Hurt recalls 
the fictionality and overt racism of the mid-nineteenth-century racial medical 
theories of Samuel Cartwright through a signifying narrative mode which links 
this history to contemporary, purportedly anti-racist racial medicine.
Biofictions seeks not only to follow and to trace connections between literary 
and scientific texts and forms, to map entanglements which have already 
occurred, but to consider how knowledge of these relationships might offer 
new ways of understanding race in the age of the genome that might challenge 
the false anti-racism of colourblindness and restore a historically conscious 
approach to race in contemporary genetics. I read the novels not only as 
revealing the biofictional nature of new racial formations – that ‘bodies are 
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always both natural and cultural, both biologically and socially raced’127 – but 
as offering ways to harness this imbrication for anti-racist ends, as a means of 
overcoming the creeping privatization of race that genetic science enables. In 
this, Biofictions departs from recent literary approaches to science which, much 
like the sociology of science I have discussed, have called for the abandonment of 
a critical mode characterized as ‘critique’. For Rita Felski, critique encompasses ‘a 
spirit of skeptical reflection or outright condemnation; an emphasis on its own 
precarious position vis-à-vis overbearing social forces; the claim to be engaged in 
some kind of radical intellectual and/or political work; and the assumption that 
whatever is not critical must therefore be uncritical’.128 Critique, in this view, is a 
negative mode which literary scholars have used to defend their own practices 
while looking down upon other disciplines (namely the sciences) in disparaging 
terms – ‘those blinkered scientists holed up in their labs’ – because scientists 
are seemingly uncritical and unaware of their own positioning.129 Steven 
Connor goes further, claiming that the discipline of English Literature ‘has been 
converted into a factory for the detection and denunciation of various kinds of 
social sin, and the affirmation of various kinds of social good’, a values-based 
discipline which has lost interest in the literary text itself.130 This, he claims, is 
the opposite of what scientists do, since they ‘do not spend their time wondering 
how or whether what they are doing does or does not constitute science’.131 The 
implication is that literary scholars might adopt the approach which scientists 
apparently take to their work, and in so doing might ‘accept their marginality’ 
and refrain from ‘mistaking epistemology for effect’ when it comes to grand 
challenges such as climate change, which only science can solve.132
It is certainly true that neither literary texts nor literary scholarship is capable 
of single-handedly solving problems like climate change, or, for the purpose of 
this study, the effects of biofictional racial formations. Yet returning to a more 
positivist view of science as the answer to problems which have complex political, 
social and cultural origins as well as impacts, while suggesting that the job of 
the literary scholar is simply ‘to protect and to care’133 for their objects (texts) 
as well as science, rather than to critically apprehend the social and political 
import of them, implies that the relationship between the disciplines is one-
way. Not only this, but as the approach of critical race scholars to contemporary 
genetics demonstrates, critique of science is clearly not the default mode of 
literary criticism. While, following Felski, I understand fiction to be an agent in 
the making of race, as an ‘active mediator rather than passive intermediary’134 in 
scientific contexts, and while Biofictions seeks to avoid automatic critique or any 
sense of literary superiority to science, I also believe that ‘the defensive praise of 
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science or the ritualized acknowledgement of the epistemological inferiority of 
the humanities’135 is not the answer. For the latter stance is linked to a materialist, 
object-oriented form of analysis focused not on politics but on ‘forging … links 
between things that were previously unconnected’,136 an interpretive mode 
which, when race is the object, flattens the possibility or desire for anti-racism. 
For example, Mitchum Huehls, in his book After Critique, argues that race in 
contemporary fiction does not mean or represent, but is an unknowable object: 
rather than requiring interpretation or defamiliarization, the contradictions of 
racial discourse within the contemporary neoliberal framework simply make 
race illegible, and contemporary writers are (as literary critics should be) only 
involved in describing this shifting object of race, rather than imagining futures 
yet unthought.137 This deliberately non-radical stance presents itself as a form of 
radical thinking, the possibility for a new kind of politics located in the status 
quo, yet such ways of reading are the preserve of the privileged, and appear 
much like ‘research processes that restrict their issues to those legitimated 
within the dominant forms of thought’ rather than a more effective ‘theory of 
knowledge that directs researchers to start off their thought from the lives of 
those marginalized or exploited by the dominant conceptual frameworks’.138
I am more interested in how an understanding that race is biofictional forces 
us to give up on the ‘proper objects’ that are biology and culture, and instead 
of either caring for or simply describing objects, to proceed on an anti-racist 
(and indeed feminist) critical basis that recognizes that what counts as biology 
and materiality is constantly in dispute.139 Such an understanding opens up 
new ways of comprehending the effects of racism on the body and the impact 
of racist social environments on biology; recent research in epigenetics is 
uncovering how ‘racialized taxonomies have real consequences upon biological 
functions, including the expression of genes’.140 Such emerging insights into the 
nature of race guide this study as it explores how biofictional forms of race 
might ‘reroute a racial hierarchy or disturb exclusionary boundaries’141 as they 
cross between literature, science and politics. It is my hope that the chapters 
of this book will be of interest not only to literary scholars but to scientists, 
sociologists and others who are concerned not only to understand but also to 
actively address the often problematically racialized (and unconsciously racist) 
conceptions emerging from the contemporary genetic sciences of race. Each 
chapter acts as a case study which addresses a different genetic development 
in the context of wider social and political debates about race, connecting each 
genetic intervention chronologically from the  1980s to the present. While 
delving into the recent histories of racial ideas in science, this book is not 
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a history of race in science, but an examination of how fiction investigates, 
actively contributes to, and might shape, the biofictional formation of race in 
genetics.
The first case study concerns the African Eve hypothesis (1987), the theory 
that all modern humans originate in Africa, which resulted from the first 
major attempt to apply DNA analysis to the study of human origins, which 
had previously been the sole province of palaeoanthropology. Having been 
the scientifically accepted (albeit contested) theory of the origin of modern 
humans for over twenty years, the hypothesis has been recently cast into doubt 
by the discovery that some contemporary human populations carry traces of 
Neanderthal DNA. This chapter asks why the hypothesis gained such credibility 
so as to become scientific orthodoxy. It argues that popularizers of African Eve 
were able to draw upon a widely known story of African origins, Alex Haley’s novel 
Roots, which subtly shaped science writing on human origins published in the 
wake of Eve. Analysing in detail how Haley’s novel enabled scientists to emphasize 
the anti-racist credentials of the hypothesis, the chapter demonstrates that it 
was ultimately the influence of anthropological scholarship on the composition 
of Roots itself which made it so appealing to genetic anthropologists. Haley 
portrayed Africans and their American ancestors conservatively, in a traditional 
form that was palatable to white readers and later audiences who watched the 
television adaptation of Roots. His tale thus provided a relatively safe model for 
writing on human origins in Africa, which was itself implicitly concerned to sell 
the idea that we are all from Africa to a white readership. Tracing how a fictional 
representation of race and racism has informed bioscientific fact, the chapter 
contends that Haley’s novel assisted in the emergence of the highly influential, 
racially inflected conception of ancestry which predominates today: the idea 
that we can know ourselves through (selected) ancestors and that we can know 
them through genetic science.
Chapter  2 further explores this idea by examining the development of 
genetic ancestry tracing technologies in the 1990s within the field of population 
genetics, developments which drew upon the findings of the African Eve 
hypothesis. The study of differences between human populations under the 
auspices of the Human Genome Diversity Project (1991) was, like Eve, intended 
to be an anti-racist endeavour, focusing on geographical location, rather than 
race, as a means of identifying genetic differences. Yet rather than erasing 
racial distinctions, this study of human genetic diversity effectively re-named 
race as ‘ethnicity’, ‘population’ or ‘geographical group’ while claiming race and 
racism to be social phenomena distinct from scientific fact. The effects of this 
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simultaneous erasure and re-inscription of race are explored by Kazuo Ishiguro 
in his 2005 novel Never Let Me Go, in which Ishiguro imagines the lives of a 
cloned population of humans, lives which bear many resemblances to those 
of people who are racialized and racially marginalized. The clones, apparently 
raceless, yet segregated on the basis of their genetic difference, are the product 
of a world without biological race, in which forms of racism nevertheless persist. 
As Ishiguro offers a critique of the post-racialism which population genetics 
superficially served to support, he presents an alternative vision of relatedness 
based on a non-genetic, non-racial affinity. The protagonist Kathy’s narrative 
focuses on describing facial expressions in place of physical characteristics, 
enabling her to find recognition not in the face of a genetically similar other, but 
in the novel’s only racially differentiated character, her teacher’s Nigerian carer 
George. Evoking the logic of Darwin’s theory of the universality of expression, 
and thus the common descent of different races, the novel’s form challenges the 
idea that who you are can be discovered in tracing a (racial) genetic ancestry. 
Instead, Ishiguro offers a model of reciprocity grounded in an understanding 
of the imbrication of the biological body (facial expressions) and its cultural 
environment as a means of thinking beyond racial categorization and what the 
novel exposes as the false anti-racist strategies of population genetics.
The apotheosis of genetic science in the twentieth century was the HGP, an 
international effort led by the UK and the United States to identify all 25,000 
genes in the human genome. When the completion of the draft of the genome 
was announced in June 2000, the implications for race were at the heart of the 
speeches given by the scientists and politicians assembled at the White House: 
as then President Bill Clinton put it, ‘one of the great truths to emerge from 
this triumphant expedition inside the human genome is that in genetic terms, 
all human beings, regardless of race, are more than 99.9 percent the same’.142 It 
was a moment with uncanny resemblances to a scene in Zadie Smith’s debut 
novel White Teeth, which had been published six months earlier. Smith’s tale 
of three London families, whose socially and racially varied backgrounds 
form the basis of their comic interactions, takes the new genetic science as 
one of its major themes: Marcus, head of the Chalfen family, is a geneticist 
whose experimental FutureMouse© has been designed to develop cancer and 
die on New Year’s Eve  1999. Despite Marcus’s assurances to the contrary at 
a grand unveiling of his genetic experiment, his science is not race free but 
has been developed from the work of a Nazi racial scientist, his mentor Dr 
Perret, the scientific links to which have been forgotten. Chapter 3 examines 
how White Teeth not only explores the consequences of the erasure of race, 
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and subsequently the possibility of racism, from contemporary genetics, but 
demonstrates how the scientific ‘reading’ of the human body as non-racial is 
one of many complex and messy genetic narratives of race that make scientific 
discourse comparable to fiction. Drawing on Lionel Trilling’s assertion that 
‘plot is to the novelist what experiment is to the scientist’,143 Smith sets up an 
extended comparison between the methods of the scientist and the writer 
of fiction as a means of testing this hypothesis. Smith uses the novel’s comic 
form, a Forsterian mode characterized by coincidence, irrationality, humour, 
melodrama and ‘artificiality’, to highlight comparable qualities in genetic 
narratives, which, the novel suggests, create and transmit stories about race. 
In becoming itself a conduit for such stories, White Teeth underscores the 
importance of fiction to fully comprehend the intrinsically narrative qualities 
of race in science.
The complexities and indeed contradictions of genetic narratives of race 
come to the fore in Chapter 4, which examines how despite the Human Genome 
Project’s rejection of the idea of genetic racial difference, only a few years later 
in 2005 the US Food and Drug Administration approved a new drug called BiDil, 
designed to treat heart failure exclusively in the African American population. 
The first ever ‘ethnic drug’, BiDil was supported by doctors and geneticists, and 
by the Association of Black Cardiologists, who saw the advent of the drug as 
placing a much-needed focus on the health of black populations. Tested only 
on ‘self-identified’ African Americans, BiDil’s creators acknowledged that race 
was used as a proxy for an unknown marker and that the drug might be effective 
in non-black populations. However, the promotion and marketing of the drug 
obscured this fact, encouraging the public instead to view BiDil as a black drug 
in ways which made race into the condition to be treated, race the disease. 
Chapter  4 examines how this racialization of medicine is satirized in Colson 
Whitehead’s  2006 novel Apex Hides the Hurt, in which the novel’s unnamed 
protagonist, a nomenclature consultant, names a new range of plasters designed 
to match the skin-tone of their wearers. Using one himself after he stubs his 
toe, the plaster hides a more serious infection and he eventually goes on to 
have the toe amputated as a result. Whitehead’s tale addresses how the market-
driven personalization of medicine along racial lines relies not on biological 
explanations of race, but on the multiple ways race is signified in language; it 
examines how race operates, in Stuart Hall’s terms, as a ‘floating signifier’, which 
determines how racial meaning can be created and exploited in science. The 
novel explores how, consequently, identifying with and accepting racialized 
medicine (which relies on language and linguistic signification to make race 
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mean) result in the protagonist’s illness: it is the protagonist’s racialization 
as black which makes him ill because it has been leeched of any meaningful 
(historical) significance by the world of commerce and medicine. His recovery 
is only possible once he addresses the historical causes of pain and illness in 
the African American population, something which, it is implied, the new 
racial science and medicine also need to do. By drawing parallels between the 
protagonist’s mysterious illness and the fictive disease Drapetomania invented 
by racist doctor Samuel Cartwright in  1851, Whitehead’s novel demonstrates 
how pharmacogenetics’ reliance on language and linguistic signification to 
make race mean has a precedent in the overtly fictional ways in which race was 
made disease in the racist medicine of the era of chattel slavery.
The final chapter investigates the role that fiction might play in the recent 
turn away from the gene-centric biology that was epitomized by the mapping 
of the human genome. Post-genomic biology, in particular epigenetics, has 
moved towards a more complex, non-deterministic conception of ‘the gene’ 
as plastic and interconnected with its environment, moving beyond older 
conceptions of genes as discrete entities with stable, determining effects. 
Epigenetics – broadly defined as the study of changes in gene function and 
expression that do not comprise changes in the DNA sequence – is revealing 
that genes can change, and that changes can be passed on to offspring, 
reconfiguring genetic inheritance and development as fluid and complex, 
rather than fixed, processes. This discovery has particularly far-reaching 
implications for the concept of race, as initial research has demonstrated that 
genes can carry a ‘memory’ of past environments and experiences (such as 
the experience of being enslaved), which may in part explain contemporary 
racial disparities in health. This chapter explores how contemporary fiction 
has already imagined the kinds of complexity that such post-genomic biology 
is beginning to uncover, and suggests that fiction might illuminate our 
understanding of these emerging scientific insights. The way experiences of 
racism become biologically embodied is explored in both Octavia Butler’s 
Kindred (1979) and Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses (1988), each of which 
depicts the bodily transformations of their protagonists following exposure 
to racial violence. The chapter argues that what the novels’ fantastical 
representations of the body highlight is the dynamic relationship between 
the imaginary and the real; the protagonists’ transformations work to show 
the arbitrariness, absurdity, but also the ultimate power of the racist belief 
which shapes their reality. In the context of epigenetics, these depictions of 
the physiological impact of racism suggest that we might understand the 
Biofictions30
relationship between the environment and genetics as the imaginary (such 
as slave owners’ belief in the racial inferiority of their slaves) made biologically 
real through health disparities in the present.
In ending with an examination of epigenetics, a scientific development 
which is challenging the more usual ahistoricism of genetics by placing an 
emphasis on the significance of past environments, this book hopes to model 
how comprehending race as biofiction might empower geneticists, literary 
scholars and those for whom race is an inescapable force, to think differently 
about scientific narratives of race; to look to contemporary fiction as a source 
of knowledge, rather than simply understanding, of how race is formed and 
functions across scientific cultures. At a moment when the validity of scientific 
fact and the expertise of scientists are under attack from an emboldened right-
wing global political movement, there might be a temptation, in defence of 
scientific expertise, to retreat into older, binary ways of thinking about fact and 
fiction as a means to defend against those who would dismiss science on the very 
grounds that scientists are themselves politically implicated and motivated. As 
Latour puts it (as he is thinking about climate change), ‘dangerous extremists’ 
are ‘using the very same argument of social construction to destroy hard-won 
evidence that could save our lives’.144 Yet to deny the ways in which the political, 
the social, the cultural and the literary are entangled with science (as tempting 
as such a denial might be in the face of an anti-science political sphere) would be 
as regressive and limiting as the attack on science itself. Far from undermining 
scientific knowledge and expertise, Biofictions aims to demonstrate how scientific 
approaches to complex, interdisciplinary ideas and problems like race might be 
bolstered, invigorated and enriched by engagements with fiction, which might 
play a key role in the creation of effective anti-racist scientific narratives and 
strategies in the future. Contemporary novels offer ways of comprehending 
how the apparently anti-racist consensus in science, reliant as it is (whatever the 
position on race taken) on maintaining the boundary between fact and fiction, 
can lead to the reproduction of the very racism it seeks to avoid. Instead the 
novels demonstrate how racial biofictions emerge at the very moments when 
race and racism are disavowed politically and scientifically, and offer alternative, 
anti-racist modes of understanding race; not only as the product of (racist) 
fictions made corporeal (as suggested in this book’s final chapter), but as an 
idea co-produced across the disciplines of science and literature, the boundaries 
between which begin to dissolve when what is fact and what is fiction can no 
longer be easily aligned or equated with them.
In January 1987, molecular biologists Rebecca Cann, Mark Stoneking and Allan 
Wilson sparked a major scientific controversy with the publication of an article 
entitled ‘Mitochondrial DNA and human evolution’ in the journal Nature. In 
the article they claimed that by analysing mitochondrial DNA derived from 
the placentas of 145 women representing five major geographic regions, they 
could infer that ‘Africa is a likely source of the human mitochondrial gene 
pool’,1 and in addition, they offered a ‘tentative time scale’ which postulated 
that ‘the common ancestor of all surviving mtDNA types existed  140,000–
290,000 years ago’.2 Mitochondrial Eve, or African Eve as she became more 
popularly known, was born. The controversy was immediate and intense. 
Palaeoanthropologists objected to what they saw as the complete dismissal 
of the fossil record by the Berkeley geneticists, whose study represented the 
first major attempt to apply the relatively new science of molecular biology 
to human origins, the study of which had previously been the province of 
palaeoanthropology. Palaeoanthropologists themselves had been split over 
what the fossil record revealed about the geographical origins of Homo sapiens: 
while multi-regionalists argued that modern humans had evolved from archaic 
homo populations in different geographical locations, others favoured an ‘Out 
of Africa’ model of the migration of modern humans from Africa to other 
parts of the world. However, whereas most traditional proponents of the Out 
of Africa model believed that once modern humans left Africa they interbred 
with premodern populations in other regions, the African Eve hypothesis stated 
that there had been no such interbreeding, that modern humans had simply 
replaced existing premodern populations.3 Some ‘Out of Africa’ proponents, 
most prominently Chris Stringer and Robin McKie, wholeheartedly embraced 
the biologists’ findings, and by the  1980s other evidence from within 
palaeoanthropology was pointing to Africa as the birthplace of modern 
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humans.4 However the multi-regionalists only intensified their campaign. The 
leading multi-regionalist advocate Milford Wolpoff organized a symposium 
for anthropologists who opposed African Eve and described the hypothesis 
as consisting of the ‘idea of killer Africans sweeping out across Europe and 
Asia, over-running everybody’, genocidal terminology that had been carefully 
rehearsed and planned.5
Indeed, what was something of an academic battle over the question of 
human origins was also an ideologically and racially charged debate. Each side 
tried to accuse the other of being racist; the multi-regionalists were accused 
of exaggerating racial divisions while African Eve advocates were accused of 
implying a total and violent replacement of Homo erectus (or Neanderthals) by 
Homo sapiens.6 Much of what Venla Oikkonen has identified as the ‘emotional 
tensions’ in journal articles and scientific commentaries about African Eve in 
the  1980s and  1990s appears to be focused around the racial implications of 
the hypothesis.7 Proponents of the hypothesis were keen to seize the findings 
for anti-racist ends, to, in part, re-envision genetics as an anti-racist science 
which emphasized commonality and racial unity over difference, and their 
work was viewed favourably by black groups and commentators who seized 
upon the findings as positive evidence that ‘all the world’s people are Africans 
in disguise’.8 Yet others were uneasy about locating the source of all humanity in 
Africa, resulting in the ‘hate mail, crank mail’ and ‘strange scrawling notes’ that 
Rebecca Cann, lead author of the mitochondrial study, describes receiving after 
the publicization of her team’s findings.9 Racist assumptions often surfaced in 
the discussions of those opposed to the hypothesis to the degree that, as Jason 
Antrosio argues, rather than celebrating Africa as the cradle of humanity, it 
is rather leaving Africa which came to be celebrated in certain academic and 
popular writing, a kind of celebratory attitude that the historian of science 
Robert Proctor has dubbed ‘Out of Africa – thank God!’.10 The media response 
to the hypothesis similarly betrayed an unease about the racial implications of 
Eve: Newsweek’s best-ever selling cover depicted an African Adam and Eve as 
mixed-race African Americans with chemically processed hair, an image which 
the illustrator claimed had originally been ‘much more pure’ but was changed 
at the request of the cover art director who wanted an illustration that would be 
‘more appealing to a wider variety of people’.11
Yet despite threatening to unsettle racialized assumptions and hierarchies, 
the African Eve hypothesis became, by the 1990s, the academically accepted, 
dominant theory of human origins. Several scientists raised serious questions 
(that were not racially inflected) about the study at the time; some queried 
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the team’s statistical analysis, while others objected to the way Cann and 
Wilson had interpreted the racial origins of the women whose DNA they had 
studied.12 Nevertheless, the theory took hold and has, since its inception, been 
taught to anthropology and biological science students alike. A slew of popular 
science writing on human origins was published in the wake of the hypothesis 
including Michael H. Brown’s The Search for Eve (1990); Brian M. Fagan’s 
The Journey from Eden: The Peopling of Our World (1990); Roger Lewin’s 
The Origin of Modern Humans (1993); Richard Dawkins’s River Out of Eden 
(1994); Richard Leakey’s The Origin of Humankind (1994); Chris Stringer and 
Robin McKie’s African Exodus: The Origins of Modern Humanity (1996); Bryan 
Sykes’s The Seven Daughters of Eve (2001); Spencer Wells’s The Journey of Man: 
A Genetic Odyssey (2002); John H. Relethford’s Reflections of Our Past: How 
Human History Is Revealed in Our Genes (2003); Stephen Oppenheimer’s Out 
of Eden (2003) and Norman A. Johnson’s Darwinian Detectives: Revealing the 
Natural History of Genes and Genomes (2007) to name only some. Television 
documentaries such as Children of Eve (1987), The Real Eve (2002) and Journey 
of Man (2003) also embedded the story of the Eve hypothesis in the popular 
imagination.
However recent developments have called into question the validity of the 
hypothesis in ways which suggest that African Eve may be losing favour in 
the second decade of the twenty-first century. In 2011 scientists studying the 
genome of a Neanderthal skeleton revealed that interbreeding did take place 
between archaic and modern humans, disproving the replacement theory at 
the heart of the Eve hypothesis.13 Human evolution is now thought to be more 
complex than previously thought; there is evidence that European and Asian 
populations contain some Neanderthal DNA, whereas African populations 
share nothing with Neanderthals, pointing to interbreeding either when 
humans emerged from Africa or at a later date. In 2010 scientists discovered 
a third hominin previously unknown to science –Denisovans – whose DNA 
matched neither humans nor Neanderthals, but traces of whose genomes were 
found in Australian aboriginal populations and in the Philippines.14 African 
Eve is not yet dead, as continued references to her and to related discoveries 
attest, however there is now enough doubt around the hypothesis for scientists 
and sociologists of science to revisit the circumstances and context in which the 
theory took hold.15
The question that is raised by recent challenges to the hypothesis is why, 
given its scientifically contested foundations, the African Eve hypothesis was 
able to gain such credibility that it became scientific orthodoxy. Why did the 
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reservations and questions raised about the study at the time it was published 
come to be dismissed and ignored in favour of a definitive narrative of an African 
Eve? Alexandra Hofmänner suggests that it was specifically the invocation of 
Africa, as an imaginative geography of otherness which has been projected onto 
the frontiers of science, which meant that an African Eve would always be more 
successful than a Russian, French or Korean Eve.16 Such geographies motivate 
‘the collection and transport of empirical artefacts, information and ideas 
from elsewhere to sites of analysis where they are measured, mapped, qualified 
and interpreted against a Western epistemological order and its standards, 
concepts and theories’.17 The hypothesis, in this sense, provides an example of 
the ‘discursive conventions’ operating within and privileged by anthropological 
science which ‘determine which social categories will succeed in attaining 
significance in the constitution of the reward system of science’.18 Another 
theory is that it was the Eve nickname itself which was responsible for the 
significant attention which the findings received and their eventual acceptance 
by both scientists and the public. As Kathleen Fuller contends, if Eve ‘had been 
named mtMable, the rush to embrace her probably would not have occurred’.19 
The Eve sobriquet reportedly came from the paper’s authors themselves, being 
‘casually bandied about the laboratory or raised at Wilson’s weekly progress 
meetings’, although both Cann and Wilson would later distance themselves from 
the name.20 Fuller argues that ‘the name “mtEve” fed into the creation stories 
many scientists were raised with; even if they no longer believed the stories, the 
concepts still manifested at an unconscious level’.21 While providing a familiar 
and comforting way of conceptualizing human origins, the Eve nickname led 
to confusion in both public understanding and scientific circles where, as Roger 
Lewin has shown, ‘captivated by the powerful images of an African Eve, many 
people naturally assumed that the Berkeley researchers were talking about 
a literal Ur-mother – the first modern human, with her Adam’, when in fact 
Eve was simply one of many individuals in a population from which modern 
humans evolved.22 For Lewin, Wilson’s description of Eve as ‘one lucky mother’ 
muddied the debate, leading writers to describe her in ways that the evidence 
did not imply.23 Nevertheless, Eve remained a popular point of reference for 
scientists writing about human origins. Richard Dawkins, as the title of his 1995 
popular science book River Out of Eden suggests, embraced the biblical analogy 
wholeheartedly, although he was keen to point out that ‘there is more poetry in 
Mitochondrial Eve than in her mythological namesake’.24
Yet there was another familiar origin story upon which proponents of this 
new tale of human ancestry were able to draw; Alex Haley’s novel Roots, which 
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had been published eleven years earlier in  1976 to immediate acclaim. Part 
autobiography, part fiction (Haley described it as ‘faction’), Roots tells the story 
of Haley’s African ancestor, Kunta Kinte, who lives a peaceful life in the Gambia, 
until he is captured by slave traders and taken to America on a slave ship. The 
narrative follows the lives of Kunta’s descendants, enslaved people who keep the 
story of their African ancestor alive, until it eventually reaches Haley in the 1970s 
present. The book ends with Haley’s account of how he came to write it and his 
trips to West Africa where he meets a griot (an oral historian) who verifies his 
tale. Haley’s novel was extraordinarily popular, selling over 1.5 million copies 
within its first eighteen months and winning the National Book Award in 1976 
and the Pulitzer Prize in 1977. Roots was made into a TV series which, when 
it aired in January  1977, made broadcasting history by becoming the most 
watched television programme ever in the United States,  130  million viewers 
(3 in  5 Americans) seeing all or part of the series, newspapers reporting the 
cancellation of night school courses, a huge drop in restaurant business and the 
emptying of bars on the night of the final episode.25
This chapter explores how Haley’s novel and the search for African ancestors 
that it inspired among black populations provided scientists and science 
popularizers with a pre-existing narrative of African origins upon which to 
draw in their own storytelling about the origins of humankind in Africa. Haley’s 
‘black family bible’26 helped scientists to tell the story of African Eve in a way 
which would be both comprehensible and appealing to the public, lending their 
account – and genetics more broadly – power and plausibility by reinforcing 
what Keith Wailoo calls ‘already existing cultural and political forms of 
imagining self and the past’.27 Roots offered a narrative model for thinking about 
the relationship between African ancestors and present-day humans, a model 
taken up by Eve’s proponents who were concerned to emphasize the implications 
of the hypothesis for individual identities in the present. Roots was an appealing 
intertext because Haley’s tale of the struggle and survival of African Americans, 
and the ancestry tracing that it inspired, helped lend credibility to African Eve 
as an anti-racist hypothesis, the promotion of which had been partly based on 
a desire to distance anthropology from the race theories which had historically 
arisen within the discipline.28
Yet Roots ultimately appealed, I suggest, because it had itself been written 
somewhat anthropologically; Haley had been influenced by his reading of 
earlier African anthropologists, the influence of which partly accounts for the 
conservativism that many critics felt characterized Haley’s portrayal of Africans 
and their American descendants. While the novel tells a story for all African 
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Americans prevented through the legacies of slavery from knowing their 
ancestries, it did so in a traditional form that was palatable to white readers 
and later audiences who watched the television show. Haley’s traditional and 
to a degree non-threatening tale of African ancestry thus provided a relatively 
safe formal example for science writing on human origins in Africa. Roots 
was appealing because this science writing was itself implicitly concerned 
with promoting the idea that we are all from Africa to a white readership. The 
influence of Roots ironically racialized a theory which was intended to be  anti-
racist, and ultimately led to the emergence of the racially inflected conception 
of ancestry which predominates today: the idea that we can know who we are 
through selected ancestors and that we can know them through genetic science. 
This chapter offers an account of the narrative origins of this idea and of the 
significance of a literary text in the emergence of one of the most controversial 
theories of human origins of the twentieth century.
Finding Roots in genes
Roots is referenced directly in several popular science books about, or with 
sections concerning, human evolution and African origins that were published 
in the wake of the Eve hypothesis. Chris Stringer, a palaeoanthropologist who 
embraced the geneticists’ findings, concludes his  1996 book African Exodus: 
The Origins of Modern Humans (co-authored with journalist Robin McKie) by 
quoting what they describe as the ‘emotional climax’ of Haley’s novel, where 
Haley meets his lost ancestors in Africa in a ceremony which Stringer compares 
to humanity’s relationship with its African kin.29 The anthropological geneticist 
John Relethford opens the first chapter of his 2003 book Reflections of Our Past: 
How Human History Is Revealed in Our Genes by relating how as a graduate 
student he became captivated by Roots, both novel and TV series, which 
inspired his own interest in genealogy.30 Geneticist Norman A. Johnson begins 
the section on mitochondrial DNA and African Eve in his book Darwinian 
Detectives: Revealing the Natural History of Genes and Genomes (2007) with 
a description of how ‘Alex Haley traced back his ancestors to Africa’.31 Steve 
Jones, however, viewed Roots in less inspirational terms, writing in his  1993 
book The Language of the Genes that ‘Alex Haley, by comparing his genes with 
those from Africa, would have learned much more about his forefathers than 
he could hope to uncover from the records’.32 For Jones the ‘ancestral voices’ 
which ‘are particularly fluent in telling the story of the past’ are mitochondria, 
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which are ‘an accurate record of history’.33 Jones typifies the attitude that many 
science writers have taken towards the historical record when writing about 
genes and ancestry – that is, as Deborah Lynn Steinberg puts it, to read genes 
as documentary evidence in a way that ‘narrates social history as (a functional 
effect of) evolutionary biology’.34 Discussing Jones’s reference to Haley’s novel, 
Steinberg contends:
Jones’s invocation of Roots as illustrative of the limits of social history and 
potentiality of genetics takes the textual metaphor to a number of disturbing 
conclusions. First is that genes enscribe a precise taxonomy of racial/ethnic 
origins … Second is the positivist notion that genetic profiling not only 
(accurately) traces racial, ethnic and national migrations but that these tracings 
are meaningful, indeed more meaningful, when they are stripped of political 
and economic context.35
A similar dismissal of social and historical contexts is evident in Relethford’s 
book in which (ironically, given that Roots provides him with a means to frame 
the opening questions of his book) he writes that ‘our written and oral histories 
are incomplete and lack much time depth’ and that genes are a much more 
authentic way of understanding the past.36
While Roots may at first appear as simply a passing point of reference – whether 
emotionally embraced or dismissed – in such reflections on human origins, its 
influence goes deeper and can be discerned in the narrative organization and 
tone of this writing. This is perhaps most evident in the fusion of individual 
origins with wider human ancestries, and the narrative emphasis on the present 
as being the key to the past, which both Roots and science writing on human 
origins share. Haley’s novel garnered such power and popularity, among African 
Americans and beyond, because he consciously conflated his own, individual 
search for ancestral roots with a wider tale of a collective ancestral past in Africa. 
The novel begins with an acknowledgements section in which Haley explains 
how the book arose from his ‘intense wish to explore if my maternal family’s 
treasured oral history might possibly be documented back into Africa where all 
black Americans began’ before he goes on to write:
Finally, I acknowledge immense debt to the griots of Africa (griots are 
storytellers) – where today it is rightly said that when a griot dies, it is as if a 
library has burned to the ground. The griots symbolize how all human ancestry 
goes back to some place, and some time, where there was no writing. Then, the 
memories and the mouths of ancient elders was the only way that early histories 
of mankind got passed along … for all of us today to know who we are.37
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From the outset, Haley presents his semi-autobiographical work as at once 
personal family saga, black history and human history, producing a work in the 
tradition of Afro-American autobiography which could be read, as Helen Taylor 
argues, not ‘as personal statement or exploration, but as communal expression 
of the collective experience and unconscious’.38 Haley knowingly wrote, as he 
explains at the end of the novel, a ‘symbolic saga of all African-descent people’,39 
and in so doing tapped into a desire among African Americans to re-connect 
with Africa as a source of both ancestry and pride, a desire that had been 
growing since Malcolm X had articulated the need for a history of the African 
origins of slaves told by their ancestors in his Autobiography, which Haley had 
co-authored. What made the wider, collective identification with Haley’s story so 
easily possible, however, was the temporal structuring of his narrative. Through 
including in his acknowledgements section a partial statement of intent (as 
quoted above), Haley places himself, and the 1970s present, as the starting point 
for a narrative which otherwise begins, a page later, in 1750. The effect of this 
is that it is Haley himself (and by extension ‘all of us’) who becomes the hero of 
his epic tale, as it is Haley who begins and ends an otherwise linear narrative of 
which Kunta Kinte is undoubtedly the star. As Jerome de Groot argues, by the 
end of the novel, ‘the author/researcher is the purpose of the research and the 
novel, the focal point of everything that has gone before’.40 Distinctions between 
past and present are blurred in this narrative frame, where Haley, ‘forever latent 
in the lives of his ancestors, emerges as heir to this past, the ready recipient of 
an uninterrupted lineage of strength and resistance’.41 History functions as an 
extension of identity, a way of understanding both collectively and individually 
who we are in a present.
Relethford’s reference to Roots at the beginning of Reflections of Our Past 
is immediately followed by an explicit link between his individual desire to 
know his family’s ancestry and a much wider, scientific quest for knowledge of 
humanity’s origins, the purpose of which is to draw the reader into his narrative 
as a potential protagonist of the epic tale he is about to narrate:
Occasionally, a show would be aired that drew my primary attention away from 
my work and to the tube … One show that particularly captured my interest 
and attention, to the detriment of my studies for a week, was the mini-series 
Roots … I was captivated by both the miniseries and the book. In addition to 
the sheer drama, I found something very appealing about the idea of finding 
one’s ‘roots’ and extending family history into the past. A number of years later, 
I acted upon this interest and contacted relatives on both my mother’s side and 
my father’s side of the family … Many of you may have similar interests in family 
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genealogy. It is natural to be curious about where you come from … My specific 
interest in family history grew into a broader interest in history and ancestry in 
general … much of my eventual professional research would ultimately revolve 
around ‘roots’ and human history.42
Relethford invites his readers to begin connecting the curiosity they might have 
about their own family history to the history of humankind, which become one 
and the same as he relates the focus of his book as being
on the evolutionary history of a population, or a group of populations … the 
scope of this book ranges from events that happened millions of years ago to 
events that occurred within the past few centuries. In a broad sense, this book 
deals with questions common to all humans – who are we, and where do we 
come from? In other words, what are our ‘roots’?43
Relethford’s direct, inclusive addresses to readers – ‘we’ and ‘our’ – signal his 
intention to tell a story which, much like Haley’s, is in some sense a quest for 
self-knowledge, where ‘we’, ‘our genes’ can ‘reconstruct the past’ in a narrative 
which is otherwise structured ‘in terms of a chronological journey’.44 The 
effect, as Marianne Sommer identifies in her analysis of Relethford’s book, is 
that ‘the reader is led from thinking about his or her grandparents and great 
grandparents to the evolutionary history of populations, their migrations, 
and structural developments. The knowledge generated through population 
genetics is presented as a seamless extension of personal memories and family 
stories into humanity’s deep past’.45 Such a leap between past and present, 
family and humanity, is made possible because the genetic techniques 
which the team who ‘discovered’ African Eve introduced foregrounded 
the importance of individuals living in the present. Unlike traditional 
palaeoanthropological accounts of human evolution which relied on fossil 
evidence – human skeletons which are thousands of years old – to tell the 
story of human origins, the DNA analysis which led to the discovery of Eve 
involved deciphering the past from the present – from the placentas of living 
women.46 These techniques stressed the primacy of present-day individuals 
in understanding human history in ways upon which science writers could 
draw in making the story of human origins in Africa relevant and exciting 
for contemporary readers; as Stephen Oppenheimer puts it in Out of Eden, 
‘we are participants in this genetic story, since  99 per cent of the work of 
reconstruction of our ancient gene trees was carried out using modern DNA 
given voluntarily by people living in different parts of the world today. This is 
a story of relevance to each and every one of us’.47
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Haley’s novel provided a literary model for how Eve’s tale could be expressed 
in narrative terms. Haley not only positioned author and reader as the starting 
point of an epic history, but his prioritization of a single line of descent has 
echoes in the shape and even methodology of the hypothesis itself. As Norman 
Johnson explains:
How did Wilson’s group track back to the most recent common ancestor of 
our mitochondrial DNA, this Eve? They started with the idea that an Eve, a 
most recent common ancestor, existed, and then they worked backwards, both 
logically and chronologically. In this way, the method of Cann, Stoneking, 
and Wilson was not all that different from what traditional genealogical 
researchers do. Although the story of Roots was told chronologically from 
Africa circa  1767 to  1970s America, Haley’s detective work was largely 
backwards. He started with the family he knew, and traced his way back 
generation by generation.48
Haley’s research into his family history had originally been much wider: he 
had travelled to Ireland in search of his white ancestors, an experience he 
wrote up, but as his biographer Robert Norrell asserts, ‘Over time, as his story 
became an exclusively African and black narrative, he deleted the passage 
about Ireland’.49 The story that emerged is one which instead tapped into the 
desire of African Americans to know their African ancestry specifically, Haley 
creating a tale where Kunta’s ‘manhood and his Africanness united the family 
even in his absence’ creating a ‘harmonious reunion between an African past 
and an American present’,50 an emphasis designed to create a singular line of 
‘pure’ African descent of which he and all African Americans could be proud. 
Yet, if conducting a comprehensive genealogy, Haley might have explored his 
ancestry along all lines, including his white European forebears that the novel 
itself makes explicit are part of his family; Kunta’s daughter Kizzy is raped by 
her enslaver and much of the narrative focuses on the outcome of that rape, 
her son Chicken George.51 This is an aspect of black American ancestry which 
Octavia Butler addresses in her  1979 novel Kindred, in which the novel’s 
heroine travels back in time to save her white slave-owning ancestor and, by 
extension, herself. However, Haley’s novel propounded a racialized politics 
of identity which consciously and symbolically prioritized a single (African) 
biological lineage as the root of identity and belonging, when any number of 
his ancestral lineages could have been explored with differing results.
The African Eve hypothesis similarly involved stressing the singularly 
African lineage of the African Americans from whom samples were taken, 
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despite a forthcoming study which suggested there was up to  39 percent 
‘white’ input into the black American mitochondrial gene pool.52 Cann had 
used mitochondrial DNA mainly from African American women to stand 
for African populations (only two of the twenty ‘African’ samples were from 
women from Africa) which raised questions about how, given the history of 
slavery in the United States and mixing between black and white populations, 
these samples from African Americans could be considered indicative of a 
‘black’ or African gene pool. Cann’s defence was that sex had historically taken 
place between white men and black women, leaving the mitochondrial gene 
pool largely unaffected.53 Yet Cann’s controversial use of African American 
women’s MtDNA to stand for African MtDNA did not lead to a discussion of 
the (genetic) legacies of American slavery (something that would later occur 
with the revelation, through Y chromosome analysis, that Thomas Jefferson 
had had children with his enslaved mistress Sally Hemings) or of the difficulties 
inherent in inferring racial or geographic origins from genes. Instead, the need 
to emphasize humanity’s direct African lineage foreclosed this possibility, even 
though the Eve study relied on the contemporary prioritization of a singular 
characteristic (MtDNA) in order to construct a meaningful line of ancestry. As 
Daniel Dennett recognizes in his discussion of Mitochondrial Eve:
Speciation can now be seen to be a phenomenon in nature that has a curious 
property: you can’t tell that it is occurring at the time it occurs! You can only 
tell much later that it has occurred, retrospectively crowning an event when you 
discover that its sequels have a certain property … Mitochondrial Eve can only 
be retrospectively crowned.54
Such privileging of a singular ancestral line as representative of a definitive 
point of origin meant that advocates of Eve were able to emphasize the unity and 
similarity of human beings in the face of arguments from their multi-regionalist 
opponents. Indeed, what some scientists also appear to have borrowed from 
Haley was a way of narrating the story of human origins as a battle against all 
odds to tell that story in the face of adversity and racism. The triumph and 
achievement of the end of Roots, which is not only that Haley has been reunited 
with his Gambian kin but that he has been able to tell his story which ‘can help 
to alleviate the legacies of the fact that preponderantly the histories have been 
written by the winners’,55 are replicated by Chris Stringer and Robin McKie when 
they quote Haley in the final paragraph of African Exodus. From the outset they 
frame their story as a fight to tell the truth of human origins in the face of ‘a 
sustained programme of vilification by scientists who have spent their lives 
Biofictions42
committed to the opposing view’.56 Their book ends on a similar note where in 
the penultimate paragraph they describe how
the scientific impact of the Out of Africa theory has already been enormous. 
Ten years ago, despite the best efforts of researchers like Chris Stringer, Gunter 
Brauer, and Desmond Clark, it would not have been possible to organise a 
scientific congress to discuss our recent African Exodus – there were too few 
supporters and too many influential opponents. But those days have gone. Its 
proponents now dominate the field … Our African Exodus, once a heresy, is 
today’s orthodoxy … Two years after Chris last held the skull of that ancient 
forebear on the eve of its return to Ethiopia, Alex Haley – the black American 
author – told the story of the hunt for his own African ‘Roots’ (as his book was 
called). In his narrative’s emotional climax, he tells how, reunited with his lost 
Gambian kin, the village women pass him their babies in an ancient ‘laying on of 
hands’ ceremony. Symbolically Haley was being told: ‘Through this flesh, which 
is us, we are you and you are us.’57
Positioning themselves as heroically re-writing the history of science in the face 
of opposition to the Eve hypothesis, Stringer and McKie’s triumph mirrors that of 
humans’ African ancestors themselves. The interactive website that accompanies 
Oppenheimer’s Out of Eden takes a similar tone: ‘We are the descendants of a 
few small groups of tropical Africans who united in the face of adversity, not 
only to the point of survival but to the development of a sophisticated social 
interaction and culture expressed through many forms.’58 Just as Haley fights to 
tell his true family story and his ancestor Kunta Kinte survives the physical and 
mental torture of slavery in order for him to do so, so African Eve’s brave survival 
becomes embodied in us, and as a story to be told by a group of courageous 
scientists in the present wanting to uncover the truth about our human origins 
in Africa.
Clearly not all of this science writing concerning Eve makes direct reference 
to Roots, but the situation of contemporary African Americans and Black Britons 
seeking to trace their ancestries back to Africa – a phenomenon that can be traced 
back to the popularity of Roots59 – also appears repeatedly in this writing and 
functions, as more overt narrative echoes of Roots do, as a means of reiterating 
the anti-racist credentials of this new approach to African origins. Stringer and 
McKie were keenly aware of the racial implications of the hypothesis: ‘Already 
the story of our African Exodus has entered the maelstrom of American racial 
issues’60 they write, citing the theory as a defence against attempts to link race 
and intelligence such as the infamous Bell Curve study. They ask readers to ‘just 
consider the political implications’ and note that ‘our theory has made a great 
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impact in black communities, particularly in the US. Pressure from organisations 
such as the Tu-Wa-Moja African study group recently led the Natural History 
Museum in Washington to close parts of its exhibition on human evolution 
because it did not reflect Out of Africa thinking’.61 Such statements position 
genetic and anthropological science as righting the wrongs of the past, as helping 
in the fight against racism, much as Haley sought to do with Roots. Yet more than 
this, genetics is positioned as having a central role in enabling black people to 
tell stories of the kind that Haley set out. Bryan Sykes ends The Seven Daughters 
of Eve, a book about ‘how the history of our species, Homo sapiens, is recorded 
in the genes that trace our ancestry back into the deep past’,62 with an account of 
working with a woman from Bristol with Jamaican parents who wanted to know 
more about her ancestry. His description of her reaction to his findings is one 
in which science enables the revelation of a history previously ignored, as the 
woman is transported through the generations back to Africa; ‘the effect on her 
was overwhelming. She was literally lost for words … It was as if the DNA was 
itself a written document from her ancestors, which in a sense it was; a document 
that had been handed down, one generation at a time, from the woman who 
had endured and survived that terrible voyage from Africa’.63 Mitochondrial Eve 
once again collides with the example of an enslaved African ancestor who in 
turn connects to individuals in the present, in a moment in which the science of 
human origins liberates black people. However while the anti-racist sentiment 
behind connecting humanity’s origins in Africa with the struggles of the living 
descendants of slaves is clear, this entanglement ultimately proves highly 
problematic for thinking about Eve. For rather than prompting a discussion 
about the legacies of slavery and racism, and their relationship to genetic science 
(a discussion which could have begun, for example, with the contested ‘African’ 
MtDNA samples), what African ancestry tracing and its precursor Roots helped 
to support in scientific narratives on human origins is a largely conservative 
mode of conceiving of race, kinship, ancestry and ‘Africanness’ which was 
familiar and acceptable to a white readership who needed to accept Eve as their 
ancestor and the methodology of genetics more broadly.
Anthropological Roots
Above all, Roots served as such a useful intertext in narratives on human origins 
in Africa because Haley represented race and ancestry in a traditional manner, 
drawing heavily upon anthropological and historical sources to produce a 
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narrative which was itself, to a degree, anthropological in style and tone. 
According to Norrell, as part of Haley’s research for Roots, he and his researcher 
George Sims studied anthropological works on West Africa to the degree that 
‘the first draft was a compendium of anthropological information on African 
life’.64 Following the publication of an article entitled ‘The African’ in the New 
York Times Magazine in 1972, Haley received a letter from retired anthropologist 
Ina Corrine Brown praising his work and suggesting sources at which he 
might look.65 Haley’s novel became a ‘patchwork’ of ‘pieces of anthropological 
scholarship incorporated whole, potted textbook histories, appropriated pieces 
of other writers’ novels, folk memory, research, errors and epiphanies’,66 a 
patchwork that would eventually lead to two plagiarism lawsuits, the second of 
which Haley settled out of court with the anthropologist and novelist Harold 
Courlander. Haley conceded that several elements of Courlander’s earlier novel 
The African, published in 1967, had made it into Roots, although Norrell has 
shown that the settlement was not intended by Haley to be an admission of guilt 
and that the judge in the case held racist views and doubted whether a black 
man like Haley could have written Roots, making a successful defence unlikely.67
Whether or not Roots did plagiarize The African, its indebtedness to 
anthropological writing was highlighted in a critical article written by Courlander, 
in which he argues that, setting aside the plagiarism issues, Haley ‘derogated the 
ideal he sought to celebrate’ in his characterization of Kunta Kinte and Africans 
in simplistic and, it is implied, potentially racist terms.68 Courlander writes that 
‘the Mandinka, like the Bamana, Soninke and other peoples of the region, were 
far more sophisticated about Europeans and products of Europe than Haley 
suggests’69 so that, for example, Kunta’s inability to recognize horses in America 
doesn’t ring true when ‘horses had been a part of the scene in Sudanic Africa 
for centuries’.70 Yet simultaneously, Courlander contends, Kunta takes on the 
ethnological perspective that is implied by such characterization: Haley has ‘placed 
in Kunta’s mind the observations and knowledge of generations of scholars’ as 
Kunta observes in detail ‘what Bell, the cook in the Big House, like an academic 
Africanist calls “Africanisms”’71 of the American-born enslaved people he lives 
alongside. Courlander provides the following example from the novel as evidence:
These heathen blacks wouldn’t understand drumtalk any better than the toubob. 
Kunta was forced to concede, though – if only with great reluctance – that 
these pagan blacks might not be totally irredeemable. Ignorant as they were, 
some of the things they did were purely African, and he could tell that they 
were totally unaware of it themselves. For one thing, he had heard all his life the 
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very same sounds of exclamation, accompanied by the very same hand gestures 
and facial expressions. And the way these blacks moved their bodies was also 
identical. No less so was the way these blacks laughed when they were among 
themselves –with their whole bodies, just like the people of Juffure.72
For Courlander, Kunta’s ethnologically detached, snobby, attitude towards 
his fellow slaves discredits the novel in literary terms, but we might also view 
Kunta’s almost scientific gaze not as the result of extensive borrowing from 
anthropological sources, but as part of a strategy (if crude and limited in its 
success) on Haley’s part to write a hero who is the intellectual equal of the whites 
who enslave him. Kunta’s observations of white people in particular seem to 
deliberately reverse colonial anthropological discourses on Africans as Haley 
turns the language of the (racist) white observer onto the whites themselves. For 
Kunta, the white slave raiders ‘had a peculiar stink’, the white deck hands on ship 
had ‘faces pitted with the holes of disease, their peculiar long hair in colours of 
yellow or black or red, some of them even with hair around their mouths and 
under their chins’ and ‘a kind of paleness without features that he knew would 
never leave his mind’.73 The first white woman he sees in America astounds him 
because ‘after seeing the hungry way the toubob on the great canoe had lusted 
after black women, he was amazed to see the toubob had women of their own; 
but looking at this specimen, he could understand why they preferred Africans’.74 
When he later encounters more poor white indentured labourers, Kunta is 
astounded because ‘even the wild animals of his homeland, it seemed to Kunta, 
had more dignity than these creatures’.75 Kunta’s dehumanizing observations of 
the white people he encounters are at one level a response to the inhuman ways 
in which they are behaving; but his observations are also an attempt to reverse 
the pseudoscientific, anthropological narratives through which Africans had so 
frequently been viewed. By making the whites the ‘specimens’ to be viewed in 
this way, Haley goes some way to undermining the dominance and truth status 
of these discourses.
Indeed, Haley’s exposure to scientific, and pseudoscientific, ideas about 
Africa extended beyond anthropological scholarship. Haley had begun work on 
what was to become Roots at the same time as he was writing the Autobiography 
of Malcolm X – an account of Malcolm X’s life and political beliefs published 
in 1964 which was Haley’s first real commercial and critical success.76 Whilst 
Haley is often portrayed as having been keen to distance himself from what were 
considered to be Malcolm X’s radical and controversial views, it seems clear that 
much of what Malcolm X articulated about African Americans’ ignorance of 
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their history and ancestry inspired Haley to uncover this history in Roots. In 
one episode Malcolm X describes his conversion to the Nation of Islam while in 
prison, which was prompted by his brother Reginald, who tells him ‘you don’t 
even know who you are … You don’t even know, the white devil has hidden it 
from you, that you are a race of people of ancient civilisations, and riches in gold 
and kings. You don’t even know your true family name’,77 a sentiment echoed in 
Kunta’s observation of his fellow American-born slaves in Roots; ‘how ignorant 
of themselves they were; they know nothing of their ancestors, as he had been 
taught from boyhood’.78 For Malcolm X, the solution lay in the core teachings 
of Elijah Muhammad, founder of the Nation of Islam, which he describes thus:
‘The true knowledge,’ reconstructed much more briefly that I received it, was that 
history had been ‘whitened’ in the white man’s history books, and that the black 
man had been ‘brainwashed for hundreds of years.’ Original Man was black, in 
the continent called Africa where the human race had emerged on the planet 
Earth … The devil white man cut these black people off from all knowledge of 
their own kind.79
Muhammad preached that blacks were the first race on earth and that the white 
race was genetically engineered by a disaffected black scientist called Yacub, 
who, having been exiled, ‘decided, as revenge, to create upon the earth a devil 
race – a bleached-out, white race of people’.80 This origin story led Malcolm X to 
read Findings in Genetics by Gregor Mendel, from which he concluded that ‘the 
white gene is recessive’, and to develop an interest in the work of archaeologists 
and anthropologists in Africa: he cites British anthropologist Louis Leakey’s 
fossil and bone findings as triumphant proof of humanity’s origins in Africa, 
likely one of the ‘white men’s books’ he was forced to use in educating his fellow 
inmates about the African origins of slaves, who ‘wouldn’t believe it unless they 
could see that a white man had said it’.81
The tension Malcolm X felt in employing the findings and writing of white 
scientists to locate human roots in Africa is also felt by Haley, who not only 
aimed to provide black Americans with knowledge of their African origins (and 
was clearly influenced by X in this regard82) but saw his writing process as a 
counterpoint to white writing. Explaining how he came to write Roots, Haley 
stated:
Most of what I’d read so far had been written by outsiders, predominantly white 
missionaries and anthropologists, and even among the most knowledgeable and 
well intentioned of them, the tone was somewhat paternal and condescending. 
Their insights and observations were inevitably limited by the cultural chasm 
separating them from their subjects.83
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Haley didn’t subscribe to the idea that white people had been created by a 
scientist called Yacub, but he clearly wrote with the knowledge that humanity 
originated in Africa. While he had reservations about ‘white missionaries and 
anthropologists’, in writing Roots Haley describes how he ‘began to devour books 
about Africa, especially about the slave trade’,84 many of which were undoubtedly 
written by them.
The result is that the while Haley attempted to undermine the (pseudo)
scientific anthropological and historical discourses that he recognized as 
problematic in their representation of Africa and Africans, this was embedded, in 
Roots, within a narrative which reproduced, without irony, the traditional modes 
of narration to be found in those texts. As Philip Curtin has shown, historians 
of Africa in the mid-twentieth century who were concerned to overturn the 
racist idea that ‘Africa had no history’ initially approached this task by taking 
‘the argument on the opponent’s “terms”’, that is, by reproducing an elitist style 
of history which drew on the same roots as Eurocentric history.85 Selecting some 
segments of African history and ignoring others, such historiography produced, 
Arnold Temu and Bonaventure Surai contend, a teleological, glorified account 
of the African past.86 This approach is evident in Roots, where there is a tension 
between Haley’s desire to redress the absence of black history, to counter the fact 
that ‘histories have been written by the winners’ and his own approach to (re)
writing that history. Narrative time moves linearly from Kunta’s birth through to 
Haley’s triumph, portraying all the while the greatness and exceptionality of the 
Kinte clan. That theirs is a history worth telling because the family command 
a high level of respect in Juffure and beyond is an unsettling reproduction of 
the kind of history that Haley, at the end of the novel, claims to be writing to 
overcome. Yet Haley’s treatment of gender and class reveals his own narratorial 
alignment with these winning histories. Haley consciously highlights Kunta’s 
sexism and the patriarchal values of Juffure throughout the novel: Kunta 
‘intended to put Binta in her place as a woman’ and ‘he would deal firmly with 
her if she ever made it necessary. After all, she was a woman’. The women are 
painfully stereotyped as coming to village meetings only ‘if a case held the 
promise of some juicy gossip’. Later when married to Bell, Kunta would ‘listen 
with one ear while he thought about something else’.87 While a charitable reading 
might situate these moments as part of Haley’s characterization of Kunta, this 
patriarchal dominance is reinforced by the narrative itself which is focalized 
almost exclusively through Haley’s male ancestors. Approximately half the book 
is given to Kunta’s life and Haley uses free indirect narration to ensure that other 
points of view are rarely experienced. When Kunta’s daughter Kizzy is sold away 
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and the story moves with her, there are only a couple of chapters dedicated to her 
experience before the narrative moves on to the perspective of her son, Chicken 
George, for the greater part of the second half of the book. Ironically, given 
that it is Haley’s grandmother and great aunt through whom he hears about his 
ancestral history, women are problematically side-lined in Haley’s tale in a way 
that undermines the mission of his book.
Something similar can be said for Haley’s treatment of class. Class stereotypes 
abound: where Kunta’s first enslaver is a rich doctor who treats the people he has 
enslaved comparatively well, Kizzy’s master is poor and (concomitantly) rapes 
her and treats his slaves badly. On seeing some white indentured labourers, ‘it 
was easy for Kunta to understand why plantation-owning massas and even their 
slaves scorned and sneered at them as “lazy, shiftless, no-count white trash” … in 
fact, as far as he was concerned, that was a charitable description’.88 Kunta’s view 
is in direct alignment with the plantation owner, a kind of elite conservatism that 
is carried over in his attitude towards rebellion and organized resistance,
as much as he hated slavery, it seemed to Kunta that no good could come of the 
white folks giving guns to blacks. First of all, the whites would always have more 
guns than the blacks. And he thought about how in his own homeland, guns and 
bullets had been given by the toubob to evil chiefs and kings, until blacks were 
fighting blacks.89
Despite all his suffering and bravery, Kunta’s political stance is unthreatening 
and pragmatic; he ‘didn’t believe that a rebellion could ever succeed’ yet criticizes 
his fellow slaves, ‘their own worst enemy was themselves … never did more 
than a handful so much as protest, let alone resist’.90 The kind of resistance that 
Kunta (and by extension Haley) advocates is cultural: it is the maintenance of 
Africanness, of African culture, language and identity, which is upheld as more 
powerful and effective than militant resistance or organized group action – the 
kind of action being taken by the Black Panthers when Haley was writing the 
novel in the late 1960s and early 1970s.91
Haley’s relentless focus on the life of one heroic and exceptional individual 
and the life of his descendants certainly fulfils the role of the griot as Kunta 
understands it – to tell of ‘great deeds of the ancient kings, holy men, hunters 
and warriors who came hundreds of rains before us’.92 Yet it is a telling of history 
in which many remain losers despite its being told from the perspective of an 
enslaved person, a history which depicts African Americans through the frame 
of a family saga which led critics to dub the novel a black Gone With the Wind.93 
Indeed the novel faced criticism, according to Helen Taylor, from black critics 
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who located it within the tradition of plantation novels from Uncle Tom’s Cabin 
onwards, texts known for their ‘patronising, racist or exploitative presentation of 
black history and experience’.94 Haley’s apparent blindness to how his blending of 
historical fact and fiction might in fact challenge traditional forms of historical 
narrative also resulted in criticism of the novel both for its lack of historical 
accuracy and for its unacknowledged borrowing from other sources.95 Several 
contemporaneous responses sought to challenge the historical accuracy of the 
narrative Haley set out, yet rather than argue that ‘he was part of an intertextually 
rich black tradition’; Haley was, according to Taylor, ‘reluctant to see himself as 
part of a black continuum’.96 The result is that Haley has largely remained, since 
Roots, an understudied if not ignored author in literary terms. While the novel 
was an undoubted commercial success, its credibility was undermined to the 
degree that it is often absent in contemporary studies and anthologies of African 
American slave narratives.97
Yet it was the conservatism with which Haley approached slavery and the 
African roots of African Americans which undoubtedly accounted for the 
novel’s popularity among white readers, including, ultimately, the science writers 
who refer to it in their accounts of humanity’s origins in Africa. Haley’s tale of 
suffering and triumph stressed the plight of Kunta and his family, but did so in 
a non-threatening way, through a form with which white readers were familiar. 
This familiarity was amplified when it came to the television adaptation of Roots. 
White critics praised the novel not only because it was being read by whites 
but also 90 per cent of the audience for the television miniseries was white.98 
The relative appeal to America’s white population was something that was taken 
into account during the production of the miniseries. Norrell has shown that 
‘the producer’s first concern in casting Roots for television was how whites 
would receive the show. Wolper said he was “trying to appeal to whites”’.99 This 
was achieved as ‘The ABC executive Brandon Stoddard said the network used 
actors whom white viewers had seen a hundred times before, “so they would feel 
comfortable”’.100 The television script went further than the book by introducing 
more white characters and making ‘some white characters “good”, whereas in 
the book there are almost no admirable white figures’.101 The anti-racist message 
of the novel, designed to foreground the history of African Americans which 
had hitherto been largely ignored, was thus, when adapted for television, 
overtaken by the need to make palatable the role that white people had had in 
the slave trade, for the benefit of the contemporary white American population 
who might, it is assumed, feel uncomfortable in beginning to make their own 
connections as to whom their ancestors might have been.
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Thus, despite the progressive and anti-racist intentions of the authors of 
popular science writing on human origins in Africa, their direct and indirect 
invocations of Roots served to reinforce the often traditional and conservative 
ways in which they represented Africa and Africans. To take one example: 
just as Kunta Kinte and the village of Juffure are represented by Haley as more 
‘primitive’ than they would have been at that time, so narrative and visual 
representations of the Eve hypothesis often rely on stereotypical portraits of 
contemporary Africans in ‘primitive’ terms, as a way of evoking Africans living 
in the era of Eve. The covers of both editions of Stephen Oppenheimer’s Out of 
Eden (or as it is titled in the United States, The Real Eve) typify this conflation. 
Each portrays the head of a young black woman next to a group of Africans 
in traditional dress, walking across a barren-looking landscape. Similar images 
crop up in the television documentary The Real Eve (based on Oppenheimer’s 
book) where images of Africans hunting with spears are interlaid with multiple 
close-up shots of silent African faces that create an anthropological, Western 
gaze.102 While it might be argued that these images are designed to be evocative 
of an ancient time, rather than indicative of contemporary African lives, a 
consistent emphasis on imagining contemporary Africans as rural, simple 
and almost timeless (and thus living much like Mitochondrial Eve would have 
done) is also scattered casually throughout this writing. Spencer Wells, in The 
Journey of Man: A Genetic Odyssey, explains in his endorsement of Eve that 
‘you are more likely to sample extremely divergent genetic lineages within a 
single African village than you are in the whole rest of the world’, before going 
on to explain why the racist notion that Africans are less evolved than other 
populations is wrong:
One of the interesting corollaries of inferring a single common ancestor is that 
each descendant lineage continues to change at the same rate, and therefore 
all of the lineages are the same age. The time that has elapsed between my 
mitochondrial DNA type and Eve’s is exactly the same as that of an African cattle 
herder.103
While declaiming the racial theories of earlier anthropologists such as Carleton 
Coon, Wells’s contemporary Africans do not live in cities and are not modern, 
but herd cattle, as Mitochondrial Eve might have done 200,000 years ago. As 
Priscilla Wald has shown in her analysis of Wells’s film which accompanied the 
book, ‘a familiar developmental hierarchy pervades the language and images’, 
where the San Bushmen are constructed as ‘relics from whom the rest of 
humanity has evolved’ and are frozen ‘in genomic time’.104
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Figure 1 Front cover of Out of Eden: The Peopling of the World by Stephen 
Oppenheimer. London: Constable and Robinson, 2003. Reproduced with the 
permission of Little, Brown Book Group.
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A similar image of timeless Africans emerges in Michael Brown’s 
comprehensive account of the development of the African Eve hypothesis, 
The Search for Eve. Brown discusses at length the implications for race that 
surrounded the hypothesis and the problems which the metaphors used to 
promote it caused, yet he ends his book with a description of a trip to Africa in 
which modern-day Africans are represented as one and the same as their ancient 
ancestors:
There were groups of twenty or so natives in the tiny settlements, just like in 
olden times, and warriors in red capes approached with spears trying to sell us 
ostrich eggs.
I thought: Eve must have used ostrich eggs for something.
And the Masai women, in sackcloth and doing a lot of heavy lifting, carrying 
huge loads of firewood at the same time they tended straggling offspring: how 
tired Eve must have been, how absolutely pooped, that star-laden night so long 
ago!105
While Brown’s book received terrible reviews for its ‘clumsy phrases’,106 for 
being ‘relentlessly tabloid in its language’107 and for its ‘many clichés and 
unappetizing images’,108 here, he does what nearly all the writers discussed 
so far do; directly compares Mitochondrial Eve to Africans and/or African 
Americans living in the past couple of hundred years. In fact, this is what is 
implicit in references to Roots in this science writing. Not only does Haley’s 
representation of Africans somehow legitimize simplistic representations of 
Africans in these narratives, but the very comparison made between Haley’s 
novel and the search for humanity’s roots in Africa encourages the collapsing 
of distinctions between Africans of  200,000 years ago, a couple of hundred 
years ago and the present.
The problematic effect of this convergence is that it ironically recalls the idea 
which typified earlier anthropological and scientific writing about Africa: that 
Africans are not as ‘evolved’ as Europeans or whites, because they are in fact a 
different species. Polygenism – a precursor to the multi-regional hypothesis – 
was propounded by American anthropologist Josiah Clark Nott in his  1855 
publication Types of Mankind, in which he describes Africans of the Cape Colony 
as ‘the lowest and most beastly specimens of mankind … but little removed, 
both in moral and physical characters, from the orang-outan’.109 Ranking 
some African groups above others, Nott proclaimed them all to be ‘without a 
history’ and stated that ‘Negroes in Africa must remain substantially in the same 
benighted state wherein Nature has placed them, and in which they have stood, 
according to Egyptian monuments, for at least 5000 years’.110 Africans’ supposed 
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primitiveness was evidence of their failure to evolve forward in time and while 
Nott’s views were controversial in the mid-nineteenth century, representations 
of Africans as primitive and timeless have continued. That science writers on 
human origins in Africa find it almost impossible not to compare recent black 
history with the evolutionary history of humans thus undermines the more overt 
anti-racist intentions of their writing. Their anti-racist intentions are sincere, as 
Wald notes, but racism is ‘intricately interwoven in the language, images and 
stories – the representational conventions – that have developed with centuries 
of oppression … the narratives that inform the science and its applications can 
perpetuate the very inequities they seek to address’.111
The griot called MtDNA
The African Eve hypothesis represented one of the first instances when new 
genetic techniques of analysis were used to make a definitive pronouncement 
on race. The idea that all humans are descended from Africa refuted older 
bioscientific emphases on racial types and biological racial difference in favour 
of an explicitly anti-racist stance designed to foreground human similarity and 
relatedness. Although the hypothesis called into question the foundations upon 
which much scientific racial thinking had been based, it still asserted genetic 
science to be a practice which could make such declarations on race; put 
differently by Wald, ‘implicit in the very conviction that genetics can refute the 
logic of racism is an assumption about the authority of genetics … to establish 
definitive terms of relatedness’.112 African Eve re-established genetic science as 
an authority on race which, whether it was argued to be biologically real or not, 
was a concept whose meaning and parameters could be ultimately determined 
by science.
Yet African Eve was a scientific fact which, as this chapter has argued, was 
shaped by fiction in such a way that the popularization of what was supposed 
to be an anti-racist hypothesis became racialized. The hypothesis was of 
significance for all humanity, regardless of race, because as Stringer and McKie 
put it, ‘our variable forms mask an essential truth – that under our skins, we 
are all Africans’,113 a sentiment reiterated by Rebecca Cann, who, interviewed 
in 2012, claimed that ‘I tell my students they should all celebrate black history 
month, since they are all Africans genetically’.114 However references to Roots, 
and to the experiences of black people attempting to trace their ancestries back 
to Africa more broadly, meant that the implications of the hypothesis were 
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invariably seen to have most significance for black people. The conflation of 
Eve’s tale with the search for African ancestors by the descendants of enslaved 
people racialized the findings so that the white population could view African 
ancestors from a distance through the familiar narrative frames of Haley’s tale 
(and thus through older anthropological conventions), while the emotional 
import of the findings was reserved for black populations still grappling with 
the recent history of transatlantic enslavement.
What Roots helped to establish in those black populations and in genetic 
science is a way of thinking about relatedness, race and identity as a question 
of biology, genealogical thinking which created a ‘stable epistemology for 
rootedness’ based on blood ties, reproducing and embedding a heteronormative 
understanding of identity and kinship.115 This way of thinking had not always 
been the norm: for example, in Dusk of Dawn: An Essay toward an Autobiography 
of a Race Concept (1940), W.E.B. Du Bois contemplated what might constitute 
a tie to Africa and, while acknowledging it as the place where a large portion of 
his ancestors lived, wrote:
The physical bond is least and the badge of color relatively unimportant save 
as a badge; the real essence of this kinship is its social heritage of slavery; the 
discrimination and insult; and this heritage binds together not simply the 
children of Africa, but extends through yellow Asia and into the South Seas. It is 
this unity that draws me to Africa.116
This is a political and social sense of belonging and cross-racial kinship which 
is absent from Roots, where instead Haley reinforced the ‘rules that govern 
relatedness’117 in his singular vision of familial relationships and a racially black 
line of descent recognized at the time by one reviewer as ‘playing its part in the 
reaffirmation of ethnicity’.118 For, as Louis Kushnuck contends, ‘if the present 
is unsatisfactory and, indeed, dangerous to the political/economic ruling class 
because of the possibility of growing class consciousness, a renewed and largely 
artificial ethnic identity is just what the capitalist ordered’.119 The impact of the 
political conservatism of Roots, published at a time of black radicalism and 
anti-racist activism, was that knowing ‘who you are’ became individualized, 
something to be discovered through ancestry and biology rather than collective 
affiliations in the present. This idea was by no means widespread in biological 
science of the time either: writing about Haley’s Roots in an exchange of letters 
in the journal Bioscience in 1978, biologist Gairdner Moment countered that 
‘whether you are black, white, or any other color, you do not need to know 
anything whatsoever about your biological ancestors to “know who you are”’.120 
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Yet this is the very idea which would become central to the technology which the 
application of genetic techniques to human evolutionary history made possible – 
genetic ancestry tracing.
The following chapter explores the development of genetic ancestry testing in 
the 1990s, the appeal of which, as Alondra Nelson contends, cannot be understood 
without considering the social transformation in the public’s interpretation of the 
past occasioned by Roots.121 Marketed primarily at African American populations, 
genetic ancestry tracing has gained enormous support from those who, like 
Haley, wish to recover family histories erased and disrupted by the Atlantic slave 
trade. Literary scholar Henry Louis Gates has made several TV series including 
African American Lives (2006–2008), Faces of America (2010) and Finding Your 
Roots (2012), which employ genetic technologies to trace the ancestries of (black) 
American celebrities, and he offers genetic ancestry testing through his own 
company AfricanDNA. This contested technology has not only reinforced the 
importance of knowing biological ancestors to individual identity, but made more 
explicit what was latent in science writing on Eve; the idea that the body is a more 
significant source of historical information than material evidence or writing. 
Writing on human origins, geneticist Bryan Sykes contends that ‘within the DNA 
is written not only our histories as individuals but the whole history of the human 
race’ and that ‘our DNA does not fade like an ancient parchment; it does not rust 
in the ground like a sword of a warrior long dead’.122 Writing is used as a metaphor 
but dismissed as a medium, to be replaced by the genes which go ‘way beyond the 
reach of written records or stone inscriptions’.123 As Richard Dawkins puts it, ‘We 
can use DNA archives to reconstruct history’,124 through what Spencer Wells terms 
the ‘historical language of the genes’.125 It is an idea not out of step with Haley’s stress 
on oral storytelling and embodied knowledge over the written word: recounting his 
visit to Gambia at the end of Roots, Haley meets griots who criticize the Western 
‘crutch of print’ as he is reminded that ‘every living person ancestrally goes back to 
some time and some place where no writing existed; and then human memories 
and mouths and ears were the only ways those human beings could store and relay 
information’.126 Haley’s novel and science writing on human origins together present 
a vision of the body as supreme in creating and storing a knowledge which is the 
foundation of identity, a vision which would have a great influence on the racial 
developments in genetics to come. But it was a vision which would be challenged – 
not least in the realm of fiction where, as I will argue in Chapter 2, the significance of 
writing itself is tested against the idea that the search for biological origins, for ‘who 
we are’ and where we come from, is something of great importance for individuals, 
racialized communities and humanity more broadly.
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In 1998 a group of scientists led by retired pathologist Eugene Foster published 
an intervention into what they termed the ‘long-standing historical controversy 
over the question of US President Thomas Jefferson’s paternity of the children of 
Sally Hemings, one of his slaves’.1 They had compared the Y-chromosomal DNA of 
the male descendants of Jefferson’s uncle and the male descendants of Hemings’s 
sons, and concluded Hemings’s youngest son, Eston Hemings Jefferson, was the 
son of Thomas Jefferson. Supporting their finding with historical claims that 
Eston ‘is said to have borne a striking resemblance to Thomas Jefferson’ while 
noting some historians’ belief that Eston was in fact the son of one of Thomas 
Jefferson’s nephews, the scientists claimed that the presence of a rare haplotype 
which had never been observed outside of the Jefferson family meant that the 
‘simplest and most probable explanations for our molecular findings are that 
Thomas Jefferson, rather than one of the Carr brothers, was the father’.2 The 
study unsettled what many historians had previously believed and while its 
findings were dismissed by some, they were taken as a starting point by others 
for a re-evaluation of Jefferson and his attitudes towards slavery. The findings 
contradicted the oral history known to the descendants of Hemings – that it 
was her first son whom Jefferson fathered – thus also unsettling long-standing 
family stories of the kind upon which Alex Haley had relied.3 Making genes act 
as a ‘new kind of historical evidence’,4 the Jefferson study was one of the first 
instances that brought to wider public attention the use of DNA analysis to trace 
ancestral history.
It is no coincidence that questions of race and racial mixing were central to 
what would become one of the catalysts for a public boom in genetic ancestry 
testing at the turn of the new millennium. The techniques that the Jefferson study 
2
Race, Genetic Ancestry Tracing and Facial 
Expression: ‘Focusing on the Faces’ in Kazuo 
Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go
Biofictions58
employed – namely Y-chromosome analysis – had been developed alongside 
and as part of a much larger initiative premised on making distinctions between 
human population groups, the Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP).5 
Proposed in  1991 by the population geneticist Luca Cavalli-Sforza and Allan 
Wilson (the lead scientist behind African Eve) as a response to the larger Human 
Genome Project (HGP), the HGDP set out to ‘study the genetic richness of 
the entire human species’ in order to ‘show both humanity’s diversity and its 
deep and underlying unity’.6 The project’s method was to take blood samples, 
saliva and hair from populations around the world from which DNA could be 
extracted and made available to scientists globally.7 Populations were defined 
as ‘ethnic groups defined by a self-imposed name’ and prioritized according 
to anthropological interest, cultural and linguistic uniqueness, and those in 
danger of ‘losing their identity as genetic, cultural, or linguistic units’.8 The Y 
chromosome was ‘the star of the project’9 providing ‘the male perspective’10 on 
human evolution, the genetic study of which had been dominated by (female) 
MtDNA and African Eve. It was argued that in addition to enabling scientists 
to understand the evolutionary history of humanity, the information gathered 
could help in the fight against disease worldwide, including in the indigenous 
populations to be sampled where, for example, the incidence of recessive diseases 
could be estimated.11
The HGDP was, much like African Eve, presented as an anti-racist 
endeavour: for Cavalli-Sforza the project represented an ‘attack on racism’, 
an example of population genetics demonstrating that the genetic differences 
between populations were much smaller than superficial physical differences 
might imply, and he suggested that thinking about humans in terms of ‘groups’ 
and ‘populations’ based on geography was more productive than using the 
hard-to-define term ‘race’.12 As Jenny Reardon has shown, Cavalli-Sforza 
believed that what genetics undermined was ‘popular’ constructions of race, 
which were based on superficial phenotypic (physical) differences and were 
separate from genotypic differences which were, in contrast, real.13 Thus, 
dismissing the significance of physical appearance, Cavalli-Sforza could join 
with anthropologists, social scientists and government officials in the late 1980s 
to argue that race, as phenotypical difference, was meaningless in science and 
society, replacing it with a genetic definition of difference which reconstructed 
the meaning of race to be molecular, and therefore distanced from ideological 
agendas.14 As such, Cavalli-Sforza argued that the HGDP should be funded 
precisely because it could be used to combat ‘social problems such as racism’ for 
which, he contended ‘there is no scientific basis’.15 Relegating race, as commonly 
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understood, to the realm of fiction, science was asserted as an authority on (the 
non-existence of) race and as separate from the sociocultural sphere from which 
race was deemed to have emerged.16
Such assertions on Cavalli-Sforza’s part were necessary because despite his 
claims to the contrary, the HGDP was accused by many indigenous and ethnic 
groups as constituting a racist, colonial, exploitative attempt to extract and 
make money from the biological material of people whose fates and lives were 
otherwise of no interest to the scientists involved. Dubbed by critics as ‘The 
Vampire Project’, a problematic rhetoric of alarm about vanishing populations 
from which DNA needed to be urgently collected was central to the project’s 
launch.17 The team claimed that ‘isolated human populations contain much more 
informative genetic records than more recent, urban ones. Such isolated human 
populations are being rapidly merged with their neighbors, however, destroying 
irrevocably the information needed to reconstruct our evolutionary history’.18 
Focusing on groups deemed to be ‘uncontaminated’ by European expansion, the 
HGDP appeared to act as a continuation of nineteenth-century anthropology, 
classifying non-Westerners as distinctive tribes stuck in the past.19 As a result, 
the project stalled as debates about its ethics continued into the late 1990s, the 
scientists involved forced to begin addressing in far greater depth issues of 
ownership, consent and consultation with participating populations.20
Yet aside from significant concerns about whether scientists would profit from 
the collection of the biological material, and whether it would be used for racist 
ends, the project also participated in what Troy Duster has called ‘the molecular 
reinscription of race’.21 For while the project emphasized ‘the importance of 
human population genetics for a feeling of panhuman kinship’, including, as part 
of its sampling, Y chromosomal DNA, which was considered not to correlate with 
any racial markers of old,22 it ultimately did constitute a search for population 
differences which could be mapped on to older divisions between races. As 
several critics have pointed out, in his 1994 co-authored book The History and 
Geography of Human Genes, Cavalli-Sforza published maps showing genetic 
differences which in some cases divided populations into geographical ethnic 
regions; Africans, Caucasoids, Mongoloids and Australian Aborigines.23 A map 
presented in 2005 grouped the fifty-two populations included in the HGDP in 
less racialized terms, but still categorized them as Africans, Europeans, Asians, 
Oceanians and Native Americans.24 What Cavalli-Sforza’s search for population 
differences amounted to was the re-labelling of race as geographic ancestry, his 
insistence that science could be separated from society, ignoring the ‘mutual 
constitution of natural, social, and moral orders’25 which, rather than society 
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alone, had produced ideas of race based upon phenotype. Although Cavalli-
Sforza was acutely aware of the history of racial science and vehemently denied 
that his project was in any way associated with it (accusing those who made 
such connections as lacking understanding of human population genetics),26 he 
was unable to comprehend the role that science played, and would continue to 
play, in the formation of the sociocultural understandings of race upon which 
it also drew.
The result is that as the term ‘race’ was being erased from human population 
genetics, scientific discussion of population differences continued to evoke 
races in all but name. This is perhaps no more evident than in genetic ancestry 
testing technologies, the commercial arm of population genetics, which has seen 
geneticists set up businesses which draw upon genetic data from indigenous 
communities to offer their customers individual maps and analyses of ancestral 
origins.27 Analysing MtDNA, Y chromosome and autosomal DNA, companies 
such as  23 and Me, Oxford Ancestors, Roots for Real and African Ancestry 
promise to give their customers information about their ‘family history’,28 ‘a 
clear view of your ancestry, your people and your heritage’29 and to ‘estimate the 
location of your ancestral origins’.30 While all are careful not to use the term race, 
it nevertheless remains a central way in which the services are to be understood 
and sold: Roots for Real, for example, recognizes that African Americans and 
British African Caribbean clients have ‘special requirements’ due to the history 
of slavery, and warns them that ‘to trace your paternal line, you can select the 
Y-DNA test, but beware that 25% of American blacks and Caribbean blacks have 
a European Y chromosome due to historical admixture with plantation owners’.31 
Racial terminology (‘black’) is conflated with the geographical ‘European’ as a 
particular group of people defined by race is directed to think about their test 
results in those terms. Similarly, another company, African Ancestry, asserts 
that it is ‘committed to providing a unique service to the black community’ by 
determining individuals’ ‘specific ethnic groups of origin with an unrivaled level 
of detail, accuracy and confidence’.32 The differences between race, ethnicity, 
clan, tribe, group or population – to name only some of the terminology 
employed in this industry – are unclear and unexplained.33 Instead, consumers 
of this technology are largely left to create their own interpretations of what 
‘a single population or ethnicity’34 means. That it is black people who are, as 
sociologists have shown, most interested and influenced by DNA ancestry tests,35 
and at whom many of the services are marketed, suggests that the technology 
has done little to change public understanding of race. It has rather served to 
underscore what Alondra Nelson terms ‘a classificatory logic of human types 
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that compounds, rather than challenges, social inequality’,36 because, as Anders 
Nordgren and Eric Juengst argue, ‘the identity categories that customers tend 
to seek to confirm, discover, or reject through DNA testing are usually social 
categories’ which ‘genomic testing can powerfully reinforce’.37 As in the Hemings 
case, DNA testing operates to confirm or deny particular ‘racial’ lineages, rather 
than to raise questions about the validity of the concept of race itself.
This chapter examines how the simultaneous denial and re-inscription of 
race in population genetics and genetic ancestry testing are addressed in one of 
the most popular and successful novels of the early twenty-first century, Kazuo 
Ishiguro’s  Never Let Me Go. A tale of the relationship between three human 
clones, Kathy, Tommy and Ruth, who have been brought up and educated in a 
kind of boarding school, Hailsham, the novel charts their lives as they grow from 
children into adults. As teenagers, the clones are sent to live in ‘the Cottages’, a 
complex which functions as a half-way house where they prepare for their future 
roles as both the carers of organ donors and donors themselves; each clone 
will donate three or four organs until they ‘complete’, being cared for between 
donations by other clones who have yet to begin their own donations. It is only 
once Kathy, Tommy and Ruth leave Hailsham that they realize that they have 
been brought up in exceptional circumstances compared to other clones and 
start to hope that there may be a way to escape their fate. Never Let Me Go is not 
a novel that engages with science, race or the relationship between the two in any 
overt way. Ishiguro provides little scientific detail about how human cloning has 
arisen and sets his novel in the recent past when human cloning did not exist in 
order to avoid interpretations of the novel as, in his words, ‘a chilling warning 
about the way we’re going with cloning and biotechnology’.38 Instead the novel 
appears to reprise the themes and concerns of Ishiguro’s previous fiction, only 
in a different guise: the idea of growing up without parents explored in When 
We Were Orphans (2000) and the narrative of an individual looking back over 
a career, who has acquiesced to a system that represses them, depicted in The 
Remains of the Day (1989). Reviewers and critics have, as a result, tended to 
conclude that Never Let Me Go is not about human cloning, instead interpreting 
the novel variously as referring to class,39 the holocaust,40 the relations between 
humans and animals,41 ‘the neoliberal state’,42 ‘vulnerable actors in our modern 
economic order’43 or more generally as a ‘disquieting look at the effects of 
dehumanization on any group that’s subject to it’.44
The novel is clearly not a comment on the dangers of cloning (something 
which was being publicly debated in the years immediately preceding its 
publication45), nor can it be classified as science fiction, yet the critical evasion 
Biofictions62
of its biotechnological premise has obscured the ways in which it does engage 
with another strand of genetics – ancestry testing – and the role of that science 
in shaping contemporary ideas about race and racial identity. I argue that Never 
Let Me Go draws a subtle analogy between the lives of the clones and people 
who are racially marginalized, as a means of exploring the ways in which race 
is erased from population genetics on the basis that it is a social rather than 
biological category, yet continues to be evoked in that science through the use 
of other, euphemistic terminology and forms of classification.46 Identifying 
correspondences between the exploitation of the clones and the marginalization 
of Britain’s non-white immigrants and migrant workers, as well as similarities 
between the clones’ functional education and the education of the colonized, 
I demonstrate that despite appearing post-racial, the world of the novel is 
saturated in racialized forms of discrimination. The clones, apparently raceless 
yet segregated on the basis of their genetic difference, reflect the internalization 
of race that is enacted in Cavalli-Sforza’s denial of race’s phenotypic significance 
in favour of the genotype – an invisible marker of difference. The clones’ 
condition reveals the ironic outcome of the claim that race has no biological 
(only social) meaning, which is that ‘any exploitation of non-white workers 
is expiated symbolically through the scientific admission of their human 
equality’.47 Rather than helping in the fight against racism, the claim that race is 
not biological can serve to shore up colourblind ideologies which remove race 
without removing racism, ideologies which result from the attempt to separate 
biology from culture, the separation of which the novel’s clones are a product.
However the chapter contends that as Never Let Me Go explores the 
paradoxes of the post-racialism which population genetics served to support, it 
also presents an alternative vision of a form of kinship based on a non-genetic, 
non-racial affinity. I identify an emphasis in Kathy’s narrative on describing 
and interpreting facial expressions in place of physical characteristics. Kathy’s 
privileging of looks and faces not only enables her to achieve a level of emotional 
comprehension not possible through her education but it is also particularly 
significant in relation to her search for a ‘possible’.48 Searching for recognition 
in the face of a genetically similar other, Kathy instead finds the recognition she 
has been seeking in the facial expression of the novel’s only racially differentiated 
character, Miss Emily’s Nigerian carer George. Evoking the logic of an older 
biological science, Darwin’s theory of the universality of expression, and thus 
the common descent of different races, I argue that Never Let Me Go explores the 
capacity of facial expressions to disrupt racial thinking and challenges the idea 
promoted by genetic ancestry tracing companies that the question of who you 
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are can be answered genetically, that tracing your (racial) genetic ancestry is a 
way of discovering an authentic, lost identity. Instead, the non-racial recognition 
between Kathy and George suggests a way of moving beyond the genetic 
assumptions that underpin much contemporary, racialized identity politics, 
towards a model of reciprocity that recalls the insights of an earlier Darwinian 
biology. It is ultimately through the novel’s emphasis on facial expression that 
Ishiguro undermines the artificial division of biological fact and sociocultural 
fiction which Cavalli-Sforza upheld. Kathy and George’s mutual recognition 
eschews genetic or racial similarity as it embraces their common experience 
of exclusion in a culture of racism which distinguishes their bodies along 
racial/genetic lines; yet it is a recognition grounded in biological similarity, a 
physiological unity brought to the fore by a socio-scientific fiction of difference. 
The world of the novel is one in which the idea of racial difference is reinforced 
through the combined effort of the scientific and sociocultural spheres, but it is 
also a world in which the entanglement of the biological body with its cultural 
environment provides the means for thinking beyond race.
The racial aura of Never Let Me Go
Writing about the paradox of contemporary genetic science, in which the idea of 
race is at once erased and reinvigorated, Alys Weinbaum suggests the implication 
of this paradox for art that takes biotechnology as its subject is that race is always 
inevitably present in such art.49 Weinbaum applies Walter Benjamin’s idea – that 
the aura of the singular artwork is lost in mechanically reproduced art, but that 
the aura of art is also ‘that which is artificially produced to replace or fill-in 
where a loss of “authority” or “authenticity” is identified’50 – to the use of race 
in biotechnology. She argues for ‘an uncanny correspondence between aura, as 
Benjamin develops it, and the concept of race that circulates in our supposedly 
post-racial times: the present denial of the biological existence of race shapes 
all invocations of race, effectively making biological race auratic each and every 
time it appears’.51 Thus, in art that engages with biotechnology, ‘in a supposedly 
post-racial age even genomic art without overt racial content is paradoxically 
haunted by racial aura … the denial of the existence of the genetic reality of race 
is in fact accompanied by racial aura; or put differently, that in the context of 
post-racialism, race is always already present’.52
Although Never Let Me Go is not quite ‘genomic art’ in that cloning is not 
its central concern, Weinbaum’s analysis is instructive for understanding 
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the peripheral or indeed ‘auratic’ emergence of race in the novel and for 
comprehending the novel’s capacity to perform a ‘critical assessment of our 
supposedly post-racial moment’.53 As a novel without ‘overt racial content’, the 
world of Never Let Me Go appears post-racial. There is no discussion of race or 
ethnic differences in England; the only kind of difference is that between the 
clones and normals, who are not represented as being physically different from 
each other. It is as though race has been effaced in the manner that Paul Gilroy 
imagines might be made possible by the new genetics, its signification moving 
from the visual level of skin colour to an internal ‘cellular’ level.54 However, the 
result is a post-racialism premised on a kind of whiteness where, as Shameem 
Black has suggested, ‘the world of Hailsham is a world of cultural sameness, a 
normative ideal of white, middle class culture’, which suggests ‘the triumph of a 
white, fascistic racial ideal that effectively obliterates the markers of multicultural 
Britain so common in the late 1990s’.55
Yet despite the apparent absence of race, the idea of racial difference 
nevertheless emerges in the predetermined roles that the genetically 
differentiated clones fulfil. As bodies that have been created to serve the needs 
of the ‘normal’ population, the clones’ experience appears little different from 
the contemporary exploitation of the black and minority ethnic workers who are 
often reduced simply to bodies that carry out various forms of undesirable and 
poorly paid labour. In addition to evoking the increasingly racialized trade in 
organs for transplantation, where human organs are illegally bought by people 
in the West from the impoverished in countries such as Turkey, Iraq and Brazil,56 
the lives of the clones echo those of the largely unseen populations of poorly 
paid migrant workers in Britain. Once the students leave Hailsham and live 
independently in ‘the Cottages’, which are ‘the remains of a farm’, they spend ‘a 
lot of the time … being chilly’ and ‘huddled around half-dead fires in the small 
hours’.57 Their only contact with the outside world is Keffers, ‘this grumpy old 
guy who turned up two or three times a week in his muddy van to look the 
place over’,58 who operates much like a gang-master, providing only the bare 
minimum the clones need to survive. Following their donations they are sent 
to ‘recovery centres’59 located in peripheral locations such as Dover, which 
are reminiscent of the detention centres in which asylum seekers are often 
detained for long periods (including the notorious Dover Immigration Removal 
Centre). At Hailsham they are given ‘Culture Briefing’ classes where ‘we had to 
role play various people we’d find out there – waiters in cafes, policemen and 
so on’,60 preparing them, in the manner of contemporary citizenship tests that 
immigrants are required to take, for what is essentially the foreign culture that 
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they are about to enter following their isolation at Hailsham. As with the largely 
unseen, usually unreported populations of poorly paid migrant workers who 
often live and work in dire circumstances, the clones’ existence in Ishiguro’s 
imaginary Britain is shielded from the mainstream society of the normals, who 
‘didn’t want to be reminded how the donation programme really worked’.61
The correspondence between Britain’s non-white immigrant populations and 
the experiences of the clones is most explicitly drawn, however, at the end of the 
novel in its first and only portrayal of racial difference. Kathy and Tommy track 
down their former guardians, Madame and Miss Emily, in the mistaken belief 
that as Hailsham students they might be able to defer their donations for a year 
or so by proving that they are genuinely in love. The only time that the clones 
are given a clear, unambiguous understanding of their situation, this moment 
is the most dramatic of the novel. Yet Kathy’s confrontation with her guardians 
is repeatedly interrupted by the presence of another character, whose existence is 
first indicated by Kathy’s observation as she enters the guardians’ house that ‘it 
was like a servant of some sort had got the place ready for the night-time’, then 
by ‘a gruff male voice,’ which ‘called something from upstairs’.62 The character is 
George, a nurse and carer to the wheelchair-bound Miss Emily, and his presence 
might be unremarkable were it not for the fact that he is described as being 
Nigerian. Although we are only presented with a brief glimpse into George’s life, 
there are clear parallels between his situation and that of Kathy. Like the clones, 
George is a carer and as the only character differentiated by race in the novel, his 
ethnicity seems linked to the social role that he inhabits. As Philomena Essed 
and David Theo Goldberg have argued in an essay on the cultural contexts which 
have made cloning conceivable:
One can also imagine the cloning of non-white, able-bodied, good-natured, 
caring, docile, moderately smart but not too intelligent bodies to do the service 
work that those more privileged seem to demand more and more. Whereas 
biological cloning is still for the most part a fiction waiting to be realized, the 
cultural cloning of preferred types to inhabit segregated spaces is everyday 
practice, especially among social elites.63
George is the culturally cloned equivalent of the genetically cloned Kathy; he 
is not only a carer but a servant forced to respond to the barked orders of his 
mistresses: ‘I’ve told you what to do. Just do as I explained’ and ‘George! George!’.64 
Where Kathy must care for her fellow clones as they slowly die through donating 
before sacrificing her own body, George, circumscribed by his racial difference, 
is destined to serve and care for Miss Emily. Ann Whitehead has noted how 
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the novel portrays a system of care analogous to Britain’s care homes, which 
are often staffed by migrant workers without citizenship.65 George represents 
this underclass of Britain’s migrant workers. His shadowy, voiceless presence 
in Kathy’s narrative – a ‘faint thump’, ‘muffled’, the ‘footsteps’,66 answering the 
door – reflects not only his peripheral status in the world of the normals, but 
also the increasingly peripheral nature of race itself. George’s condition exposes 
the pitfalls of the post-racialism that the biological disavowal of race enables: 
removing the concept of race, as Goldberg argues, does not remove the material 
conditions of race or racism.67 The near absence of racial difference in the novel 
only serves to highlight the presence of racial discrimination as the model for 
the clones’ subjugation and oppression.
The novel’s critique of the erasure of race is extended in its allusion to the 
historical racisms and exclusionary modes of humanism that provide a precedent 
for the contemporary forms of dehumanization that the denial of race enables. 
If the inescapability of the clones’ situation corresponds to the contemporary 
exploitation of migrant workers, the way in which their humanity is queried 
and judged during the course of their education recalls the experiences of the 
colonized. Albert Memmi writes of the schooling of the colonized child that the 
‘memory which is assigned him is certainly not that of his people. The history 
which is taught him is not his own … Everything seems to have taken place out 
of his country’,68 and it is this sense of alienation and externally acquired habits 
of memory that characterize the educational system of the ‘colony’ of Hailsham. 
The clones are taught about the different counties of an England they have never 
seen through romanticized ‘picture calendars’, which consist of images of ‘little 
villages with streams going through them, white monuments on hillsides, old 
churches beside fields’ that Kathy holds on to once she has left Hailsham: ‘it’s 
amazing, even now, after all these miles I’ve covered as a carer, the extent to 
which my idea of the various counties is still set by these pictures Miss Emily put 
up on her easel’.69 Given Kathy’s familiarity with an alternative England in which 
she is more likely to be ‘having coffee in a service station, staring at the motorway 
through the big windows’,70 her preservation of the former image reflects the 
gap between expectation and reality that has often characterized the immigrant 
experience of the mother country, the result of an education designed to serve 
the needs of the colonizer.
The functional role of the students’ education is particularly apparent in the 
emphasis placed on their ability to be creative and to produce art, again recalling 
the experience of colonized or enslaved people. At the beginning of the novel 
Kathy explains the young students’ preoccupation with the arts, ‘paintings, 
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drawings, pottery; all sorts of “sculptures”’,71 upon which they are encouraged 
by their guardians to focus their attention. Their creations are then sold at 
‘Exchanges’ where the work of all the students is displayed and bought by other 
students, with the best pieces being taken away for the mysterious Madame’s 
‘Gallery’.72 In her school days, Kathy reveals that ‘how much you were liked and 
respected, had to do with how good you were at “creating”’.73 The clones come 
to attribute great significance to their art, convincing themselves that it might 
be a qualification for getting their organ donations deferred because, according 
to Miss Emily, ‘things like pictures, poetry, all that kind of stuff, she said they 
revealed what you were like inside. She said they revealed your soul’.74 It is not 
until the end of the novel that the real purpose of the gallery is explained by Miss 
Emily: ‘We took away your art because we thought it would reveal your souls. Or 
to put it more finely, we did it to prove you had souls at all’.75
The guardians’ reduction of the students’ art and creativity to functioning 
as evidence of their humanity echoes the artificial relationship between art and 
humanity that historically characterized Europeans’ judgement of the non-
European subject. Discussing the way that the humanness of black Africans 
was assessed by Europeans during the Enlightenment, Henry Louis Gates, Jr. 
writes:
Since the beginning of the seventeenth century, Europeans had wondered aloud 
whether or not the African ‘Species of Men’, as they most commonly put it, could 
ever create formal literature, could ever master ‘the arts and sciences.’ If they 
could, the argument ran, then the African variety of humanity and the European 
variety were fundamentally related. If not, then it seemed clear that the African 
was destined by nature to be a slave.76
Gates goes on to give the example of George Moses Horton, an African American 
slave poet in the 1820s whose master promised him his freedom in exchange for 
an adequate return on sales of his poetry.77 As Gates explains, ‘Writing, for these 
slaves, was not an activity of mind; rather, it was a commodity which they were 
forced to trade for their humanity’.78 Such limited criteria for what constitutes 
art, and therefore what constitutes the human, is little different to the function 
performed by the clones’ art.79 Far from proving their humanity, the hope the 
students invest in art and education only reveals their subjection to a debased 
liberal ideology premised on a limited idea of what constitutes the human. Yet 
while the clones’ art is unable to liberate them, Never Let Me Go might itself be 
considered ‘art that paves the way for liberation’ in critically apprehending racial 
aura and making its spectral presence visible.80 In recalling the historical ways in 
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which the colonized and enslaved have been excluded from the human and the 
contemporary figurative cloning of a racialized underclass, Ishiguro’s portrayal 
of the clones exposes the ambivalent nature of race in genetics and in British 
society more generally. The seemingly post-racial world of the novel reveals itself 
to be a world saturated in forms of racial differentiation and discrimination, 
displaced onto the genetically differentiated clones whose condition reflects the 
‘paradoxical persistence of geneticized racial thinking in our supposedly post-
racial moment’.81
Identifying with the other: Race versus face
As Never Let Me Go explores the paradoxes of a seemingly post-racial genetics, 
it also presents a vision of how human relations, and what it means to be human, 
might be understood without allusion to racial difference. This is achieved 
through Kathy’s narrative style. For a number of critics, the banality and repetition 
of Kathy’s narration challenges the (falsely) humanist education and artwork 
that the clones are brought up to revere.82 I suggest that the challenge of Kathy’s 
narration does not reside solely in its apparent inhumanity but that her emphasis 
on descriptions of facial expressions (in place of physical characteristics) enables 
her to challenge the conventions of the art and education that have ultimately 
contributed to, rather than ameliorated, her oppression. Significantly, this style 
of narration places an emphasis on a universal human trait – facial expression – 
above physical attributes including racial differences. In so doing it recalls Darwin’s 
emphasis on the unity of man over racial distinctions and difference outlined in 
The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, which, published in 1872, 
sought to show that the origins of human facial expressions could be found in 
the expressions of animals, an argument which formed part of his response to 
the continuing debates on evolution sparked by the Origin of Species (1859). In 
making this argument Darwin was able to conclude that ‘all the chief expressions 
exhibited by man are the same throughout the world’, and that ‘the young and 
the old of widely different races, both with man and animals, express the same 
state of mind by the same movements’.83 Darwin’s theory thus had implications 
not only for man’s relationship to animals, but also for the relationship between 
different human races; the universal facial expressions of man proved that all 
races had evolved from the same species and not, as the polygenists of the time 
argued, that races had evolved from different origins. Although there has since 
been much discussion of whether expressions and emotions are universally 
Focusing on the Faces 69
human,84 Darwin’s thesis remains a powerful indictment of scientific racism 
and demonstrates that, as Sarah Winter contends, ‘prior to modern genetics, the 
biological species unity of humanity can be clearly defined – and the biological 
status of race refuted’.85 It is the logic of Darwin’s thesis upon which Ishiguro 
draws in the alternative form of non-racial and non-genetic kinship that the 
novel proposes.
Kathy’s narration represents her experience in a way that evades the codes, 
conventions and expectations of the traditional education she has been given 
and that has contributed to her oppression. The kind of writing that Kathy has 
been taught to do is at the forefront of her mind as she narrates her life story in 
the present:
Sometimes I’ll be driving on a long, weaving road across marshland, or maybe 
past rows of furrowed fields, the sky big and grey and never changing mile 
after mile, and I find I’m thinking about my essay, the one I was supposed to be 
writing back then, when we were at the Cottages … When I think about my essay 
today, what I do is go over it in some detail: I may think of a completely new 
approach I could have taken, or about different writers and books I could have 
focused on … Just lately, I’ve even toyed with the idea of going back and working 
on it, once I’m not a carer any more and I’ve got the time.86
Although Kathy is thinking about her former writing and reading as she 
composes her narrative, there is little evidence in her writing of the intellectual 
training she received at Hailsham. Despite revealing her familiarity with 
The Odyssey,  1001 Nights and the novels of Thomas Hardy, George Eliot, 
Edna O’Brien, Margaret Drabble and James Joyce, Kathy does not adopt the 
techniques for storytelling or stylistic innovation represented in these wide-
ranging literary texts. Instead, as John Mullan argues, ‘for all her earnest 
reading, Kathy H.’s narrative voice feels deprived of resources’.87 From the first 
line of the novel – ‘My name is Kathy H. I’m thirty-one years old, and I’ve been 
a carer now for over eleven years’88 – to the last – ‘I just waited a bit, then turned 
back to the car, to drive off to wherever it was I was supposed to be’89 – Kathy 
writes in a mundane style that would seem to suggest a limited capacity for 
creativity and critical thinking.
Yet it is creativity that has been functionalized in Kathy’s experience. She 
recounts how the essays the students were told to write were designed to ‘absorb 
us properly for anything up to two years’, and that ‘how well you were settling 
in at the Cottages – how well you were coping – was somehow reflected by 
how many books you’d read’.90 Distracting the students from their impending 
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deaths, their essays and reading are merely an extension of an education that has 
prevented them from reaching a true understanding of their situation. Denied 
the possibility of freedom through art of the kind given to the slave poet George 
Moses Horton, Kathy produces an artwork that challenges the conventions of 
the canonical, European literature she has studied. Specifically, her description 
of faces challenges the emphasis in much Victorian literature (the topic of her 
essay) on physical features as representative of character, the product of the 
contemporaneous science of physiognomy.91
Kathy rarely describes the physical characteristics of the people she presents 
in her narrative and never refers to race or ethnicity. No information is given 
about what Kathy and her closest companions, Ruth and Tommy, look like. 
Only the physical features of the guardians and the veterans at the Cottages are 
described and then only in very basic terms. Kathy describes the same traits, 
height and hair, each time: Madame ‘was a tall, narrow woman with short 
hair’, Miss Emily ‘wasn’t especially tall … she wore her silvery hair tied back’, 
‘Chrissie was a tall girl who was quite beautiful when she stood up to her full 
height’ and Rodney ‘went around with his hair tied back in a ponytail’.92 These 
repetitive, unimaginative physical descriptions highlight the limited importance 
of the physical body in Kathy’s psyche. Awaiting the harvesting of their organs, 
Kathy and the other clones are emotionally detached from their own bodies, 
which are merely functional rather than individual, an attitude reflected in their 
emotionally disconnected approach to sex: ‘sex had got like “being creative” had 
been a few years earlier. It felt like if you hadn’t done it yet, you ought to, and 
quickly’.93 Devoid of meaning, bodies do not provide or add to an understanding 
of character.
Rather than describing physical features, Kathy instead describes facial 
expressions. Her narrative abounds with descriptions of people’s countenances 
and her interpretation of the thoughts and feelings that these looks express. 
Typical of this is Kathy’s recollection of an encounter with Miss Emily: ‘I 
remember when I went to tell Miss Emily my chosen topic was Victorian novels, 
I hadn’t really thought about it much and I could see she knew it. But she just gave 
me one of her searching stares and said nothing more’.94 Kathy ‘sees’ in order to 
understand the thoughts of others. Having been brought up being ‘told and not 
told’95 about the true purpose of her life, she learns to interpret facial expressions, 
which reveal more than what is said. When the students joke among themselves 
about electric fences in Second World War prison camps, Kathy is initially alerted 
to the possibility that Hailsham’s fences could be electrified through Miss Lucy’s 
look: ‘I went on watching Miss Lucy through all this, and I could see, just for a 
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second, a ghostly expression come over her face as she watched the class in front 
of her’.96 Kathy’s inability to articulate her own feelings (for example ‘I wasn’t 
keen on Ruth going with them to Norfolk, though I couldn’t really say why’97), 
which is evident everywhere in her narrative, is the product of an upbringing in 
which words mask, or cannot convey, the full picture of what someone is feeling. 
As a result, in place of dialogue Kathy meditates on facial expressions which, 
for Kathy, are a more reliable and honest marker of emotion. As she humiliates 
and mocks Ruth about her belief in the potential of her possible, the humans 
the clones are copied from, she monitors Ruth’s face for a reaction: ‘I glanced at 
Ruth beside me. There was no anger in her eyes, just a kind of wariness. There 
was even a sort of hope, I thought, that when the poster appeared, it would be 
perfectly innocuous – something that reminded us of Hailsham, something like 
that. I could see all of this in her face, the way it didn’t quite settle on any one 
expression, but hovered tentatively’.98
Although she is somehow conditioned to see what is not said, Kathy also 
privileges this form of non-verbal communication because it brings her closer to 
an understanding of the human soul than any of her art or writing. Ultimately it 
is her ability to interpret facial expressions (rather than words or texts) that gives 
her a reliable and honest understanding of human emotion. Darwin privileges 
the facial over the verbal in this way when he writes: ‘We readily perceive 
sympathy in others by their expression; our sufferings are thus mitigated and 
our pleasures increased; and mutual good feeling is thus strengthened. The 
movements of expression give vividness and energy to our spoken words. They 
reveal the thoughts and intentions of others more truly than do words, which 
may be falsified’.99 As Ruth lies dying after a donation, Kathy observes:
Just for a few seconds, no more, she looked straight at me and she knew exactly 
who I was. It was one of those little islands of lucidity donors sometimes get to in 
the midst of their ghastly battles, and she looked at me, just for that moment, and 
although she didn’t speak, I knew what her look meant. So I said to her: ‘It’s okay, 
I’m going to do it, Ruth. I’m going to become Tommy’s carer as soon as I can.’ I 
said it under my breath, because I didn’t think she’d hear the words anyway, even 
if I shouted them. But my hope was that with our gazes locked as they were for 
those few seconds, she’d read my expression exactly as I’d read hers.100
It is through reading expressions and locking gazes that Kathy attempts to 
form a relationship with another based on a reciprocity of feeling, emotion and 
understanding in which words are insignificant. She draws on this capacity at 
the end of the novel when she encounters Madame and they discuss the moment 
at Hailsham when Madame catches Kathy singing ‘Never Let Me Go’ while 
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cradling a pillow. Attempting to break the barrier between clones and normals, 
Kathy tells Madame, ‘I think I know what you’re thinking about,’ and notes that 
‘Madame’s expression didn’t change as she kept staring into my face’.101 Although 
Madame initially resists Kathy’s attempt to establish a mutual interpretation of 
the moment by mocking Kathy’s attempt to read through seeing, ‘a mind-reader. 
You should be on the stage’, their meeting ends when Madame, overcoming her 
fear of the clones, empathizes and physically connects with Kathy by looking: 
‘She reached out her hand, all the while staring into my face, and placed it on my 
cheek. I could feel a trembling go all through her body, but she kept her hand 
where it was, and I could see again tears appearing in her eyes’.102
Kathy’s looking is tied to, and perhaps also derived from, another kind of 
looking that she performs in her search for a possible. Throughout the novel, 
Kathy’s sense of alienation from the world of the normals is linked to her inability 
to find a reflection, a lack caused by the absence of a genetic parent or ancestor. 
From a young age Kathy senses this difference:
So you’re waiting, even if you don’t quite know it, waiting for the moment when 
you realise that you really are different to them; that there are people out there, 
like Madame, who don’t hate you or wish you any harm, but who nevertheless 
shudder at the very thought of you – of how you were brought into this world 
and why – and who dread the idea of your hand brushing against theirs. The 
first time you glimpse yourself though the eyes of a person like that, it’s a cold 
moment. It’s like walking past a mirror you’ve walked past every day of your life, 
and suddenly it shows you something else, something troubling and strange.103
It is a moment which has been compared to the experience of alienation brought 
about by racism; Martin Puchner describes this scene as ‘a recognition scene, a 
standard feature in novels about racism and other forms of discrimination’.104 
Searching for recognition and familiarity in a world that deems them to be less 
than human, Kathy and the other clones look for their possibles, who they believe 
could be discovered at any moment. Kathy looks in pornographic magazines, 
explaining how ‘I hardly saw the contorted bodies, because I was focusing on the 
faces. Even in the little adverts for videos or whatever tucked away to the side, I 
checked each model’s face before moving on’,105 and it is during this time at the 
Cottages that the students take a trip to Norfolk after a sighting of a possible for 
Ruth. Kathy explains that ‘we all of us, to varying degrees, believed that when 
you saw the person you were copied from, you’d get some insight into who you 
were deep down, and maybe too, you’d see something of what your life held 
in store’.106 Once again, seeing is understanding for Kathy, whose search for 
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reciprocity and recognition in the faces of others is caught up in her search for 
genetic recognition.
However, instead of discovering who she is by finding a possible, the only 
person in whom Kathy can find a likeness is George. It is through a comment 
made by Miss Emily that the reader learns of George’s racial difference and 
Kathy’s reaction to it. In describing her first post-Hailsham encounter with 
Kathy, Miss Emily says: ‘I recognized you, but you may well not have recognized 
me. In fact, Kathy H., once not so long ago, I passed you sitting on that bench 
out there, and you certainly didn’t recognize me then. You glanced at George, 
the big Nigerian man pushing me. Oh yes, you had quite a good look at him, and 
he at you’.107 Instead of recognizing Miss Emily, the guardian for whom she has 
been searching, Kathy recognizes herself in George. Through their silent face-
to-face looking Kathy gains access to a sense of kinship that goes beyond the 
confines of the genetic connection she has hitherto been seeking in a possible. 
The recognition between Kathy and George is based on their mutual exclusion 
on the basis of their genetic and racial alienation, yet it is also a recognition that 
negates the significance of these differences. Privileging facial expression over 
physical appearance enables Kathy to recognize that understanding who she is 
might be achieved in the recognition of shared human experience, in a non-
biological and non-racial affinity.
In this way Never Let Me Go offers an alternative view of kinship that 
challenges the idea that understanding who you are can be achieved through the 
genes, in tracing a (racial) genetic ancestry.108 This has been the claim of genetic 
ancestry tracing companies, a claim popularized in television programmes such 
as the 2003 BBC2 documentary Motherland: A Genetic Journey, in which the 
scientists behind the company Roots for Real were featured. Billed as a ‘quest 
to recover lost identity’, the documentary followed three Black Britons as they 
traced their ancestries, through DNA analysis, to specific parts of Africa, 
exploring their emotions as they confronted their African ‘distant cousins’ in 
order to discover ‘who they are and where they came from’.109 One participant, 
Mark Anderson, described how ‘the question of who my ancestors were and 
what my past was like was one that always needed answering for me. I was never 
comfortable describing myself as a Black Briton. I always felt that something was 
missing from my story’.110 Not only have serious questions been raised about the 
accuracy of genetic ancestry tests which, while claiming to offer individualized 
results, present results which would likely apply to large populations (and in 
the absence of historical information could be explained by any number of 
scenarios),111 but the focus on Y chromosome and MtDNA analysis as ways 
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of understanding ancestry is also misleading because these only represent two 
‘corridors of ancestry’, excluding many others.112 It is on this basis that Richard 
Dawkins criticized the Motherland documentary, of which he writes:
They used Y-chromosomal and mitochondrial DNA because, for the reasons 
we have seen, they are more traceable than genes in general. But unfortunately, 
the producers never really came clean about the limitations this imposed. In 
particular, no doubt for sound televisual reasons, they came close to actively 
deceiving these individuals, and also their long-lost African ‘relatives’, into 
becoming far more emotional about the reunions than they had any right to be.113
For Dawkins, the Motherland documentary was ‘sentimental rubbish’ because 
‘different genes tell different stories’ and ‘at any given time in the past we have a 
huge number of genealogical ancestors’ meaning ‘a single chunk of DNA, such 
as from a mitochondrion or Y chromosome, gives as impoverished a view of the 
past as a single sentence from a history book’.114
However beyond his methodological objections, Dawkins does not challenge 
the idea that, as he puts it, ‘ancestors hold the key to understanding life itself ’,115 
a claim which is central to the appeal of genetic ancestry testing. The tests make 
ancestry key to identity, to which race is also key; as biologist Fatimah Jackson 
contends, ancestry testing companies have exploited a vulnerable market in 
African Americans where ‘identity is disproportionately linked to phenotype, 
and in ethnic minority groups is associated with levels of self-confidence, 
performance, and overall positive life outcomes’.116 Put differently by Stuart 
Murray, ‘Because genomic vocabularies have so pervaded the public sphere, it is 
impossible not to understand the self as a problem in these terms.’117 The silent 
bond between Kathy and George resists the naturalization of genetic explanations 
of kinship, the prevailing conception that DNA is the key to the self. Instead, 
they embrace the kind of ethics of care that Murray argues is needed in an era 
in which genetic technologies have recast family relationships in genetic terms. 
They eschew ‘a self that uncritically does the bidding of those ideologies we call 
family, nation, or race … however “naturalized” or “biologized” these terms may 
become’ in favour of an ethical care which ‘will mobilize these as the tropes 
that they are, and seek new relations, new modes, and new terms by which we 
might once again ask the question of the good life’.118 The seemingly natural 
connection between race and identity is broken in the non-racial recognition 
between Kathy and George, creating a post-racial vision that, rather than being 
based on a denial of racial inequality, gestures towards the kind of affinities that 
Donna Haraway imagines might emerge from a unity between social relations, 
science and technology: ‘a self-consciously constructed space that cannot affirm 
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the capacity to act on the basis of natural identification, but only on the basis of 
conscious coalition, of affinity, or political kinship’.119 While Black argues that 
‘the students’ loss of cultural specificity signals one tactic by which they lose 
their purchase on human identity’,120 it is rather the belief that such cultural or 
ethnic forms of identification are self-evidently human that Ishiguro’s portrayal 
of Kathy and George confronts. Who you are, the novel suggests, is determined 
not in the promise of a recovered genetic ancestry (in this case by the discovery 
or identification of a ‘possible’), but by your interactions and affiliations in the 
present and the shared experiences on which such affiliations are built.
Reading faces, reading literature
Kathy’s emphasis on a universal, biological means of expressing emotion has, 
however, implications beyond repudiating the primacy of racial and genetic 
forms of identification. Her emphasis on facial expression overrides the 
articulation of emotion in words, apparently calling into question the efficacy of 
the novel’s own communicative means. This tension is explored at various points 
in the novel where the value of words, writing or literature is undermined. One 
such moment is when Kathy is at Hailsham and catches Miss Lucy
leaning over in concentration, forehead very low, arms up on the surface, 
scrawling furious lines over a page with a pencil. Underneath the heavy black 
lines I could see neat blue handwriting. As I watched, she went on scrubbing the 
pencil point over the paper, almost in the way we did shading in Art, except her 
movements were much more angry, as if she didn’t mind gouging right through 
the sheet.121
Miss Lucy scrawls over the students’ work in anger at the false ideals they have 
developed through their education; their writing is a sham that reduces, rather 
than proves, their humanity. Kathy, who assesses the situation in her usual way – 
‘I could see her face was flushed, but there were no traces of tears’ – narrates how 
she was confused and upset by what she had seen but adds, ‘if you’d asked me to 
define just what I was so upset about, I wouldn’t have been able to explain’.122 It 
is precisely because their writing leaves the students unable to express their true 
feelings in words that Miss Lucy reacts against it; Kathy at some level understands 
this, which is why she responds emotionally to Miss Lucy’s ‘flushed’ face.
Another such incident occurs when Kathy describes the experience of reading 
Daniel Deronda at the Cottages, around the time that she and the other students 
are struggling to make sense of their origins and look for their possibles. She 
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makes no explicit connection between this discussion of possibles, of genetic 
ancestors or parents, and her reading of Daniel Deronda, the tale of a young man 
adopted at birth who becomes involved with a Jewish family only to discover that 
he is Jewish himself, giving a sense of purpose to his hitherto directionless life. 
Instead, she simply remarks that she had ‘not been enjoying it very much’.123 For 
Kathy, reading Daniel Deronda is part of the competitive reading the students 
are forced to do in order to prove how well they are coping; its meaning, the way 
that it might relate to the human condition (in this case Kathy’s) or how Kathy 
as a reader might empathize with its characters is erased, despite the fact that the 
resonances are clear: when Eliot describes how Deronda’s ‘own face in the glass 
had during many years been associated for him with thoughts of someone whom 
he must be like – one about whose character and lot he continually wondered, 
and never dared to ask’,124 we are immediately reminded of how Kathy’s looking 
in a mirror provokes similar questions about who she is.
These moments draw attention to the assumptions embedded in the act of 
reading and the expectation that literature and writing will signify something 
to the person reading it. That Kathy’s reading of faces is more significant than 
her reading of books is not an indication that the significance of literature is 
diminished; it is, rather, part of an alternative mode of interpretation that might 
act as a model for our own reading. Derek Attridge is instructive here: he writes 
of a ‘parallel between creativity and responsiveness’ in literature and argues that 
‘creatively responding to the other … involves the shifting of ingrained modes of 
understanding in order to take account of that which was systematically excluded 
by them’.125 Kathy’s responsiveness to others, particularly George, is enabled 
by her creative method of describing facial expressions in place of physical 
characteristics, involving a ‘shifting of ingrained modes of understanding’. 
In this, Ishiguro provides an example of how we, as readers, might creatively 
respond to and interpret the novel. It is in looking and seeing beyond ingrained 
assumptions about how literature should work, seeing beyond what appears as 
a banal and unremarkable narrative mode, that the reader, like Kathy, is able 
to read differently and see how Kathy reads differently in interpreting what is 
written on the face. Attridge argues that literature is effective even if it ‘solves no 
problems and saves no souls’,126 a moot point in the case of Kathy and her fellow 
clones; although literature itself cannot save them or prove they have souls, it 
remains effective as a means through which Kathy can challenge and subvert the 
very idea that it can save them.
Yet the novel also moves beyond the more abstract responsiveness espoused 
by Attridge towards a biologically grounded conception of recognition and 
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human similarity that reveals literature’s ability to apprehend the human 
experience of facial expression. In the concluding sections of The Expression of 
the Emotions in Man and Animals, Darwin reflects on the difficulty of describing 
specific expressions, which, in the context of the novel, reminds us of Kathy’s 
limited mode of description:
M. Lemoine argues that, if man possessed an innate knowledge of expression, 
authors and artists would not have found it so difficult, as is notoriously the case, 
to describe and depict the characteristic signs of each particular state of mind. 
But this does not seem to me a valid argument. We may actually behold the 
expression changing in an unmistakable manner in a man or animal, and yet be 
quite unable, as I know from experience, to analyse the nature of the change … It 
has often struck me as a curious fact that so many shades of expression are 
instantly recognized without any conscious process of analysis on our part. No 
one, I believe, can clearly describe a sullen or sly expression; yet many observers 
are unanimous that these expressions can be recognized in the various races of 
man … If, then, great ignorance of details does not prevent our recognizing with 
certainty and promptitude various expressions, I do not see how this ignorance 
can be advanced as an argument that our knowledge, though vague and general, 
is not innate.127
The lack of specificity in Kathy’s descriptions of faces reflects her lack of ‘any 
conscious process of analysis’; hers is an innate, human reaction that would 
seem to prove Darwin’s point that a ‘great ignorance of details’ (which arguably 
defines Kathy’s experience) does not prevent the recognition of expression. 
Kathy’s sparse language thus highlights her human ability to respond, feel and 
recognize, so that as readers we feel more than empathy towards Kathy, as she 
feels more than empathy towards George: we recognize ourselves in the life of 
a clone. Rather than providing a warning about the dystopic potential of new 
genetic technologies, or simply critiquing formations of race in genetic science, 
Never Let Me Go acknowledges our human biological commonality and develops 
a biofictional narrative form which harnesses the power of facial expressions to 
suggest a way of moving beyond both the dismissal of biology and its separation 
from cultural context in debates about the meaning of race. As it speaks to such 
contemporary debates about race and science while drawing on the logic of an 
older, Darwinian science of facial expression, the novel recalls an insight from 
Eliot’s Daniel Deronda, which, in this case, does signify that ‘often the grand 
meanings of faces as well as of written words may lie chiefly in the impressions 
of those who look on them’.128
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In June  2000 US President Bill Clinton joined with British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair (via satellite), Francis Collins, Director of the National Human 
Genome Research Institute, and Craig Venter, Chief Officer of Celera Genomics 
Corporation, at a White House press conference to announce that the first-
ever draft of the human genome had been completed. The Human Genome 
Project (HGP), begun fifteen years earlier, had identified all  25,000 genes in 
the human genome and sequenced the  3 billion base pairs in human DNA. 
The culmination of international scientific collaboration, as well as public and 
commercial scientific work (represented by Collins and Venter respectively), the 
project came to symbolize half a century of rapid developments in the biological 
sciences and placed the new scientific discipline of genomics at the forefront of 
twenty-first-century scientific endeavour. In pronouncing on the significance of 
the completed first draft, and the scientific knowledge and subsequent medical 
benefits that would be made possible by this major achievement, the scientific 
and political figures at the White House meeting described the genome 
variously as a book, language or writing, which scientists would now be able to 
read. Collins explained that the genome was ‘the human book of life’, arguing 
that we must now ‘learn how to speak the language of the genome fluently’,1 
Clinton claimed it was ‘the language in which God created life’,2 while Venter 
declared that ‘for the first time our species can read the chemical letters of its 
genetic code’.3 The book metaphor had first developed from genetic scientists’ 
use of the initial letters A, C, G and T to stand (metonymically) for the names of 
the four base molecules (adenine, cytosine, guanine and thymine) that make up 
DNA.4 From this, a whole set of equivalences developed in genetic discourses; a 
gene was a sentence, a chromosome a chapter, DNA a language and the genome 
the book.5 By the time it was used by Clinton, Venter and Collins to announce 
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the completion of the draft, the book metaphor was more than what Brigitte 
Nerlich, Robert Dingwall and David D. Clarke describe as ‘a conventional means 
of articulating a shared understanding of the biological phenomena being 
discussed’;6 it provided a way for the speakers to convey a sense of profundity 
about the project in language which would be readily understood by the public.
However, describing the genome as a book also had wider implications for 
books more traditionally conceived, an issue of which both scientists involved in 
the announcement seemed peripherally aware. Collins stated: ‘We are here today 
to celebrate a milestone along a truly unprecedented voyage, this one into ourselves. 
Alexander Pope wrote, “Know then thyself. Presume not God to scan. The proper 
study of mankind is man.” What more powerful form of study of mankind could 
there be than to read our own instruction book?’7 In quoting from a literary source, 
Collins appears unaware of the irony of his analogy; while using Pope’s words to 
explain the importance of sequencing the genome, of studying man, he then 
asserts the genome to be the ultimate book, there being no ‘more powerful’ way to 
understand human life than reading it. Reading other books which may grapple with 
the study of mankind, such as Pope’s, appears less significant. The question of the 
place of the literary in a world where the genome is proclaimed to be the definitive 
book of life is taken up more directly by Venter, who ended his speech thus:
Some have said to me that sequencing the human genome will diminish 
humanity by taking the mystery out of life. Poets have argued that genome 
sequencing is an example of sterilizing reductionism that will rob them of their 
inspiration. Nothing could be further from the truth. The complexities and 
wonder of how the inanimate chemicals that are our genetic code give rise to the 
imponderables of the human spirit should keep poets and philosophers inspired 
for the millenniums.8
Venter imagines a productive future for literature inspired, rather than 
threatened, by the genome, yet the meaning and mysteries of life remain 
grounded in the ‘genetic code’, which in his brief account of the direct linkage 
between ‘inanimate chemicals’ and ‘the imponderables of the human spirit’ 
leans towards the reductionism he describes poets as fearing. Science has often 
provided poets with inspiration but, in Venter’s account, literature is framed as 
merely responsive to science, capable of expressing a form of humanity which 
has already been delineated by science.
These comments by Collins and Venter, the ‘book of life’ metaphor, demonstrate 
how the sequencing of the genome presented an implicit challenge to the literary. 
If the genome was a book, then scientists were the new literary critics, interpreting 
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the meaning of an array of different genes by ‘reading’ them, making ‘the body a 
text for interpretation’.9 As Patricia Waugh contends, ‘the idea that the human self 
is written was hardly news to anyone who had spent the past twenty-five years 
in the literary academy’,10 yet the kinds of readings of the genes being conducted 
by scientists were somewhat different to the mode of reading and interpretation 
which characterized contemporaneous literary criticism. Deborah Lynn Steinberg 
has argued that while the language metaphor ‘would seem to democratize, to open 
up the expert conceptual terrains of science and to invite a familiar, interpretive 
mode of address to the non-scientific reader’, what it actually signified was a fixed 
mode of reading where ‘the genetic scientist as “reader”; decodes, but significantly 
does not produce; is a discoverer rather than mediator of meanings construed as 
already embedded’.11 Rather than understanding genes as being open to multiple 
kinds of interpretation and analysis, the meaning of which is dependent on their 
context (in the way that a literary critic might understand language), in genomics at 
the turn of the new millennium ‘the phenomenon of language itself is essentialised 
in structuralist, positivistic terms. The denotive properties of genes as words – 
their “claims” as it were – emerge as naturalized, as equivalent certainties’.12 Such 
an understanding of language (and thus of genes) was rooted in the origins of the 
book/writing metaphor which Lily E. Kay identifies as ‘historically specific and 
culturally contingent’.13 The metaphor reflected the culturally dominant modes 
of thought of the early twentieth century, and became embedded in the very 
structure of science itself: Judith Roof, for example, has shown how the emphasis 
on the double helix structure of DNA was in part the product of structuralism and 
theories about the binary nature of language prevalent at that time.14 Therefore at 
the completion of the draft of the HGP, the scientific reading and interpretation 
of genes led their meanings to become relatively fixed and singular despite the 
complexity that the sequencing uncovered, enabling geneticists to present their 
claims about the genome in definitive and certain terms.
Indeed one of the only things that those gathered at the White House were 
able to be immediately definitive about – as discoverers rather than mediators 
of genetic meaning – was one of the project’s most significant findings about 
humanity; that race has no biological meaning. Clinton’s speech is famous for his 
assertion that ‘one of the great truths to emerge from this triumphant expedition 
inside the human genome is that in genetic terms, all human beings, regardless 
of race, are more than 99.9 percent the same’.15 This point was reiterated later 
in the proceedings by Venter who, describing the different ethnicities of the 
people whose genomes he had sequenced, claimed that they could not be 
distinguished from one another genomically and that the results showed ‘the 
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concept of race has no genetic or scientific basis’.16 Francis Collins received a 
long round of applause following his statement ‘I am happy that today the only 
race we are talking about is the human race’.17 Geneticists only had one reading 
of the human body when it came to race, its genetic non-existence put forward 
as a hard fact that it was no longer possible to dispute. Yet reading genes, as 
Steinberg contends, is not the neutral and definitive act it may be presented as; 
‘the power to “read” genes is, in part, embedded in the power to manipulate 
them … editorial decisions about which genes are meaningful; which genes can 
or should be deleted, are predicated on the inequalities and dependencies that 
shore up the boundaries of professional expertise, authority and authorship’.18 
Put differently, scientists’ readings of genes at the turn of the second millennium 
were perhaps not only more contingent and provisional than they appeared, but 
rather than simply reading genes geneticists were also in part authors of the 
genome. As Waugh notes, ‘as science grows more theoretical’ (and in the case 
of the genome its objects of study less visible) ‘so it becomes more dependent 
on narrative presentation and the use of rhetorical tropes such as metaphors’.19 
The book of life metaphor itself evinced geneticists’ reliance on language and 
narrative in ways which suggest that their subsequent readings of the gene 
were anything but straightforwardly factual or definitive. Writing and reading 
occurred simultaneously, and just as the powerful and shaping language 
metaphor was the product of the wider cultural discourse of the moment, in 
the case of race, scientists’ readings of the gene should themselves be read and 
understood in the context of wider socio-political discourses about race which 
ultimately became part of the narrative of race which emerged from the HGP.
For it is clear that the announcement that race had no biological meaning 
occurred at a time when in the wider political sphere race was being minimized 
as a meaningful subject of public concern. As discussed in the Introduction to 
this book, the anti-racist movements of the 1980s and 1990s, which drew their 
impetus from struggles against racism such as the anti-apartheid movement, 
had begun to give way to the disappearance of race from political and social 
dialogues.20 In the United States, political conservatives were advocating the 
removal of the concept of race from law and politics, and advocating colourblind 
policies, often employing genetic reasoning as evidence that race was no longer 
valid, as a means of attacking affirmative action programmes.21 In the UK, anti-
racist legislation came into force in  2000 in the wake of the racist murder of 
Stephen Lawrence and the finding of the MacPherson enquiry that the police 
were institutionally racist. The Race Relations Amendment Act placed a duty on 
public bodies to eliminate discrimination and promote equality, but the effect 
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of this move was in fact a quieting of discussions of race and racism, as David 
Theo Goldberg contends, ‘formal public admissions also slide into absolutions, 
dissolving the energy of the insurgent into the modest, quieting force of the 
law, reducing resistant antiracist anger each time to the formalisms of antiracial 
insistence. “We will not tolerate racism” invariably and quite quickly becomes 
“We cannot speak the language of race”’.22 This was certainly the turn taken by the 
leaders of the HGDP, who, as discussed in the previous chapter, saw the solution 
to accusations of racism as being to deny the biological reality of race itself.
It was in this context that those gathered at the White House stressed 
that they would ensure that the mapping of the genome would not result in 
discrimination of any kind, a public affirmation of the anti-racist credentials 
of the project. But it was their assertions about the genetic non-existence of 
race which were put forward as the project’s ultimate contribution to anti-
racism; what they announced was the end of race itself, a biofictional ‘reading’ 
and narrative of race which both fed into and drew upon the political and 
social discourses of the moment as well as preceding scientific statements 
of race. There is little doubt that the anti-racist intentions of the scientists 
involved in the HGP were genuine, and their findings found favour with the 
views of many in the humanities that race as concept was nothing more than a 
social fiction made biological by bad science. The year 2000 was also the year 
in which Gilroy published his influential text Against Race, in which he argued 
that developments in genetics had caused a crisis in racial thinking which 
presented the opportunity to move beyond race. However, as Waugh asserts, 
‘a science that threatens to impinge on human life not merely in the form of 
technology but also in the shaping of values and public policy, needs to be as 
vigilant as possible about the status of its evidence and the effects of narrative 
transmission’.23 For the effect of the transmission of the anti-racist reading of 
the gene was a narrative which could be used to support a wider erasure of 
race and de-prioritization of the need to tackle racism. While ‘commitments 
to do away with race … have long been associated with social movements to 
end racism’, as Goldberg contends, ‘the end of racism is confused with no more 
than being against race, the end of race substituting to varying degrees for 
the commitment to – the struggles for –ending racism. The refusal of racism 
reduces to racial refusal; and racial refusal is thought to exhaust antiracism’.24 
Ending genetic race was – as in the case of the HGDP – posited as enough to 
end racism (rather than anti-racist action), but this position risks silencing 
populations historically discriminated against because the basis of that 
discrimination is no longer thought to apply.
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Zadie Smith’s debut novel White Teeth, published in the same year that the 
draft of the HGP was announced, examines the consequences of the removal of 
race – and thus the possibility of racism – from genetic science. The novel tells 
the story of the Iqbals and the Joneses, two working-class, multi-racial north 
London families, in which the fathers, Samad Iqbal and Archie Jones, met as 
soldiers during the Second World War. Their children, Irie Jones and twins Magid 
and Millat Iqbal, grow up together, before meeting the Chalfens, a middle-class 
family to whom they are sent by their school to be mentored. Marcus Chalfen is 
a geneticist whose experiments have led him to engineer the genome of a mouse 
(his FutureMouse© bears a close resemblance to Oncomouse®, a genetically 
modified mouse predisposed to contracting cancer, created in the  1980s by 
a group of Harvard scientists). Both Irie and Magid become interested in his 
science and the Chalfens’ ‘scientific’ approach to life more generally. Marcus is 
insistent that his science has nothing to do with racial classification or racism, but 
as the novel progresses it is revealed that the creation of FutureMouse© has been 
possible only through the work of his predecessor and mentor Dr Perret, who is 
revealed to be the Nazi racial scientist that Archie and Samad had encountered 
during the Second World War. This is one of several moments in the novel at 
which Smith suggests that the removal of race from science leads to both cultural 
and scientific amnesia about historical racisms and to the reproduction of past 
structures of racial thinking in the present. Arguing against critical assessments 
of the novel which read Smith’s engagement with genetics as linked to a post-
racial message about the blending, mixing and hybridity which are seen to make 
race increasingly redundant in postcolonial London,25 this chapter contends 
that it is Smith’s portrayal of genetic science which destabilizes the notion that 
contemporary London is post-racial. For the novel uncovers how the science 
upon which such conclusions often rely is the product of not only historical 
and contemporary political currents but of narrativization – it is a story which 
cannot be reduced to a singular or definitive meaning.
White Teeth explores how genomic science, far from being neutrally objective 
in its ‘readings’ of the body and of genes, creates and transmits stories which, 
like those of fiction, are complex, messy, multiple and contradictory. Smith sets 
up an extended comparison between the methods of the scientist and the writer 
of fiction as a means of testing this hypothesis, drawing on Lionel Trilling’s 
claim that ‘plot is to the novelist what experiment is to the scientist’26 to offer 
a metafictional consideration of the similarities between the science the novel 
addresses and the narrative form of the novel itself. White Teeth is written in a 
Forsterian comic mode characterized by coincidence, irrationality, humour and 
One Part Truth and Three Parts Fiction 85
melodrama, designed, in the vein of Forster’s novels, to convey the ‘messy human 
concoction’27 of life and the muddle of human nature. That this understanding 
of life can only be fully realized through the ‘artificial’ imposition of these forms 
by the novelist to test human nature is what makes her practice, Smith imagines, 
comparable to the experiment of a scientist. However her comparison also 
opens up space for a consideration of how, conversely, science is like writing, 
and how the messiness of the human in fiction might be closer to that of science 
than those who announced the mapping of the genome imagined it to be. This 
chapter examines how in highlighting the narrative qualities of genomics, rather 
than simply being passively inspired by that science, White Teeth becomes one 
of the ‘stories that expose the stories that are told to us, by the scientists “for our 
own good”’.28 Rather than upholding the anti-racist story told by the Human 
Genome Project ‘for our own good’, the novel’s examination of the stories told 
by science leads us to the questions posed by Steinberg; ‘can there be a genetics 
divorced from its own history? … how is an anti-racist genetics possible?’.29 
The beginnings of an answer, the novel suggests, lie in interrogating the nature 
of scientific narrative and its transmission. For it is in science as narrative 
that race is variously latent, fictionalized and varied in meaning, an emblem 
of the instability of scientific ‘reading’ and an indicator of shifting (scientific) 
interpretations of the genes themselves.
Genetics, race and the comic novel
In 1943, long before his intervention in the two cultures controversy between 
C.P. Snow and F.R. Leavis, Lionel Trilling published an essay on E.M. Forster’s 
first novel Where Angels Fear to Tread in which he offered a comparison of 
the methods of the scientist and the writer of fiction. In defence of Forster’s 
melodramatic plots, from which, Trilling suggests, ‘contemporary taste draws 
back, insisting that life is not like that’, he writes:
Plot is to the novelist what experiment is to the scientist, which is exactly what 
Zola did not know when he wrote his essay ‘The Experimental Novel’; Zola’s 
defense of scientific naturalism in fiction has nothing at all to do with experiment. 
The science he had in mind as analogous to novel writing was medicine as 
practised by the great physician Claude Bernard; that is to say he had in mind 
an empirical, not an experimental science. And Zola’s novelistic ‘science’ was a 
science of observation, and precisely not of experiment. He condemned plot as 
artificial, but experiment is artificial too – nature does not exist in test-tubes and 
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retorts and under controlled conditions, and to conclude that what happens in 
the laboratory is what happens in the universe requires a leap of the imagination. 
But experiment, with its artificiality, is our best way of making things act so that 
we can learn about their nature. And plot in the novel does the same for human 
nature.30
Interviewed in 2002 about her short story The Trials of Finch, Zadie Smith refers 
to Trilling’s scientific analogy as she reflects on the construction of character and 
plot in her own writing, coming to a similar defence of artificiality:
Real character gives itself away, I think, in the quiet moments, and, for me, it’s 
a great effort to write the quieter bits, to not always explicate through plot. The 
objection, again, with Finch was this: life is not like that! But I’m still not sure 
what’s meant by that idea. That’s sort of why I’m studying the novel again. I do 
believe in the uses of plot – Lionel Trilling talked about it as a sort of laboratory 
of ideas. What happens in a lab is an artificiality that sets us up for an experience 
of the world. The scientist begins with a thesis he wants in some way to prove – 
he may not get the results he expects, but his experiment is tangential to the 
world, it has a place there. I think the intention is the same in fiction.31
It seems likely that Smith came to Trilling’s essay through her self-professed 
‘love’ of E.M. Forster, ‘to whom’ she has stated, ‘all my fiction is indebted’.32 
Smith has written of and, similarly to Trilling, defended Forster’s melodrama, 
recognizing its influence on her own work.33 Following the publication of White 
Teeth, Smith was criticized for the artificiality of her style: James Wood branded 
the novel part of an emerging genre which he dubbed ‘hysterical realism’, novels 
characterized by improbable plots in which novelists ‘clothe real people who 
could never actually endure the stories that happen to them’.34 For Wood – 
espousing the kind of objection to melodrama that Trilling identifies – ‘they are 
stories which defy the laws of persuasion’.35 Yet Smith’s reflections, via Trilling, 
on the use of plot suggest that the ‘artificial’ elements of her writing are strategic 
and considered, rather than indicative of the out of control postmodernism that 
Wood considers them to be.
Indeed they are the product of her emulation of the characteristics of the 
Forsterian comic novel, of which she has both written and spoken extensively. 
Asked in an interview about what appeals to her in Forster’s work, Smith stated 
that ‘Forster represents one of the earliest loves of my reading life and the first 
intimations I ever had of the power and beauty of this funny, artificial little 
construction, the novel’.36 Smith identifies two characteristics of the Forsterian 
comic novel which have influenced her writing; the artificial and, related to 
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this, the funny, which is characterized, for Smith, not only by humour but 
by the peculiarity, inconsistency and muddle of the human condition. She 
writes that:
there is a lot in Forster that fails, is both cloying and banal: his Pantheism, his 
fetish for the exotic, his idealisation of music. The mystic will occasionally look 
the fool. Forster took a risk, opening the comic novel to let in the things it was 
not designed for; small patches of purple prose were the result. But Forster’s 
innovation remains: he allowed the English comic novel the possibility of a 
spiritual and bodily life, not simply to exist as an exquisitely worked game of 
social ethics but as a messy human concoction. He expanded the comic novel’s 
ethical space (while unbalancing its moral certainties) simply by letting more of 
life in.37
For Smith, Forster’s strength lies in the fact that he ‘suggested there might 
be some ethical advantage in not always pursuing a perfect and unyielding 
rationality’, and that he ‘wanted his people to be in a muddle: his was a study 
of the emotional, erratic and unreasonable in human life’.38 The influence of 
this Forsterian comic muddle on White Teeth is clear: from Samad’s decision to 
send one of his twin sons to Bangladesh to remove him from the ‘corruption’39 
of English culture in response to his own affair with the twins’ teacher Poppy 
Burt-Jones, to Archie’s coin tossing to decide whether or not to commit suicide 
or later, whether to shoot Dr Perret, or Irie’s decision to sleep with both twin 
brothers Magid and Millat within hours of each other, the novel is full of people 
who behave in emotional, unreasonable and funny ways. However there has 
been a critical tendency to overlook the comic form of White Teeth, despite the 
fact that it was the novel’s comedy which was arguably responsible for its almost 
instant popularity: the novel’s back cover attests to the fact that Smith’s humour 
was celebrated (and marketed) above all else: reviewers described the novel as 
‘funny, generous, big-hearted’, ‘swooping, funny’, ‘relentlessly funny’, ‘hilarious’, 
‘extremely funny’.40 Literary critics have instead focused more on articulating 
the postcolonial themes of the novel, on Smith’s portrayal of race relations in late 
twentieth-century London and of the inevitable hybridity and cultural mixing 
which the presence of immigrant populations has brought about.41 Where the 
novel’s comedy is commented upon, it is interpreted as a tactical strategy through 
which Smith avoids being overtly political: for Claire Squires the comic deflation 
which characterizes Smith’s portrayals of racism works to show that racism is 
out of date,42 while for Susie Thomas, Smith’s comic mode more problematically 
evades painful questions about race and multiculturalism.43
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Yet Smith’s comic style does not consist simply of the whimsical, the light-
hearted or even the funny treatment of her subjects, but in emulating a Forsterian 
‘messy human concoction’, Smith is able to present an altogether more complex 
understanding of race and racism in relation to science. For while the novel 
explores the racial implications of contemporary genetics through Marcus’s 
science to offer what Ashley Dawson calls a ‘timely warning that the history 
of “race” is by no means over’,44 it does so in a comic mode in which science is 
subject to the irrational and misguided interpretations of the novel’s characters. 
Smith makes popular misunderstandings about genetics part of the comic fabric 
of the novel, depicting the ways in which Marcus’s genetic ideas infiltrate the 
thoughts of the other characters, where they become muddled and confused. 
Alsana’s nightmare vision of the ‘dissolution, disappearance’ that the immigrant 
fears is expressed through her comic misunderstanding of the process of genetic 
inheritance, her anxieties about the behaviour of her children merging with 
broader, cultural anxieties about the meaning of genetics:
Even the unflappable Alsana Iqbal would regularly wake up in a puddle of her 
own sweat after a night visited by visions of Millat (genetically BB; where B 
stands for Bengali-ness) marrying someone called Sarah (aa where ‘a’ stands for 
Aryan), resulting in a child called Michael (Ba), who in turn marries somebody 
called Lucy (aa), leaving Alsana with a legacy of unrecognizable great-
grandchildren (Aaaaaaa!), their Bengali-ness thoroughly diluted, genotype 
hidden by phenotype.45
Cultural, racial and genetic forms of inheritance become conflated in a kind of 
reductionism that Roof has identified as characterizing popular understandings 
of DNA: ‘When we imagine genes as agents, they become literal representatives 
of our bodies, our wills, and our desires. We become our genes and our genes 
become us, so that we imagine that we, too, somehow survive from generation 
to generation’.46 Millat’s attempt to shoot Dr Perret at the end of the novel 
comically becomes a mission determined by his genetic inheritance from his 
revolutionary great-great-grandfather Mangal Pande; ‘his is an imperative 
secreted in the genes and the cold steel inside his pocket is the answer to 
a claim made on him long ago. He’s a Pandy deep down. And there’s mutiny 
in his blood’.47 The genes become the ultimate carriers of historical meaning; 
history is ‘made to appear materially in the present, carried with us always … We 
are what we are because they were who they were’.48 Patterns of behaviour are 
repeated from generation to generation, the past lives on in the present, through 
the genes. Thus Samad’s ‘sins’ – his affair with Poppy – will be passed on to 
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his sons ‘stored up in the genes’,49 while the Chalfens comically consider the 
success of their extended family in terms of the ‘good genes which were so often 
referred to’.50 In an analysis of film comedies about science, Roof suggests that 
‘science comedies take over and amplify cultural beliefs as part of their generic 
working. Popular misconceptions about science become part of the stuff of 
the comedy so that comedies are much more symptomatic readings of myth 
than more “serious,” or even fantasy, genres might be’.51 Such an amplification 
of cultural belief is evident in the comic misconceptions of genetics presented 
in White Teeth: making science the stuff of comedy and, specifically, the stuff of 
the comic novel, Smith uncovers the myths about genetics which circulate in 
contemporary culture.
Yet the novel suggests that science itself is part of the human muddle and 
mocks the attempts of scientists to extricate themselves from the unreasonable 
and irrational human behaviour which contributes to such popular 
misinterpretations of their science. Marcus, explaining his FutureMouse© 
experiment to Irie, emphasizes the precision, predictability and rationality of 
his science, everything that the novel’s muddled and impassioned characters 
are not: ‘if you re-engineer the actual genome, so that specific cancers are 
expressed in specific tissues at predetermined times in the mouse’s development, 
then you’re no longer dealing with the random. You’re eliminating the random 
actions of a mutagen’.52 However, no amount of explaining can prevent the 
public’s misunderstanding of his work. Waiting for Magid at the airport Marcus 
encounters an Asian girl reading his popular science book, whose interpretation 
of his science, ‘where are we going here? Millions of blonds with blue eyes? Mail 
order babies? I mean, if you’re Indian like me you’ve got something to worry 
about, yeah?’ leaves him bemused;
It was exhausting just to listen to her. Nowhere in the book did Marcus even touch 
upon human eugenics – it wasn’t his field, and he had no particular interest in 
it. And yet this girl had managed to read a book almost entirely concerned with 
the more prosaic developments in recombinant DNA – gene therapy, proteins to 
dissolve blood clots, the cloning of insulin – and emerge from it full of the usual 
neo-fascist tabloid fantasies.53
What might otherwise be a sympathetic portrait of a scientist struggling to 
communicate the truth of his science is undermined, however, by the fact that in 
his desire for a straightforward and rational understanding of his science, a desire 
reflected in the design brief for the ‘white/chrome/pure/plain … uncontaminated 
cavity’54 of the Perret Institute, Marcus has ignored the truth of his science’s 
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history; the fact that his work on FutureMouse© is the direct result of the racial 
scientific research of the Nazis. Dr Perret’s photograph hangs on Marcus’s wall 
alongside those of Watson and Crick, and at the launch of FutureMouse© at the 
Perret Institute, Marcus describes his mentor as ‘elemental and inspirational. 
Not only is he a personal inspiration, but he laid the foundations for so much 
of this work’.55 The racial aspects of Perret’s science have become obscured 
in the present, their trace to be found only in small details, in the fact that 
FutureMouse© is programmed to lose its pigmentation and turn from brown 
to white, and in the ironically blank yet racialized space of the Perret Institute, 
which is ‘pared down, sterilized, made new every day by a Nigerian cleaning 
lady with an industrial Hoover and guarded through the night by Mr DeWinter, 
a Polish nightwatchman’.56 Science, Smith suggests, cannot exist in an empty, 
purified space, separate from the complexities and entanglements of its history; 
it is, unavoidably, part of the popular interpretations the public attribute to it, 
part of the muddle that the comic novel strives to represent.
It is the scientific approach to race in the novel which exposes precisely the 
ways in which science can be muddled and unreasonable, as Smith calls attention 
to the contradictions and inconsistencies in geneticists’ comprehension of both 
race and racism. While Marcus’s denial of the significance of race in his work is 
undermined by history, it is also shown to be dubious given the attitudes towards 
the Iqbals and the Joneses displayed by the Chalfen family. Irie is sent to the home 
of Marcus and his wife Joyce by the headmaster of her secondary school Glenard 
Oak Comprehensive. The headmaster makes Irie part of a ‘guinea-pig project’, 
with the aim of ‘bringing children of disadvantaged or minority backgrounds 
into contact with kids who might have something to offer them’.57 The educated, 
middle class liberals Joyce and Marcus are the modern-day heirs of the school’s 
colonialist founder, Edmund Glenard, who set up the school as an experimental 
workhouse for Jamaicans, because ‘the natives required instruction, Christian 
faith and moral guidance’.58 Indeed scientists Joyce and Marcus, from an 
extended family characterized by ‘the good genes which were so often referred 
to: two scientists, one mathematician, three psychiatrists’,59 have something of 
the colonialist about them as they interact with Irie and the twins. This is an 
attitude first hinted at when Smith introduces Joyce through an extract from 
her book on plants, The New Flower Power, which is full of language common 
to racial science:
Yes, self-pollination is the simpler and more certain of the two fertilization 
processes, especially for many species that colonize by copiously repeating the 
same parental strain. But a species cloning such uniform offspring runs the risk 
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of having its entire population wiped out by a single evolutionary event … cross-
pollination produces more varied offspring that are better able to cope with a 
changed environment60
The way in which Joyce writes and thinks about her science spills over into 
her interaction with the teenagers, whom she calls ‘brown strangers’.61 Millat is 
‘Beautiful’, ‘gorgeous’,62 ‘exotic’63 and Joyce comically theorizes about the children 
using a combination of her preconceptions about race and her knowledge of 
plants; ‘Joyce paused and looked at Irie and Millat the way she had looked at her 
Garter Knight delphinium … There was a quiet pain in the first one (Irieanthus 
negressium marcusilia)’.64 Thinking of herself as someone who is helping the 
troubled teens, Joyce’s interventions only serve to comically highlight her own 
prejudices and her own, inevitable muddled mixing of scientific ideas with non-
scientific ones;
She had read up on the subject. And it appeared Millat was filled with self-
revulsion and hatred of his own kind; that he had possibly a slave mentality, 
or maybe a colour-complex centred around his mother (he was far darker than 
she), or a wish for his own annihilation by means of dilution in a white gene 
pool, or an inability to reconcile two opposing cultures.65
Marcus takes a comparable approach, deciding to educate Irie yet continually 
treating her as an exotic object of sexual fascination; he describes her as a ‘big 
brown goddess’ who ‘has the most tremendous breasts’.66
It is not only the Chalfens who are characterized in this way. The novel 
is full of white middle-class professionals who largely see themselves as non-
racist yet who perpetuate racial stereotypes and racialized ways of thinking 
which impact people of colour. At the twins’ primary school the Parent 
Teacher Association makes it clear that they have gone out of their way to 
consider cultural diversity, celebrating ‘a variety of religious and secular events; 
amongst them, Christmas, Ramadan, Chinese New Year, Diwali, Yom Kippur, 
Hanukkah, the birthday of Haile Selassie, and the death of Martin Luther 
King’,67 although Smith shows that this has resulted from a fear of being racist 
as much as anything else. The chairwoman of the PTA, in arguing with Samad, 
‘wanted to check that it was not her imagination, that she was being unfair or 
undemocratic, or worse still racist (but she had read Colour Blind, a seminal 
leaflet from the Rainbow Coalition, she had scored well on the self-test) racist in 
ways that were so deeply ingrained and socially determining that they escaped 
her attention’.68 While well-meaning, Smith suggests that such neuroticism 
about race is ultimately an inadequate way to recognize the impact of racism. 
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The teachers, like the Chalfens, cannot help but espouse a continual stream 
of subtle, racial microaggressions: teacher Poppy Burt-Jones who attends the 
meeting assumes Samad is Indian, compares him to Omar Sharif, his good 
looks explained because ‘they say dark skin wrinkles less’.69 The novel suggests 
that racism and racial thinking, rather than having disappeared or been 
reduced to the preserve of ‘a few rotten folks’70 as post-racialist politics would 
have it, are endemic and only reproduced when their possibility is denied. This 
is the social backdrop to Marcus’s genetic experiments and it has the important 
role of highlighting how the cultures in which scientists live and work impact 
upon their scientific thinking. In a study of the ideology of colourblindness in 
genomics, sociologist Johnny E. Williams found race to be deeply embedded 
in scientists’ socio-political belief systems because scientists are a part of a 
society in which everyone is racially socialized.71 Williams contends, however, 
that ‘the ideology of color blindness as a rhetorical mechanism conveniently 
enables genomicists to position their research as being beyond the influence of 
“race” and systemic racism’, enabling racial ways of perceiving and interacting 
with genes to go unacknowledged.72 In an example which strongly echoes the 
justifications of the fictional Marcus Chalfen quoted above, Williams cites 
a scientist who claims ‘I’m very much a scientist [who] believes in fact, not 
opinion. The interpretation is very simple. I know which mutation caused the 
disease, and the severity of the mutation determines the severity of the disease 
and how much treatment [I] have to give … As far as I’m concerned, race 
plays no part in the kind of work I do’.73 Williams’s point is that the scientific 
removal of the significance of race from genetics comes from a position of 
(often white) privilege which does not recognize the ways in which racism is 
deeply ingrained in all parts of society, precisely the point that Smith makes 
in her portrayal of the Chalfen family. Marcus’s denials about the connection 
of his science to eugenics only produce muddle because he has failed to 
ask himself Goldberg’s question, ‘what residues of racist arrangement and 
subordination – social, economic, cultural, psychological, legal and political – 
linger unaddressed and repressed in singularly stressing racial demise?’74 The 
novel provides an answer, identifying and uncovering the ‘residues of racist 
arrangement’ in everyday social interactions which feed into institutions and 
professions such as science which have placed themselves beyond race. Far 
from trivializing racism through the novel’s comic form, Smith uses that form 
to demonstrate the pitfalls of removing race from science; namely, the failure 
to recognize the residues of racial thinking which remain operative when race 
itself disappears.
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The science of fiction
In making scientific rationality and truth the stuff of the comic novel, Smith 
appears to present what might be deemed a typically literary or deconstructive 
view of science, the kind of critique to which scientists began to object during 
the culture wars of the 1990s. Waugh outlines how the questioning of scientific 
knowledge at the end of the twentieth century led to
constructivist claims that objectivity and rationality are culturally produced 
systems, that science cannot arrive at knowledge of a mind-independent natural 
reality, that its methods are always relative to shifting and heterogeneous 
theoretical frameworks, and that the ‘objects’ of scientific knowledge are therefore 
as ‘intentional’ as those of a literary text … In other words, scientific knowledge 
and language are no more exact than aesthetic knowledge and language.75
Smith does not fall into a constructivist trap, but instead satirizes the 
incomprehension of scientists towards literary critiques of their work while self-
consciously addressing the status of her own novel as a literary representation 
of scientific endeavour. Marcus consistently identifies literature as the antithesis 
of scientific rationality and reason, the Chalfens espousing a traditional belief in 
‘the truth’ which, for them, is the opposite of humanistic study:
If you were arguing with a Chalfen, trying to put a case for these strange French 
men who think truth is a function of language, or that history is interpretive and 
science metaphorical, the Chalfen in question would hear you out quietly, then 
wave his hand, dismissive, feeling no need to dignify such bunkum with a retort. 
Truth was truth to a Chalfen.76
For Marcus, science and fiction have little to say to each other; ‘science and 
science fiction were like ships in the night, passing each other in the fog’;77 
his popular science collaboration with the novelist Surrey T. Banks, which is 
a ‘split level high/low culture book, whereby Marcus wrote a “hard science” 
chapter on one particular development in genetics and then the novelist wrote 
a twin chapter exploring these ideas from a futuristic, fictional, what-if-this-
led-to-this point of view, and so on for eight chapters each’, is motivated purely 
by ‘pecuniary reasons’.78 Factual, high-culture science is pitted against fiction, 
which is culturally ‘low’, as Smith pokes fun at both Marcus’s polarized view of 
the two cultures and her own portrayal of genetics, as the novel itself becomes the 
target of Marcus’s objection to the ‘great ocean of idiots, conspiracists, religious 
lunatics, presumptuous novelists, animal-rights activists, students of politics, 
and all the other breeds of fundamentalists who professed strange objections to 
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his life’s work’.79 Perhaps anticipating a criticism of the novel that never actually 
materialized, Smith acknowledges the limitations of novelists’ attempts to 
represent complex scientific ideas, something of which she was conscious when 
writing the novel. Christina Patterson, interviewing Smith, reports that Smith 
‘read one “incredibly boring” book about onco-mice and cancer genes in mice 
and talked to “a lot of bright friends” in order to write the scientific stuff, but 
is still, with characteristic modesty, convinced that the science in the book is 
“incredibly bad”’.80
Yet the novel demonstrates that its own literary, comic representation of 
science has value by showing that, contrary to Marcus’s view, science does have 
similarities with fiction, and that the novel’s inevitable representation of partial, 
plural and multiple truths about science simply reflects the fact that science 
itself consists of both the truthful and the fictional. Smith thus rejects the idea 
put forward by Magid when he writes to Marcus, that ‘when you delve into the 
mysteries of inherited characteristics, surely you go straight to the soul of the 
human condition as dramatically and fundamentally as any poet, except you are 
armed with something essential the poet does not have: the truth’.81 Smith would 
not disagree with Magid’s characterization of the literary as being inaccessible 
to a singular truth: she has written of writers’ ability to ‘speak simultaneous 
truths’,82 and has said that the aim of her writing is ‘truth without generalization, 
without cliché, and without simplification – which is almost impossible. But 
that’s the nice thing about the novel. The aim is way out of everybody’s reach, 
so you keep on writing them just in case’.83 Indeed the status of writing as a 
source of ‘the truth’ is questioned everywhere in White Teeth: Irie, ‘sick of never 
getting the whole truth’,84 turns to her grandmother’s schoolbooks from Jamaica 
to try to discover the truth of her heritage, but the colonial books she reads 
‘Dominica: Hints and Notes to Intending Settlers’ and ‘In Sugar Cane Land’ give 
her a false picture of ‘dashing Capt. Durham’,85 the Englishman who impregnated 
her great-grandmother Ambrosia Bowden. The history of Glenard Oak School 
is reconstructed inaccurately through a booklet written by the PTA, who decide 
to remember the school’s founder, Edmund Glenard – the English colonialist 
who tried to rape Ambrosia – as ‘their kindly Victorian benefactor’.86 Samad 
is incensed by the way historians have written of his great-grandfather as a 
drunkard rather than a revolutionary, ‘the truth mutating, bending, receding’.87
Smith demonstrates, however, that this might also be a description of 
Marcus’s science, which frequently takes narrative and fictional forms that 
disrupt any straightforward access it may claim to ‘the truth’. Marcus ironically 
recognizes the slippery nature of narrative as a source of ‘the truth’ when he 
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dismisses the Iqbals’ history, ‘a great revolutionary. So I’ve heard. I wouldn’t take 
any of that seriously, if I were you. One part truth and three parts fiction in that 
family, I fancy’,88 yet is unable to recognize that his science is also part truth 
and part fiction. The boundaries between science and fiction are certainly more 
porous than Marcus is willing to admit: when Irie reads the FutureMouse© press 
release to a journalist, ‘though she had repeated the words many times, they 
still seemed fantastical, absurd – fiction on the wings of fantasy – with more 
of a dash of Surrey T. Banks in them’.89 The communication of science to the 
public relies on the use of narrative, but this imaginative strain also becomes 
part of the science itself. Marcus inadvertently hints at this when he contradicts 
his earlier assertion about science fiction when introducing Dr Perret, whom 
he describes as ‘pushing the envelope, when work in this area was seriously 
underfunded and looked to remain in the realms of science fiction’.90 However it 
is through FutureMouse© itself that his science becomes fiction: the hyperbolic 
promotion of FutureMouse© means that it becomes, in the public’s eyes, a 
version of the cartoon character Danger Mouse; the mouse is a ‘cartoon of an 
idea’ where ‘one expected the damn mouse to stand up and speak by itself ’.91 
Roof has argued that ‘representations of science render scientific facts less “true” 
(or more culturally relative) while the figures of their representation become 
scientifically operative’.92 This is a paradox which White Teeth goes some way to 
uncovering: the science behind FutureMouse© is elided by the mouse itself, the 
mouse transformed into a fiction, which then becomes a kind of truth, as the 
novel ends with FutureMouse© escaping, Danger Mouse style, from its display 
case at the Perret Institute.
Suggesting points of similarity between Marcus’s genetics and the fictional, 
Smith not only offers a comment on what happens to science in culture, on the 
biofictional nature of science and the representation of science, but also draws 
attention to the relationship between the novel itself and the science which it 
represents. If the comic novel conveys a Forsterian ‘messy human concoction’93 
it does so, for Smith, through its portrayal of irrational, messy characters and, 
in the case of White Teeth, the entanglement of those characters with an equally 
as unreasonable science. However the comic novel is also characterized by 
its artificial form: writing of Forster’s muddled characters, Smith states that 
‘what interests me is that his narrative structure is muddled also; impulsive, 
meandering, irrational, which seeming faults lead him on to two further 
problematics: mawkishness and melodrama’.94 As I have already touched upon, 
both Smith and Trilling recognize that Forster’s plots, which consist of ‘all the 
old devices of recognition scenes, secrets, letters that prove something, stolen 
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babies, destroyed wills, long-lost brothers, hidden sins, shocking revelations 
and even physical conflict’,95 tend to melodrama, leaving his writing open to 
the charge of artificiality. Yet such artificiality of plot is justified, and has value, 
because it is the novelist’s way of examining human nature, ‘of making things act 
so that we can learn about their nature’,96 in the manner of a scientist. Trilling’s 
comparison between scientific experiment and novelistic plot is a means of 
defending Forster’s art but in White Teeth it becomes a means for Smith to 
further interrogate the relationship between science and the (comic) novel. For 
while Smith considers the ways in which science is like fiction, she also imagines 
how fiction is like science.
The artificiality and melodrama of the plot of White Teeth cannot be 
disputed. James Wood incredulously summarizes what is arguably the novel’s 
most melodramatic point – its ending – thus, ‘White Teeth ends with a clashing 
finale, in which all the novel’s characters – most of whom are now dispersed 
between various cults and fanatical religious groups – head towards the press 
conference which the scientist, Marcus Chalfen, is delivering in London, to 
announce the successful cloning of his mouse’.97 The finale connects all of the 
novel’s groups and characters together improbably in the same place, to which 
Smith adds the shocking revelations, recognition scenes and physical conflict of 
the Forsterian novel: Archie recognizes Dr Perret as the Dr Sick whom he failed 
to kill during the war, Samad realizes Archie’s lie, Millat tries to shoot Dr Perret 
and FutureMouse© escapes. The muddle is complete, resolved with further, 
unresolvable muddle: it is unclear to the authorities which twin is responsible 
for the shooting, while it is also unclear which is the father of Irie’s baby, a plot 
device too far for Wood; ‘near the end of White Teeth, one of the characters, 
Irie Jones, has sex with one of the twins, called Millat; but then rushes round to 
see the other twin, called Magid, to have sex with him only moments after. She 
becomes pregnant; and she will never know which twin impregnated her. But it 
is really Smith’s hot plot which has had its way with her’.98
However Smith’s ‘hot plot’, like Forster’s ‘hot melodrama’,99 is more controlled 
than Wood imagines it to be. Smith self-consciously turns her plot into part of 
the experiment around which it revolves. In a kind of literalization of Trilling’s 
analogy, Smith imagines the manoeuvring of her characters through plot as a 
scientific experiment, inviting the reader to recognize the novel as a fiction, 
as artificially constructed and contrived as Marcus’s FutureMouse©. Smith 
gestures towards this at various points in White Teeth where the novel’s fictive, 
constructed nature is made explicit. For example, when Irie is employed by 
Marcus to organize his filing cabinet and is arranging the letters between Marcus 
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and Magid, she ‘split the filing system in two, choosing to file by author primarily, 
then chronologically, rather than let simple dates rule the roost. Because this was 
all about people. People making a connection across continents, across seas’.100 
This is how Smith has structured each of the novel’s four sections – by character 
and date, two dates for each section: Archie  1974,  1945; Samad  1984,  1857; 
Irie 1990, 1907; Magid, Millat and Marcus 1992, 1999. That the novel is organized 
in the same way as Marcus’s filing cabinet is funny, but it also draws attention 
to the possibility of an experimental exchange between what science does and 
what the novel does, an idea Smith develops more fully at the novel’s end, where 
she imagines, in the manner of a scientist or social scientist, how people would 
react to the scene at the Perret Institute. Although initially referring to the 
imaginary ‘focus group’ which has chosen the décor of the institute, the people 
Smith imagines as wanting to know about different strands of the plot become 
her readers, as Smith reveals how they too have been subject to the novel’s 
experiment:
and there is surely a demographic pattern to all those who wish to see the 
eyewitness statements that identified Magid as many times as Millat … And 
it is young professional women aged eighteen to thirty-two who would like a 
snapshot seven years hence of Irie, Joshua and Hortense sitting by a Caribbean 
sea … And it could be that it is largely the criminal class and the elderly who find 
themselves wanting to make bets on the winner of a blackjack game … It would 
make an interesting survey (what kind would be your decision) to examine the 
present and divide the onlookers into two groups: those whose eyes fell upon a 
bleeding man, slumped across a table, and those who watched the getaway of a 
small brown rebel mouse.101
The Perret Institute is transformed into a kind of laboratory in which, as with 
the design and engineering of FutureMouse©, there is ‘no question about who 
was pulling the strings’:102 Smith has, like a scientist in the lab, engineered the 
scene to see what results she gets, creating ‘an artificiality which sets us up for an 
experience of the world’.103
The ‘scientific’ aspects of Smith’s plot are also evident in the novel’s 
emphasis on cause and effect. Marcus demonstrates complete mastery over 
FutureMouse© by being able to determine how and when the mouse will die; he 
creates ‘mice who year after year expressed more and more eloquently Marcus’s 
designs … planting instructions and imperatives in the germ line to be realized 
in physical characteristics. Creating mice whose very bodies did exactly what 
Marcus told them’.104 His science is characterized by examining the consequences 
of actions in time, as he explains to Irie, looking at photos of the mouse with a 
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progressively bigger tumour in each picture, ‘what you really want to know is 
how a tumour progresses in living tissue’,105 ‘I plant a cancer and a cancer turns 
up precisely when I expect it’.106 Marcus’s science is based on predictability and 
precision, on being able to determine exactly how a tumour will progress in 
time, a precision which, I have shown, the novel undermines in its emphasis on 
the unpredictable and the irrational. Yet it is such causality which gives structure 
to the novel’s melodramatic plot. For Trilling, the Forsterian plot ‘represents the 
novelist’s interest in causality’ and ‘because it is concerned not only with states of 
being, but with consequences, gives the greatest reality to social forces’.107 Smith 
accords a similar importance to causality, writing that ‘it seems that if you put 
people on paper and move them through time, you cannot help but talk about 
ethics, because the ethical realm exists nowhere if not here: in the consequences 
of human actions as they unfold in time, and the multiple interpretive possibility 
of those actions. Narrative itself is the performance of that very procedure’.108
The plot of White Teeth, like Marcus’s FutureMouse©, consists of the 
consequences of actions as they unfold through time: Archie, having saved 
Dr Sick during the Second World War, is not only destined to save him once 
again at the Perret Institute but his actions enable the rest of the plot to unfold 
in the existence of Marcus, his science and the relationship between Archie’s 
daughter, Irie, and the Chalfen family. The consequences of Archie’s coin 
flipping resonate throughout the novel, his predictable fate underscored by the 
repeated mantra that ‘every moment happens twice: inside and outside, and 
they are two different histories’.109 The uncertainty of repetition, the possibility 
of difference in the predictably repeated which this phrase encapsulates, is what 
makes the novel different to Marcus’s science: Marcus’s concern to ‘eliminate 
the random’110 allows no room for chance, whereas Smith recognizes, as Alsana 
does when she understands that Magid (having been sent to Bangladesh) is 
more English than Millat, that ‘you can’t plan everything’.111 An element of 
chance must also be factored into the plot, hence the escape of FutureMouse© 
at the end of the novel, and the fact that Archie’s decisions rest on the toss of a 
coin. Trilling writes that ‘one thing to say is that certain kinds of unmotivated 
events in fiction represent what happens in life. Life is not only a matter of logic 
and motivation but of chance. The storyteller may –perhaps should – suggest 
this element of life’.112 White Teeth celebrates chance, placing it in opposition 
to Marcus’s scientific rationalism, but at the same time Smith self-consciously 
demonstrates that such chance is part of the artificial and constructed nature of 
the novel’s plot and is, in this sense, comparable to the artificial experiments of 
the scientist (Marcus) in the laboratory.
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Narrativizing the genetics of race
In articulating the ways in which the novelist’s engineering of plot is comparable 
to a scientist’s engineering of a mouse, Smith moves beyond a defence of 
melodrama, beyond Trilling’s analogy, to consider what fictional writing about 
science entails, which, the novel suggests, is a degree of reciprocity: in uncovering 
the narrative aspects of genetics as part of her wider critique of science’s claims 
to rationalism, objectivity and neutrality, the novelist must also reflect upon 
her own claims to represent human messiness, the irrational, unreasonable and 
uncertain. Smith demonstrates that the fictional representation of the messy 
human concoction requires a degree of artificiality and, by making the novel’s 
fictive, constructed nature explicit, reminds readers that what the novel does is 
only another form of what science does – both are practices which artificially 
test and experiment with (human) nature. Reflecting on the stories told by 
science through an examination of its own forms of storytelling, White Teeth 
demonstrates that the contemporary novel can do more than simply explore the 
science of race in the manner of Marcus’s collaborator Surrey T. Banks, ‘from a 
futuristic, fictional, what-if-this-led-to-this point of view’.113 It does examine the 
claims, forms of representation and cultural reception of contemporary genetics, 
but also thinks through its own relationship to the science which it represents, 
thus throwing into doubt Dominic Head’s claim that
the dominant transnational forces of globalization are promoted through 
developments in science and technology, and this has become an area of human 
experience that is especially difficult for the novel to register. To engage with 
rapid technological change, an instantaneous response is demanded, and this 
is beyond the capabilities of a literary form that is, rather, cumulative in its 
procedures of reflection and commentary.114
White Teeth not only registers the rapid developments which led to the completion 
of the human genome sequence in the year of its publication, exploring the 
impact of the public prominence of genetics on conceptions of race, but Smith 
demonstrates that the novel’s form, far from being the cumulative commentary 
to science’s rapidity, is a reflexive form with the capacity to suggest points of 
confluence between science and fiction, shedding light on both practices at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century.
White Teeth suggests that we might approach the racial pronouncements 
of the HGP differently, viewing what was promoted as a definitive, anti-racist 
statement on the non-biological nature of race as anything but definitive. 
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Indeed, as the following chapter will investigate, the findings of the HGP did not 
put a stop to the use of racial categorization in genetics, which has, if anything, 
increased in a number of strands of genetic investigation since the mapping of 
the genome. White Teeth exposes the inconsistencies around race in science in 
the twenty-first century by demonstrating how such uncertainties inevitably 
arise from the narrative exposition and transmission of science combined with a 
politics of colourblindness which have together worked to obscure experiences 
of racism. If, as Roof writes, ‘genetic sameness’ is being acknowledged by science 
‘at the very moment conservative factions pressure for the end of programs 
that help disadvantaged citizens’,115 then Smith suggests that understanding 
such pronouncements as scientific stories is one way of beginning to unpick 
the assumed anti-racist tenor of contemporary science which often ironically 
enables, rather than forecloses, the possibility of socio-political racisms.
In the summer of  2015, a worldwide media storm erupted after the parents 
of Rachel Dolezal, a civil rights activist and Professor of Africana Studies in 
Washington State in the United States, gave an interview in which they claimed 
that their daughter had been posing as a black woman when she was in fact white. 
Wearing tanning lotion and afro hair weaves, Dolezal had presented as black to 
her colleagues, students and fellow officers at her local chapter of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, of which she was president. 
Following a television interview in which she was asked whether she was African 
American, Dolezal appeared on NBC news and confirmed that she identified as 
black and with ‘the black experience’.1 The case garnered international attention 
as commentators and critics argued over whether choosing a race was something 
that it was ethical, or indeed possible, to do. A minority supported Dolezal as a 
‘transracial’ woman who had proved that race is ultimately a fiction, but most 
condemned her as participating in a form of black-face, pointing to the fact that 
the idea of being transracial and the ability to choose a racial identity are options 
only really open to white people. Among the many debates and discussions about 
Dolezal which occurred across various fora, a meme appeared which pictured 
Dolezal with the caption ‘But doc we black people need Bidil’.
Designed as a humorous comment on the case, the meme references a drug, 
BiDil, which was approved by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
in 2004 for the treatment of congestive heart failure exclusively in the African 
American population. The invention of the first-ever racially targeted drug (a 
combination of two pre-existing heart failure drugs isosorbide dinitrate and 
hydralazine) was reported widely in the media upon its approval, but the drug 
failed to gain widespread acceptance in the medical community in large part 
due to the controversy which surrounded its development. Based on a contested 
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statistic that heart failure rates were twice as high in black people as in white, 
the drug’s developers located the cause of this disparity in biology, rather than 
taking account of what an editorial in Nature Biotechnology called the ‘host of 
factors, including genetics, diet and lifestyle, social discrimination, economic 
inequality and even geographic location’2 that a greater part of the medical 
community recognized as the cause of health inequities between black and 
white populations. While only a few years earlier the HGP had asserted that 
race had no genetic meaning, BiDil seemed to affirm the opposite; that race 
was in fact a medically verified genetic reality. Indeed, its appearance in the 
Dolezal meme ten years after its approval reveals not only widespread public 
knowledge of the drug, but a public understanding of race as a genetic and 
medical fact. The joke of the meme works through appealing to the ‘common 
Figure 2 Rachel Dolezal Meme. Anonymous, http://www.quickmeme.com/
p/3w42zi.
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sense’ of its viewer, who knows that BiDil is a drug only for African Americans 
and therefore not one that Dolezal could possibly take: her blackness is not real 
because it is not biological and so her identification as black is revealed to be not 
only a sham, but a potential danger to her own health. Anyone can look black, 
the meme suggests, but race is really an internal property, something which 
cannot necessarily be seen and, therefore, claimed by anybody, even if the social 
conditions were to be such that a white person might want to become black.
It is therefore somewhat ironic that it was in fact self-identification with a race 
which lay at the heart of the method used to develop BiDil. The original study, 
which re-examined data from existing clinical studies, was based on patients 
‘self-identified as black (defined as of African descent)’.3 An earlier linked study 
on the methodology of the BiDil trial noted that ‘although ethnicity may not 
be accurately determined or have a true biologic basis, identifying patients by 
ethnicity does select a group of individuals who have some characteristics in 
common’.4 The researchers identified ‘African-American ethnicity by patient 
self-identification’ because this was ‘the method used in other studies in which 
the impact of ethnicity was analyzed’.5 BiDil thus emerged from a medical 
understanding of race not as biological essence, but as a proxy for unknown 
genetic markers which, its proponents argued, were clustered in self-identified 
black populations but might well also be found in white populations. Until 
researchers could ‘identify genotypic and phenotypic characteristics that would 
transcend racial or ethnic categories’,6 BiDil, it was argued, should be prescribed 
on the basis that ‘the drug is saving lives in a large and clearly identifiable black 
population’.7 The pitfalls of using such a loose and ultimately ‘unscientific’ 
methodology have been well-documented. A 2003 study found that prospective 
patients of race-based medicine do not have complete knowledge of their 
ancestry and that ‘the ability to identify one’s geographic ancestry in a way that 
rules out recent admixture and provides a homogeneous background for drug 
prescription or diagnosis is not reliable with a proportion of the population that 
is large enough to be of relevance in designing medical policy’.8 As Jonathan 
Kahn contends, the relationship between skin colour or physical appearance 
and genetic ancestry is unstable, and while self-reporting – a fundamentally 
subjective social practice – may capture valuable social variables that affect 
health, it is something which changes over time as people age and may fail to 
capture significant variation in biological ancestry.9 Dolezal’s identification as 
black is a case in point.
The Dolezal meme looks different in this light: what was no doubt intended as 
an off-the-cuff joke about race reveals a chasm between the public understanding 
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of BiDil and the scientific reasoning upon which its development was based. 
Dolezal could, in fact, be a viable candidate for BiDil because there was no 
genetic basis for the drug. Despite being presented as a ‘path-breaking example 
of the coming age of pharmacogenomics … [BiDil] is not a pharmacogenomic 
drug’, Kahn notes, as ‘the mechanism of action by which it appears to have a 
beneficial effect on heart failure patients is unknown’.10 Far from being based on 
specific genetic markers, which might correlate to a particular racial group, there 
were no definitive biological traits that BiDil could be linked to. Yet the public’s 
(mis)understanding that BiDil is based on a genetic understanding of race is 
unsurprising, given that the original acknowledgement by the drug’s developers – 
that race does not have a true biologic basis – was largely erased once BiDil was 
approved by the FDA. Instead, the connection between race and genetics was, as 
Sarah Blacker has argued, ‘taken up in the social world untranslated’.11 This lack 
of translation was something of a deliberate strategy on the part of NitroMed, 
the pharmaceutical company which developed BiDil, because their marketing 
of the drug relied on obscuring the complexities and ultimately incoherence 
of race in pharmacogenetics in favour of a narrative which represented racial 
health inequalities as what Blacker describes as ‘naturalized biological categories 
that are understood as inevitable’.12 Kahn has shown in detail how BiDil was 
transformed from a drug presented as suitable for patients of all races (which 
failed to gain the approval of the FDA because the statistics on which it was 
based did not meet FDA standards) into a black drug because ‘race continues 
to have a commercial value in differentiating products in a crowded biomedical 
marketplace’ and ‘racial identity itself is becoming a patentable commodity’.13 
Locating BiDil as part of a wider revolution in personalized medicine, NitroMed 
harnessed the support of black organizations including the Association of 
Black Cardiologists and the NAACP, to target African Americans and present 
the drug as a means of empowering a community historically exploited and 
left behind by medicine.14 Celebrated in trade magazines as a racially targeted 
marketing success story,15 this marketing strategy presented BiDil as an anti-
racist invention, a drug which gave black patients power, and, as was argued at 
the FDA meeting at which it was approved, a drug which could act as a sign of 
the American government’s intention to right racial wrongs.16 This anti-racist 
framing made some scientists uneasy; it was argued that the drug represented 
‘the primacy of political correctness over science’ and that the FDA might have 
‘felt it should take the path of affirmative ethnic drug approval in the face of 
political pressure’.17 Yet BiDil’s advocates used similar reasoning to defend it: for 
Jay Cohn, one of the lead medical researchers involved in the study, opponents 
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of the drug who objected to it on the basis that it re-inscribed race as biological 
were using ‘political correctness’ to deprive black patients of effective therapy.18 
As in the case of the HGDP, those advocating for a racialized understanding 
of genetics through BiDil invoked anti-racist reasoning to support their views, 
leading to a degree of public acceptance and support for the drug which could 
be used for commercial ends.
However BiDil was a commercial failure: costing seven times more than 
the two generic drugs of which it consisted, medical insurance companies 
were reluctant to pay for it while many doctors remained unconvinced about 
the rationale and motivations behind it.19 NitroMed, in focusing its marketing 
on winning over black patients and communities, also failed to recognize that 
doctors might not listen to their black patients in the same way as they did their 
white patients.20 Yet despite its lack of commercial success, which eventually 
caused NitroMed to fold (NitroMed ceased operations in 2011, selling BiDil to 
Arbor pharmaceuticals through which the drug is still available as of May 2019), 
BiDil left a significant legacy. It legitimized the use of racial categories in 
medicine and the idea that specific genetic markers could be linked to particular 
races, while simultaneously underscoring how fragile, unstable and incoherent 
race becomes in that context where it is accepted and worked with even though 
there were no justifiable medical or scientific grounds for doing so. In some ways 
the attempt to racialize heart disease that BiDil represented was not new. As 
Anne Pollock has shown, racial thinking had been present in cardiology since 
the discipline’s founding, and the idea of race itself has been shaped by medical 
practice across a long period of time.21 Another recent study of race in medicine, 
Lundy Braun’s Breathing Race into the Machine, has demonstrated how, in the 
case of lung capacity, the idea of racial difference became embedded in the 
machinery used to measure lung function, with predictably negative results for 
the health of black populations.22 What distinguished BiDil, however, was its 
branding. BiDil not only suggested that there was an association between race 
and genetic difference but branded race itself as the condition to be treated, and 
made race the disease; as drug companies began to strategically brand certain 
medical conditions, in the case of BiDil, race itself became a condition to be 
addressed through targeted intervention and advertising.23
Colson Whitehead’s 2006 novel Apex Hides the Hurt satirizes the racialization 
of medicine in the United States as it explores the consequences for African 
Americans of the conflation of business interests and medical science in the 
name of racial justice. The novel’s protagonist is an unnamed African American 
man who works as a nomenclature consultant – his job is to name or to re-brand 
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commercial products, anything from drugs developed in the pharmaceutical 
business to children’s toys, a job he does very successfully, winning many awards. 
His crowning achievement is the name he gives to a new range of bandages – 
Apex – which have been designed in a range of colours to match the skin-tone 
of their wearers, marketed with the tagline ‘Apex Hides the Hurt’.24 Increasingly 
disillusioned with his profession, the protagonist stubs his toe in his apartment, 
and uses one of the plasters he has named, obscuring his wound which continues 
to fester due to repeated and unexplained toe stubbings and which eventually 
develops into a serious infection after he steps in some mud near a pig farm on 
an away day with his colleagues. Unaware of its seriousness due to the Apex, 
he eventually collapses and is forced to have his toe amputated in hospital. The 
novel’s narrative moves between the before and after of the amputation. After a 
long and lonely convalescence, the protagonist agrees to take on a new job, the 
renaming of a small town, to which he travels in order to talk to its residents and 
to determine what it should be called.
Whitehead’s novel is about the creation of meaning through naming, the 
power that naming wields, and Apex Hides the Hurt explores how things from 
commercial products, to towns, to people themselves are variously made to signify 
in relation to the names they are given. Whitehead has said that the inspiration 
for the novel came from his reading of an article in the mid-1990s in the New 
York Times about the naming of Prozac and the profession of pharmaceutical 
naming,25 and has also stated that the novel is about ‘certain forms of 
multicultural cheerleading [which] are as susceptible to corruption as capitalist 
boosterism and frontier idealism, two other systems I talk about in Apex’.26 This 
chapter argues that Apex Hides the Hurt examines the commercialization both 
of medicine and of multiculturalism through the novel’s imaginary medical aid 
Apex, the marketing of which relies on the fact that, as in the case of BiDil, the 
meaning of race and racial identity is nebulous, and the many ways it signifies 
can be employed to create an aura of certainty and legitimacy where none exists. 
What Whitehead demonstrates is that where once race was widely held to be 
grounded in biology, new developments in genetics (most prominently the 
Human Genome Project), which have asserted that race is not genetic, mean 
that race must now be signified through language, and this is something that 
medical science and its marketing rely upon. The novel explores how race is, 
as Stuart Hall theorized, a floating signifier, and its lack of a fixed signified, 
the inability for it to be grounded in genetics (as was demonstrated in the case 
of BiDil), means that it is language, in particular naming, which becomes the 
primary mode through which racial meaning can be created and exploited.
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Making naming the new ‘science’ of race, the novel works as a kind of allegory 
about racial medicines such as BiDil, as it considers what happens when people 
are encouraged by medical science to self-identity with something which has 
no clear or comprehensible meaning, with a proxy for the unknown which is, 
in essence, biofictional – race. Buying into the racial identities signified by the 
words and images of medical marketing results, in the novel, not in better health 
but in illness; race literally becomes the disease in Apex as the protagonist’s 
mysterious physical and mental illness manifest as a response to his gradual 
realization that his blackness has been leeched of any meaningful significance by 
the world of commerce. Recovery from his illness is only possible by restoring 
the links between race, racism and American history, by acknowledging the 
historical origins of names and language and their power to signify in the present. 
While this process of restoration is most overtly carried out in the protagonist’s 
investigations into the black history of Winthrop, the town he is sent to rename, 
this chapter explores how Whitehead also suggests that a comparable form of 
historical recovery might also be necessary in medicine. The protagonist’s illness 
bears striking resemblance to the imaginary disease Drapetomania which was 
hypothesized by doctor and racial scientist Samuel Cartwright in 1851. The novel 
Signifies, in the tradition of African American writing as theorized by Henry 
Louis Gates, on this earlier racial science, intertextually evoking and revising 
Cartwright’s theory as it links that theory to modern racial medicine. In this way 
Whitehead satirizes the purportedly anti-racist import of medicines such as BiDil, 
but also underscores how pharmacogenetics’ reliance on language and linguistic 
signification to make race mean has a precedent in the overtly fictional ways in 
which race was made disease in the racist medicine of the era of chattel slavery. By 
invoking Cartwright’s ludicrous Drapetomania hypothesis, Whitehead not only 
parodies white scientific racism, through the tradition of black Signification, but 
foregrounds the long history of the biofictional constructions of race which have 
shaped, and continue to shape, the public understanding of blackness.
The science of marketing race
The marketing, operation and effects of Apex, the ‘multicultural bandage’27 that 
is named by the protagonist of Apex Hides the Hurt, bear many resemblances to 
BiDil. Invented by a pharmaceutical company wanting to sell more bandages, 
Apex, like BiDil, re-purposes an existing treatment by racializing it in such 
a way as to make race a matter of consumer choice: ‘The boxes didn’t say Sri 
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Lankan, Latino, or Viking. The packages spoke for themselves. The people chose 
themselves and in that way perhaps he had named a mirror. In pharmacies you 
started to see that motion – folks placing their hands against the box to see if 
the shade in the little window matched their skin.’28 Invoking racial difference 
without explicitly naming it, Apex capitalizes on social understandings of race 
as it encourages people to essentially choose their own medicine on the basis of 
how they self-identify – exactly the move encouraged by the makers of BiDil. 
Such self-identification is encouraged through a marketing campaign which is 
targeted at particular racial communities; ‘at Oglivy and Myrtle they knew the 
neighborhoods … They knew the colors of clientele and zip codes and could ship 
boxes accordingly’.29 The marketing campaign cynically situates Apex as a force 
for social good, its invention framed as a step towards inclusivity and diversity, as 
Whitehead comically shows how the language and imagery of multiculturalism 
come to be used for corporate ends; ‘in the advertising, multicultural children 
skinned knees, revealing the blood underneath, the commonality of wound, 
they were all brothers now, and multicultural bandages were affixed to red boo-
boos. United in polychromic harmony, in injury, with our individual differences 
respected, eventually all healed beneath Apex’.30 Racial difference becomes a 
branded, corporatized story to be told as a way of personalizing medicine while 
maintaining a broad, commercial appeal. Apex is a product which everyone, 
from people in ‘poor countries’ to ‘school nurses of integrated elementaries’ can 
use so not, as the protagonist puts it using his typical wordplay, to add ‘insult to 
injury’.31 While Apex makes clear that the pink flesh tones of standard plasters 
reflect a medical system which by default caters to whiteness, the solution it 
creates is not one interested in addressing inherent racisms or inequalities 
within medicine. Rather, just as the social and environmental causes of heart 
failure and differential rates thereof between white and black populations were 
overlooked by those emphasizing genetic difference through the promotion of 
BiDil, the advertising of Apex decontextualizes pain and makes it a universal 
experience, something processed by everyone in the same way despite the racial 
difference for which it also caters. This is ultimately a move which fails to address 
the causes of pain and illness, instead covering them over, hiding, rather than 
confronting, the hurt: ‘the deep psychic wounds of history and the more recent 
gashes ripped by the present, all of these could be covered by this wonderful, 
unnamed multicultural adhesive bandage. It erased. Huzzah’.32
While the protagonist’s firm works on behalf of pharmaceutical companies, 
there is no discussion of medical science in the novel as Whitehead suggests 
that medicine and marketing have become one and the same, medical science 
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subsumed by, if not indistinguishable from, the marketing strategies of the drug 
companies which often fund it. In the world of the novel it is marketing which 
is now scientific, and the protagonist understands his job in scientific terms: 
describing how ‘he came up with the names’ on the first page of the novel, we are 
told that ‘he exposed them to high temperatures for extended periods of time. 
Sometimes consonants broke off and left angry vowels on the laboratory tables. 
How else was he to know if they were ready for what the world had in store 
for them?’33 The scientific method which matters is not that which creates the 
product itself but the method by which it is named. When names go wrong and 
start to lose their intended significations, ‘it was time for the neologists to return 
to their laboratories’,34 and after he becomes ill and is no longer able to work, 
‘he had this suspicion that all he had inside himself now were Frankenstein 
names, lumbering creatures stitched together from glottal stops and sibilants, 
angry unspellable misfits suitable only for the monstrous. Names that were 
now his kin’.35 Like Frankenstein, he takes little responsibility for releasing 
‘the logos, his former charges’36 into the world; naming and marketing are not 
enterprises concerned with human consequences, something underscored by 
the colonial imagery in which the protagonist also conceives of himself and his 
‘science’. He imagines his inspiration to come from ‘his interior’ composed of 
‘rocks and mountain ranges … strange flora, saplings that curtsied eccentrically, 
low shrubs that extended bizarre fronds’, ‘a territory within himself ’ from 
which ‘he would bring back specimens to the old world. These most excellent 
dispatches. His names’.37 The invention of Apex is ‘a terrain so far uncharted. 
Pith helmets necessary’.38 Multinational commerce and to a degree medicine, 
Whitehead suggests, are neo-colonial in so far as their promise of anti-racist 
liberation is simply a meaning created by the marketing of products which 
ironically reproduce the very things they disavow. Yet the protagonist can think 
of his work in these terms, apparently without any irony, precisely because his 
job is to control the meanings of imagery and phrases so that they only signify 
in particular, ahistorical and ultimately superficial ways.
For the protagonist’s science is semiotics, ‘the science of communication 
studied through the interpretation of signs and symbols as they operate in 
various fields, esp. language’.39 His job is to manipulate the meaning of signs by 
coming up with signifiers (names like Apex) which can be attached to referents 
(in the case of Apex, multi-coloured plasters) to create signifieds which go 
beyond the denotive: Apex does not simply signify a particular kind of plaster, 
but a benign form of multiculturalism and celebration of diversity, a connotation 
which is used to sell the product.40 As he explains to a man he meets in a bar, 
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‘I name  things like new cars and toothbrushes and stuff like that so that they 
sound catchy. You have some kind of insurance policy to reassure people or make 
them less depressed so they can accept the world. Well you need a reassuring name 
that will make them believe in the insurance policy’.41 The names he gives must 
signify the objects or products themselves but also a particular feeling; the actual 
meaning of words is less important than how they sound, the associations they 
convey and the emotions they provoke. Pondering on the name ‘New Prospera’ 
that has been suggested by his old firm as the new name for the town he is tasked 
with naming, the protagonist thinks that Prospera ‘Had that romance-language 
armature, he was pretty sure it was a Spanish or Italian word for something. What 
it meant in those languages was unimportant; what was important was how it 
resonated here. The lilting a at the end like a rung up to wealth and affluence, 
take a step. A glamorous Old World cape draped over the bony shoulders of 
prosaic prosperity’.42 While the relationship between the names and their objects 
is very clearly arbitrary in a Saussurean sense – the name Apex and bandages 
have no intrinsic relationship to each other – at the same time the protagonist 
recognizes that once established as signs the signifier/signified relation has long-
lasting cultural power and significance; ‘some might say a rose by any other name 
but he didn’t go in for that kind of crap … A rose by any other name would wilt 
fast, smell like bitter almonds, God help you if the thorns broke the skin’.43
Whitehead’s novel suggests that semiotics is not only responsible for the 
commercial success of medicines but that, in the case of Apex (and following 
from this BiDil), language is integral to the way race functions and signifies 
in medicine itself. Whitehead’s protagonist exploits but also grapples with the 
fact that race is, in Stuart Hall’s terms, a ‘floating signifier’, a term which has 
no fixed or definitive signified. Noting how biological definitions of race have 
been debunked, and how black is not a genetic category, Hall explains that these 
associations nevertheless remain because
race works like a language. And signifiers refer to the systems and concepts of 
the classification of a culture to its making meaning practices. And those things 
gain their meaning, not because of what they contain in their essence, but in the 
shifting relations of difference, which they establish with other concepts and ideas 
in a signifying field. Their meaning, because it is relational, and not essential, 
can never be finally fixed, but is subject to the constant process of redefinition 
and appropriation. To the losing of old meanings, and the appropriation and 
collection on contracting new ones, to the endless process of being constantly 
re-signified, made to mean something different in different cultures, in different 
historical formations, at different moments of time.44
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There is nothing fixed that is signified by the signifier ‘race’ with the result that 
the meaning of race is always slippery, shifting and changing; race ‘cannot be 
secured in its meaning’, which is what, traditionally, science has attempted to 
achieve. For Hall, understanding race as operating primarily like a language is 
the opposite of a scientific, physiological understanding of race – ‘to say that 
race is a discursive category recognizes that all attempts to ground this concept 
scientifically, to locate differences between the races, on what one might 
call scientific, biological, or genetic grounds, have been largely shown to be 
untenable’.45 Yet what Whitehead suggests is that, ironically, it is an understanding 
of race as floating signifier (rather than as biologically grounded reality) which 
is now being utilized in the interlinked development and promotion of racial 
medicine. Tacitly recognizing the pitfalls – social, political and scientific – of 
explicitly claiming race as genetic, Apex exploits the lack of a concrete signified 
for race by invoking the ideas associated with and clustered around it; mainly 
bodily and physical appearance, in particular skin colour, but also difference, 
diversity, identity, biology and language. The result is that ‘it was hard to argue 
against the utility of an adhesive bandage and in those early days of Apex, he, 
like many citizens, found it near impossible to contradict the reasoning of the 
multicultural bandage’.46 Its reasoning cannot be contradicted because there is 
nothing definitive or fixed against which it can be measured or judged; always 
being re-signified and made to mean something different, Apex ironically 
capitalizes on race’s lack of concrete biological grounding by making race a 
floating signifier.
The protagonist slowly begins to recognize that not only is race a floating 
signifier, but that it is a signifier which itself takes many forms and has gone 
through many iterations precisely because its signified is not fixed. He begins 
to understand that the names he gives to things obscure more than they reveal, 
a revelation which crystalizes around the idea of what Apex does, ‘a name that 
got to the heart of the thing – that would be miraculous. But he never got to the 
heart of the thing, he just slapped a bandage on it to keep the pus in’.47 This is the 
work of racial categorization: it attempts to name and identify people but can 
only ever do so in crude and ultimately harmful ways because identity cannot 
be contained or defined by a signifier that has no definitive signified. As he 
digs deeper into the history of Winthrop, the shifting nature of racial signifiers 
themselves is brought directly into view:
Colored. The sliver of himself still in tune with marketing shivered each time 
Gertrude used the word colored. He kept stubbing his toe on it. As it were. 
Colored, Negro, Afro-American, African American. She was a few iterations 
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behind the times. Not that you could keep up, anyway. Every couple of years 
someone came up with something that got us an inch closer to the truth. Bit by bit 
we crept along. As if that thing we believed to be approaching actually existed.48
These attempts to name something that does not really exist – racial difference – 
underscore the linguistic, rather than biological, ways in which race is brought 
into being, and thus ultimately the fictional nature of the concept of race itself. 
The novel suggests that racial marketing exploits this, with the result that 
medicine comes to be more reliant on language and signification to establish 
racial meaning, than on genetics. This was certainly the case with BiDil where, 
having acknowledged there to be no genetic basis for race, the drug’s developers 
then utilized the slipperiness of signifier and signified to obscure the fact: the 
language of the patent for BiDil used the terms ‘black’ and ‘African American’ 
interchangeably,49 and its reliance on self-identification operated as a ‘fig leaf 
that covers a broad array of implicitly biologized conceptions of race’.50 Apex 
Hides the Hurt suggests that recognizing the raced body as, in Hall’s terms, a 
schema composed of stories, anecdotes, metaphors and images, rather than as 
defined and determined by biology,51 has material, physiological effects. For 
the protagonist of the novel, looking ‘behind false names, beneath the skin we 
gave them’, behind skin colour and appearance in the case of the marketing 
of race (which reveals that race cannot be biologically grounded), results in a 
malaise that cannot easily be cured.
Signifyin(g) science: Historicizing race as illness
The protagonist’s gradual realization that he has been involved in medicalizing 
and commercializing race as an identity which has no clear or definitive meaning 
makes him physically and mentally ill. His illness is seemingly mysterious, 
having no obvious or given cause; ‘one day he stubbed his toe. In retrospect 
there was some inevitability tied up in said stubbing, so he came to believe that 
his toe wanted to be stubbed for reasons that were unknowable. Unnameable’.52 
From the initial wound, the protagonist continues to hurt himself; ‘the toe had 
been strangely magnetized by injury so that whenever there was something in 
the vicinity with stubbing polarity, his toe was immediately drawn to it’,53 in 
what appears as a case of self-harm, something which he acknowledges only by 
detaching himself from that part of his body; ‘he decided his toe had developed 
an abuse pathology, and kept returning to the hurt as if one day it would place 
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the pain in context’.54 After ignoring the injury he becomes ‘weak and feverish’,55 
coughing, shuddering and panting until he collapses and is taken to hospital to 
have the toe amputated. Yet this does not cure his illness; once out of hospital 
‘his foot throbbed in phantom pain’ and he is left with a limp and ‘it had been 
brought to his attention that his limp was psychosomatic’.56
His self-inflicted toe injury partly represents an underlying desire to feel 
something in the emotionless, atomized life he leads – an individualized existence 
which is the result of his adherence to the ideals of the marketing business which 
instrumentalizes emotion for commercial ends. The protagonist has no real 
identity; not only does he have no name, but little information is given about his 
past or family life, other than the fact that he attended an Ivy League university 
called Quincy. Instead, the beginning of his story is a kind of blankness; ‘he had 
no purpose, he had no vocation. He had a job, which he lost, and so he answered 
the ad in the paper’.57 This matter-of-fact tone is the product of a personality that 
is emotionally detached: he cannot feel his own emotions and denies them, or 
only sees them through the lens of marketing; ‘he hadn’t met that special someone 
but he went out a lot, made reservations at approved restaurants. Occasionally 
he extended a hand across the table to spark a soulful gaze. Friends of his set 
him up with their sisters. He had a kind of vibe he projected. Wage earning. Self-
actualizing. Nice catch’.58 The protagonist takes his boss’s description of him ‘you 
are the product’59 to heart. His concern lies more with perception than with true 
feeling; ‘when it came to gifts, it was the appearance of thought that counts’,60 in a 
world where he sees everything as sellable; just before his toe becomes infected as 
he walks in the countryside, ‘for a few minutes he allowed himself to be swayed 
by the sales pitch of nature’.61 His saturation in marketing means that his whole 
sense of self is hollow if not non-existent, and his illness emerges as a response 
to the branding of self – symbolized by his use of Apex which while purportedly 
covering hurt (through personalized branding) ultimately causes him more pain 
by allowing his wound to fester.
Yet Whitehead makes clear that the illness is primarily a manifestation of a 
racial identity crisis brought about not only by the lack of any definitive signified 
for race, but by the detachment of race from racism, of identity from history 
and of language from context, detachments that the world of marketing has 
encouraged and promoted. The depersonalization that results in his toe stubbing 
is caused by the repression and denial of black history, a history which is present 
but ignored in the language that he manipulates. From the ‘Hey and Hey, man’62 
that he and his white colleagues greet each other with, to his blasé approach 
to working with them ‘no skin off his back’,63 the protagonist ironically ignores 
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the original signifieds of the language and phrases he uses. Once he arrives in 
Winthrop, however, the racial and racist associations of language become harder 
to ignore as he slowly begins to uncover the town’s history. Originally founded 
by two freed slaves, the town’s original name, Freedom, is changed soon after 
to that of the white, barbed-wire mogul Winthrop, who decides to settle there. 
Its present difficulties have arisen as Lucky Aberdeen, a millionaire software 
developer originally from the town, wants to change its name to New Prospera, 
but is opposed by the Winthrop family and the town’s mayor Regina Goode, who 
is descended from one of the freed slave men and wants to revert to the name 
Freedom. The protagonist initially adopts his old way of thinking as he favours 
New Prospera, a name without historical or contextual significance, rejecting 
the name Freedom because he considers it ‘so defiantly unimaginative as to 
approach a kind of moral weakness’.64
Yet a momentary loss of balance which causes him to fall over forces him 
to reconsider, and he begins to understand how language signifies race and 
racialized history in ways which continue to determine relationships in the 
present. The newspaper reporter who interviews him about what he intends to call 
the town signifies the protagonist’s blackness with the headline ‘CONSULTANT 
VOWS TO “KEEP IT REAL”’,65 while Lucky asks his advice about a name for his 
new business venture without any apparent irony, ‘Do you think Charred and 
Feathered would be a good name for a chicken joint?’66 Lucky can only ask such 
a question because the violence of America’s history of black enslavement has 
been all but erased by earlier forms of marketing. The Winthrop family, having 
made their fortune in barbed wire, fear the loss of the town’s Winthrop name to 
the software millionaire, as the town is flooded with corporate chain stores, the 
Winthrop library becoming an Outfit Outlet clothing store, and the international 
food franchise the Admiral competing with the bar of the Winthrop hotel. Yet 
Whitehead suggests that these corporate brands are simply the modern-day 
heirs of the likes of Winthrop, which has operated much like a corporation, the 
library holding the official, heavily biased history of the town commissioned by 
the Winthrop family, while the hotel is run by a black couple who are directly 
descended from the town’s first inhabitants and who only have two days off a 
year. A name that appears to represent tradition is in fact a cover for historic 
racial violence; ‘maybe there were some Indians or something’ Albie Winthrop 
muses, considering the origins of the town, ‘but they didn’t have a road’.67 The 
protagonist comes to identify with the position of the freed slaves Goode and 
Field who founded the town (and whose names it is clear were not freely chosen) 
who understood that ‘to give yourself a name is power. They will try to give you 
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a name and tell you who you are and try to make you into something else, and 
that is slavery’.68 In ceding the power of naming to commerce, the protagonist 
has done willingly what Field and Goode were forced by Winthrop to do – give 
up an identity formed through self-determinism and self-naming, in favour of 
being named in a way which erases experience and history.
The treatment for the protagonist’s illness is thus not a cheap bandage but a 
reckoning with language, and with the power of the naming, word-play, puns and 
double entendres that have characterized his sense of self. While the protagonist 
can only begin to recover from his illness by recovering the original significations 
of names and of language, by connecting his experience to that of former slaves 
Goode and Field, Whitehead also models an alternative mode of signification 
through which the linguistic and ultimately fictional forms of racialization – 
in particular that which is evident in contemporary racialized medicine – are 
brought to the fore. Apex Hides the Hurt Signifies in the tradition of African 
American writing as described by Henry Louis Gates in The Signifying Monkey. 
Gates defined Signifyin(g) as a trope and sign of the Afro-American tradition, 
a form of double-voiced discourse characterized by ‘the open-endedness of 
figurative language, rather than its single-minded closure’.69 Consisting of formal 
revision and intertextuality, repetition and pastiche, Signifyin(g) defers meaning 
by altering the meaning of signification itself; ‘whereas signification depends for 
order and coherence on the exclusion of unconscious associations which any 
given word yields at any given time, Signification luxuriates in the inclusion of 
the free play of these associative rhetorical and semantic relations’.70 Such free 
play is the opposite of what Whitehead’s protagonist has attempted to achieve in 
his work. He has aligned himself with what Gates terms ‘white meaning’71 and as 
Stephanie Li argues, he has a ‘conception of language as based upon singularity; 
there is only one signifier for each signified’.72 Yet the novel itself Signifies in the 
black tradition in various ways as several critics have noted. Howard Ramsby II 
links the unnamed, isolated and intelligent narrator of Apex to a long tradition of 
comparable narrators in the work of African American writers including Ralph 
Ellison, Ishmael Reed and Charles Johnson;73 Li notes that Apex signifies on 
many tropes of Invisible Man;74 while Leise writes that ‘Whitehead’s Signifyin(g) 
form reverberates with the language of slavery’.75
However, the novel not only revises and Signifies on older African American 
writing and the familiar tropes of the tradition but Signifies on nineteenth-
century medical science. The mysterious symptoms with which the protagonist 
suffers bear a close resemblance to the disease of Drapetomania which was 
invented in 1851 by doctor and racial scientist Samuel A. Cartwright. In a report 
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‘On the diseases and physical peculiarities of the negro race’ published in the 
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, Cartwright set out what he saw as 
the ‘anatomical and physiological differences between the negro and the white 
man’76 before explaining ‘the diseases of the negroes’ including ‘pulmonary 
congestions, pneumonia’,77 ‘fevers’78 and ‘negro consumption’79 but also the mental 
illness ‘Drapetomania, or the Disease Causing Slaves to Run Away’.80 Taken 
from the Greek for ‘runaway slave’ and ‘madness’, Drapetomania, Cartwright 
hypothesized, could be diagnosed by the ‘absconding from service’, and was ‘as 
much a disease of the mind as any other species of mental alienation’81 which 
could be cured by a method of governance that keeps the negro in the position of 
the ‘submissive knee-bender’, a position which he claimed was set out for black 
people in the Bible.82 ‘They have only to be kept in that state, and treated like 
children, with care, kindness, attention and humanity, to prevent and cure them 
from running away’,83 Cartwright wrote; although it is frequently noted that the 
‘treatment’ prescribed for runaway slaves was the removal of a toe.84 In this way, 
Cartwright, who was one of the most widely known and respected physicians 
of the American south, laboured to defend the Southern contention that Negro 
slavery was morally right and socially and economically justifiable.85
Whitehead’s protagonist’s toe injury is reminiscent of the injury sustained 
by Kunta Kinte who in Haley’s Roots has half his foot cut off in order to stop 
him trying to escape. Yet it is also a sign that he is suffering from Cartwright’s 
fictional disease Drapetomania. Just before the peak of his illness and his 
collapse, he attends the Identity Awards (the award ceremony for his industry), 
as he has been nominated for ‘Best Name – Medical’. He runs away from the 
ceremony because he is feverish and on the verge of delirium, as not only his 
body but his mind becomes overwhelmed by his realization that names can be 
false, misleading and obscure the truth, ‘What is the word, he asked himself, 
for that elusive thing? It was on the tip of his tongue. What is the name for 
that which is always beyond our grasp? What do you call that which escapes?’86 
The name he imagines being given to himself in this moment of confusion is 
particularly significant; ‘he heard them call his name as he slipped out of the 
room. FUGITIVE’.87 That the protagonist’s desire to escape the superficial and 
damaging industry he has hitherto supported is made reminiscent of earlier 
African American attempts to escape slavery, and that both are conceived of as a 
kind of illness, is curious. Whitehead’s comparison suggests that the protagonist 
is not only trying to escape his industry but his blackness – a ‘condition’ that 
he has ignored and emptied of signification but which cannot be escaped.88 By 
Signifyin(g) on the way black people’s desire for self-determination and freedom 
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was historically medicalized by racial science at this moment in the novel, 
Whitehead suggests that the historic pathologization of blackness continues 
to signify in African Americans’ life experience; that the way race was made 
illness in the development of BiDil is merely a continuation of older attempts to 
medicate race, a repetition that the self-conscious Signifyin(g) technique is well 
placed to highlight. Gates notes that an aspect of Signifyin(g) in the nineteenth 
century was the parody and troping of white writing and racism by black 
authors  – ‘blacks … were quite capable of establishing the necessary distance 
between themselves and their condition to signify upon white racism through 
parody’89 and recent scholarship by Britt Rusert has shown how nineteenth-
century African American writers responded to the race sciences of their day 
through practices of collage, assemblage and juxtaposition.90 Frederick Douglass, 
who responded to the work of racial scientists including Josiah C. Nott, George 
Glidden, Louis Agassiz and Samuel George Morton in The Claims of the Negro, 
Ethnologically Considered (1854), argued that there were several ways to approach 
the absurd assertion common among these thinkers that the negro was not a 
man; ‘there are many ways to answer this denial. One is by ridicule; a second by 
denunciation; a third by argument’.91 Whitehead chooses all three; by comically 
Signifyin(g) on Drapetomania, Whitehead draws attention to this tradition of 
satirizing race science in African American writing, and positions himself, and 
Apex, in a comparable Signifying relation to contemporary racial medicine.
Whitehead’s parody of racial medicine, in the Signifyin(g) tradition, calls 
attention to fictive traditions in science which have sought to shape public 
understanding of blackness. As Rusert puts it, ‘by the 1850s, science and fiction 
often merged through the fantastical and bizarre claims of racial science’92 and 
Cartwright’s Drapetomania in particular illuminates ‘the site where antebellum 
racial science veered into the realm of fiction’.93 Apex Hides the Hurt not only 
Signifies on earlier texts of racial science but on the relationship that these texts 
had to contemporaneous writing by African Americans. Rusert suggests that the 
‘science fictions of antebellum race science were simultaneously challenged by 
early black speculative fictions, which deployed science itself to imagine alternative 
histories of enslavement and freedom’.94 Apex Hides the Hurt does something 
similar with the racial medicine of its day – the pharmacogenetic development of 
BiDil. By satirizing and Signifyin(g) on medicines like BiDil, Whitehead signals 
that not only are they the medical descendants of diseases such as Drapetomania 
and that the black body remains to a degree trapped by such biofictional creations, 
but that contemporary fiction itself can play a role in bringing those ‘science 
fictions’ to light, just as earlier African American fiction sought to do.
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Identifying (with) blackness
While the novel reveals blackness to have been pathologized by medical science 
past and present, a pathologization from which the protagonist attempts to 
escape, the protagonist cannot escape the question of the meaning and value 
of blackness. How should a black person self-identify in a world where race 
has become a brand and been branded as illness? Is blackness a valid or useful 
way of (self)identifying when its biofictional shaping in medicine and beyond 
is ever present? These are questions with which Whitehead’s protagonist must 
grapple during his convalescence in Winthrop, but they are also questions raised 
by BiDil. In basing the drug on people ‘self-identified’ as black, its developers 
set the tone for its marketing but also for its prescription; the drug encouraged 
black people to decide for themselves whether they needed it and in so doing 
made race, in Kahn’s terms, ‘an individual problem and a personal responsibility, 
and therefore of no concern to the political community at large’.95 Operating 
much like personalized medicines where there is an onus on individuals to take 
responsibility for their own self-examination and self-improvement,96 BiDil 
forced black patients to decide what their blackness meant in biological terms 
and to determine whether it had value in a medical context. The support that 
the drug received from black organizations and publics led some scientists and 
sociologists of science to argue that the drug’s invocation of race could not be 
easily argued against. Francis Collins, writing in  2010 in a popular book on 
personalized medicine, stated that ‘though we might ultimately hope to see race 
eliminated as a consideration in human society, an insistence on that outcome 
right now would cause us to ignore health disparities, and to offend many 
individuals for whom self-identified race is an important part of their personal 
identity’.97 The belief of some black people in the identity that the drug exploited 
for commercial ends becomes the justification for the drug’s deployment of race 
itself: Pollock contends that ‘racialized medicine achieves its durability not from 
the power of racist ideology on the one hand or mechanistic understandings 
of bodies on the other, but because many people – in government, in social 
activism, in medicine, and beyond – have coalesced around it as a way to 
articulate their visions of what to do’.98 She asks why scholars have focused on 
scientific and political critiques of race but have been ‘reluctant to grapple with 
why prominent civil rights and black health actors have backed the drug’.99 For 
Pollock the diverse positions adopted by black theorists and black organizations 
are complex,100 and indeed studies have shown that black people are much more 
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ambivalent and divided over how to position themselves in relation to racial 
medicine than has sometimes been acknowledged.101
Apex Hides the Hurt suggests a non-homogenizing way black people might 
begin to position themselves within the fraught and contested landscape of 
racial medicine. Like those at whom BiDil is aimed, the protagonist is caught 
between the apparently competing poles of individualism and community: 
racialized medicine encourages a personalized approach to sickness based on 
a seemingly individualized and tailored solution, as it strategically invokes 
racial groupings and a homogenized black community. While the protagonist’s 
illness is to a degree caused by his isolation from black history, Whitehead 
suggests that the solution does not lie in the straightforward identification 
with ‘the black community’ or blackness. For what the novel’s protagonist 
ultimately uncovers is the complex and fractured history of the founding black 
community of the town he is tasked with renaming. On the verge of giving up 
on names altogether, ‘they should have kept the place nameless’102 he thinks, 
he discovers a fourth possible name for the town – Struggle – which had been 
originally suggested by one of the town’s two black founders but the existence of 
which has been erased. Struggle is the name suggested by Field, the suspicious 
and cautious man whom the town’s first residents nickname ‘the Dark’103 due 
to the contrast between his temperament and that of his co-founder Goode, 
known as ‘the Light’. Field ‘didn’t have anyone. He’d lost his family back on the 
plantation’104 and advocates that the community avoid white people wherever 
possible, whereas religious Goode, as his name suggests, tries to see the positive 
and do his moral duty in every situation. The historical erasure of the suggested 
name Struggle in favour of Freedom (which is presented as the ‘black’ option for 
re-naming the town) simplifies the complexities and tensions within the black 
community, which the novel suggests has always been a site of contestation 
and difference.105 The protagonist decides to name the town Struggle, and to 
identify with Field, not only to recover this lost history, but to signal the fact 
that black identity is a site of struggle; blackness is never (and has never been) 
unified or singular but shifts and evolves much like the signifier race itself. As 
Derek Maus has asserted, for the protagonist, listening to the Dark ‘requires 
being open to more critical and less superficial interpretations of signs’,106 a way 
of reading blackness that Whitehead puts forward as a means of getting closer 
to ‘the heart of the thing’.107
It is this way of reading and understanding blackness which might speak 
to debates about the uses of race in pharmacogenomics and medicine. The 
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protagonist’s eventual ‘reading’ of black history and community, which embraces 
the deferral of meaning that characterizes Gates’s conception of Signification, 
suggests that attempts to pinpoint blackness in static terms are destined to fail. 
Moving beyond the limiting and circumscribed forms of identity offered up by 
brand consultants and by extension science, the protagonist comes to realize he 
will never be ‘fixed’ as his illness continues following his decision to name the 
town Struggle, ‘his foot hurt more than ever’.108 Black life is struggle, Whitehead 
suggests, an experience and identity characterized by ongoing suffering caused 
by racisms past and present as well as the struggle for self-definition and struggle 
against the definitions and constraints that others attempt to impose on black 
people:
You call something by a name, you fix it in place. A thing or a person, it didn’t 
matter – the name you gave it allowed you to draw a bead, take aim, shoot. But 
there was a flip side of calling something by the name you gave it – and that was 
wanting to be called by the name that you gave to yourself.109
An understanding of race as an intrinsically plural, diverse and disparate 
narrative, as a site of contestation and struggle, might give those health 
professionals and scientists who would diagnose on the basis of skin colour 
pause, while enabling black people to resist the basic options presented to them 
and to look beyond what appears to be right or good or anti-racist in medicines 
like BiDil. While it is the lack of a clear definition of ‘black’ which is exploited in 
the development of race-based medicines, the solution appears to be not to fight 
for a singular or fixed definition, but to redefine and re-signify the multiplicities 
of blackness in ways which challenge the ahistorical and apolitical presentation 
of race in science. The following and final chapter of this book examines how 
a newer, emerging strand of genetic science – epigenetics – might offer the 
opportunity to do just this as it brings focus to the impact of racism (past and 
present) on the body, as a means of accounting for racial inequalities in health.
A special issue of the American Journal of Human Biology appeared in  2009 
focused on the study of ‘Developmental Plasticity in a Biocultural Context’. 
One article in the issue, a study by Grazyna Jasienska, examined the question 
of why African American babies have tended to have a lower birth weight in 
comparison with the birth weight of European American babies, and attributed 
the difference not only to contemporary socio-economic inequalities, but to the 
conditions experienced by black Americans during slavery, the effects of which, 
the article claimed, have been passed on through intergenerational signals of 
environmental quality, or epigenetic processes.1 Jasienska argues that while 
difference in socio-economic status does account for some racial differences in 
birth characteristics, it does not account for the significant differences in the 
weight of newborns between black and white women on low incomes or, within 
black populations, between the babies of black women born in African countries 
living in the United States, and those of black women who were born in the 
United States.2 Jasienska suggests that the difference can be explained by the 
‘influence of intergenerational life conditions, especially for the female line’ which 
for African Americans comprises the ‘inadequate diet and strenuous workload’ 
of enslaved populations who ‘experienced an imbalance between energy intake 
and energy expenditure, and had high energetic costs of fighting infectious 
diseases’.3 The low birth weight of African American children is thus partly the 
result of the low weight of enslaved children, the low rate of childhood growth 
as a result of poor nutrition and intense labour from a young age experienced by 
enslaved people, and the fact that enslaved mothers and grandmothers had poor 
nutritional development during adult life.4 The experiences of ancestors become 
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embodied in health disparities in the present, the genes carrying a ‘memory’ of 
these experiences, while the genes also create new memories as they are affected 
by the psychosocial stresses of racism in the present.
Another study in the issue focused on the environmental influences on the 
genes which occur during the lifetime of an individual as the cause of racial 
differences in health outcomes. Kuzawa and Sweet, studying US black – white 
disparities in cardiovascular disease, suggest that ‘there is now a strong rationale 
to consider developmental and epigenetic mechanisms as links between early 
life environmental factors like maternal stress during pregnancy and adult 
race-based health disparities in diseases like hypertension, diabetes, stroke 
and coronary heart disease’.5 According to the authors, racial differences 
in rates of disease can be explained by the fact that lower birth weights in 
African Americans are related to higher blood pressure in later life, and that 
lower birth weights are caused by maternal stressors and the passage of stress 
hormones across the placenta, which are, in turn, caused by psychosocial stress, 
depression, exposure to racial discrimination and residential segregation.6 They 
note that ‘whereas group membership and continental race are poor predictors 
of genetic variation, these same categories are directly related to the social 
and structural manifestations of inequality that impact the development of 
responsive biological systems’.7 What such studies appear to demonstrate is that 
racial difference is a fluid, complex combination of the influence on the genes of 
an individual’s current environment and the environment of their ancestors. Put 
differently, racism has biological effects which in turn create racial disparities 
in health; rather than biologizing social definitions of race, race is revealed as a 
social construct with biological consequences.
The new science upon which these studies rely is epigenetics, which, 
in its broadest sense, is concerned with the interaction of genes with their 
environment. Epigenetics is the study of the processes by which the chemicals 
and proteins within DNA are modified, through methylation and histone 
modification, in ways which affect gene expression, but not the fixed sequence 
of DNA. The discovery which has forced scientists to reconsider their long-
held assumptions is that these epigenetic marks can be switched on or off 
according to the environmental conditions in which the body finds itself, and, 
in some cases, that such changes can be inherited by offspring and passed from 
generation to generation. For Tim Spector, Professor of Twin Research and 
Genetic Epidemiology, epigenetics challenges four fundamental assumptions 
that have governed genetic science: that genes singlehandedly define the essence 
of human beings and are the only mechanism of inheritance; that genes and 
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heritable genetic destiny cannot be changed or modified; that an environmental 
event can’t produce a long-lasting influence on your genes; and that you cannot 
inherit the effects of your ancestors’ environments.8 The more familiar linear 
model of development and inheritance in which genes are fixed for life and 
passed on unchanged has thus been fundamentally challenged by the newly 
revealed complexity of the gene and environment relationship. The study 
of epigenetic mechanisms reveals that the human body’s genetic structures 
can change and change back, that the body is in a dynamic relationship to 
its environment, that culture can become embodied. In the case of race, the 
initial findings of epigenetic studies have the potential to work against the more 
traditional inscription of race as genetically real; for rather than consolidating 
racial categorizations, or fixing race as a deterministic essence, epigenetics 
reveals how the experience of being racialized influences genetic development 
and inheritance.
These developments have been met with a great deal of excitement in the 
academy, particularly among social scientists, philosophers and humanities 
scholars, who have viewed epigenetic science, and developments within post-
genomic biology more broadly, as a sign that the entanglement of the biological 
and the social is finally being taken seriously within genetic science. That 
racialization and racism have real and profound impacts on health is not a new 
idea; social epidemiologists, most notably Nancy Krieger, have long argued that 
patterns of inequality in health and disease are fundamentally shaped by societal 
conditions, and that racism and discrimination can harm health by becoming 
embodied across the life course.9 However epigenetics is providing scholars 
with a new way to frame and evidence ‘the effects of white racism’10 on the 
physiology of black and brown bodies, offering, as Maurizio Meloni contends, 
‘a key missing link to explain the molecular pathways by which transient 
environmental factors can leave marks or be inscribed on the biological body’.11 
Such explanatory epigenetic mechanisms have been popularized in the media 
where headlines such as ‘Post-Traumatic Slave Syndrome and Intergenerational 
Trauma: Slavery Is Like a Curse Passing through the DNA of Black People’12 
and ‘The Epigenetics of Being Black and Feeling Blue: Understanding African 
American Vulnerability to Disease’13 have embedded a racialized understanding 
of epigenetics within the public imagination. Epigenetics is understood both as 
a mechanism which operates transgenerationally and as genetic markers which 
result from contemporary racial microaggressions, which can have negative 
health-related consequences for the mental, emotional and physical well-being 
of black people.14
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Yet headlines and articles such as these have also caused a significant degree 
of unease among scientists and sociologists, who have increasingly criticized the 
media as well as their fellow academics, for making ‘wild claims’15 and creating 
hype around a science which is still very much in its infancy. Over the past ten 
years there has been, as Brigitte Nerlich has argued, ‘a general shift from breathless 
excitement, grand claims and hype to more nuanced, modest and humble 
assessments of what epigenetics is and what it can achieve’.16 Critics of epigenetic 
‘hype’ emphasize that there is still a great deal of uncertainty around its findings 
and therefore that the bold and to a degree revolutionary claims being made for 
it simply cannot be scientifically supported. Such uncertainties and contingencies 
include the fact that ‘there is a lack of consensus within bioscience over the 
meaning of epigenetic effects, mechanisms, and even the word itself ’, a major 
instability which means that, according to Martin Pickersgill, the enthusiasm 
for transgenerational inheritance among sociologists risks co-producing an 
‘alien science’ that may disaffect the very communities of life scientists with 
which sociologists would like to collaborate.17 The concept of transgenerational 
epigenetic inheritance has proved particularly controversial, with some suggesting 
that what appears transgenerational could in fact be the result of the experience of 
similar environments in the present.18 Ruth Müller et al. have expressed concern 
about ‘over-simplified translations from social structures to biological processes 
and vice versa’ which may ironically lead to a new kind of determinism, arguing:
if we hope to translate the findings of epigenetic research on the developmental 
mechanisms linking nutrition with disease risk into effective health policy, it 
is imperative that we view nutrition not as a simple exposure in isolation, or a 
function of individual choice, but as a resource that is constrained in complex 
ways by social and structural factors that distribute resources, and chances of 
health, unevenly across society.19
The rush to embrace an epigenetic view of inheritance and development risks 
a failure to recognize the complexities encompassed by the environment and 
risks ‘individuals, their health and their behaviour’ becoming ‘bound and ruled 
by the epigenetic marks they have acquired in early life’.20 This risk is only 
magnified when it comes to race because, as Lundy Braun et al. argue, ‘once race 
is presumed, the ways in which multiple genetic inheritances interact with the 
environment within that individual seem to disappear’,21 as racial difference is 
assumed to be the primary factor affecting a person’s life experience.
A significant element of the misunderstandings, simplifications and hype 
around public and lay understandings of epigenetics has been attributed to the 
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metaphors, language and allusions through which this new science has been 
communicated by both scientists and the press. The ideas of the nineteenth-
century biologist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck are frequently invoked in popular and 
academic writing on epigenetics.22 Lamarck’s thesis, set out in his 1809 Philosophie 
Zoologique, was that it was possible for organisms to acquire physical characteristics 
during their lifetimes, which were then inherited by their offspring.23 It was a 
controversial theory which was invoked throughout the nineteenth century but 
which enjoyed a significant resurgence during the debates that followed Darwin’s 
Origin of Species in 1859.24 The idea that environmentally acquired characteristics 
might be passed on genetically was, after dominating debates for several decades, 
ultimately laid to rest with the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis in the 1940s when 
Darwinian natural selection became the basis of modern genetic science. However, 
the transgenerational responses identified by recent epigenetic studies have led 
some to conclude that Lamarck was, in fact, partially right.25 Such invocations 
situate epigenetics as a kind of neo-Lamarckism and, in so doing, according to 
critics such as Ute Deichmann, create a misleading picture of what epigenetics 
actually means because, unlike Lamarckism, ‘phenomena of inherited variation 
related to epigenetic marks … are not actively acquired … they are not adaptive 
(except by chance), and in many cases are detrimental for the organisms’.26 
Nevertheless the similarities between epigenetic mechanisms of inheritance 
and Lamarck’s theories (as they were understood in opposition to Darwinism 
at the end of the nineteenth century) have proved irresistible to popularizers 
of epigenetics. Tim Spector references Rudyard Kipling’s Just So Stories (1902), 
fantastic tales of how various animals came to obtain their physical characteristics 
through human or environmental intervention – stories which were influenced 
by Lamarckian ideas27 – in the leopard-print design of his book’s dust jacket. 
Kipling’s Lamarckian-influenced stories How the Camel Got His Hump, How 
the Leopard Got His Spots and How the Rhinoceros Got His Skin are also recalled 
in one of the major metaphors used to communicate epigenetic processes – the 
idea that epigenetics ‘gets under the skin’. This is a metaphor that, Nerlich notes, 
operates on several levels in epigenetic discourse, as it means ‘to affect someone 
very strongly in a way that is difficult to forget’ but it is also a phrase which
like many metaphors for emotion, has a physiological basis. Think about 
expressions  like ‘to be a pain in the neck’, ‘to stick in one’s throat’, ‘to step on 
somebody’s toes’, ‘to get hot under the collar’, etc. This intimate link between 
talking, meaning, thinking and physiology makes the ‘getting under the 
skin’ metaphor quite potent and probably contributed to popularising epigenetics 
in particular contexts.28
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As is the case with genetics more broadly, literary references and metaphor have 
been frequently employed as a communicative tool to explain the meaning and 
mechanisms of epigenetics to a public audience, but often in ways that are then 
also blamed for the public misunderstanding of that science.29
This chapter explores whether literature might be considered differently in 
relation to epigenetic science; not as a source of either misleading or distorting 
images and metaphors, but as a means of thinking through the implications 
of this science, a means of amplifying and expanding both scientific and lay 
understandings of emerging issues in epigenetics. For while leading epigeneticist 
Edith Heard has claimed that ‘there’s a gap between the fact and the fantasy’ of 
epigenetics and ‘Now the facts are having to catch up’,30 I want to argue, as I have 
throughout this book, that contemporary fiction offers ways of comprehending 
the relationship between fact and fantasy, reality and fiction, which suggest 
that there might be something to be gained from taking a relational, rather 
than oppositional, approach to the imagined and the real as epigenetic science 
develops. This is nowhere more important than for the concept of race. The 
novels examined as case studies in this chapter, Octavia Butler’s Kindred (1979) 
and Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses (1988), each explore how race is created 
at the intersection of the imagined and the real, through a focus on the impact of 
racist environments on the body; US plantation slavery in the case of the former, 
and late-twentieth-century hostile immigration environments in the UK in the 
case of the latter. While both novels were published years before epigenetics came 
to prominence, each imagines processes of bodily change and transformation 
which are comparable to the mechanisms which epigenetic science is beginning 
to uncover: Butler and Rushdie employ fantastical modes to represent the 
way experiences of racism become biologically embodied, imagining how 
black and brown bodies acquire certain characteristics through exposure to 
racist environments in the UK and United States. Their representations of the 
porous boundary between the body and its wider environment offer a mode 
of comprehending the epigenetic effects of racism as the imagined or fictional 
(the racist belief in the inferiority of other races) made real (in apparently 
‘racial’ biological characteristics). These fantastic literary interrogations of the 
dynamic relationship between the imaginary and reality not only shed light 
on the entanglement of the biological with specific, historical, cultural and 
social environments through which epigenetic changes are formed, but reveal 
how fiction itself is, and might productively be, intertwined with the ‘facts’ of 
epigenetic science.
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Heard sounds a note of caution about the nascent state of epigenetics, claiming 
that ‘it’s our duty as scientists to pass on the right messages’,31 something which 
is indisputable. Yet it is also the case that epigenetic science is currently in a 
state of flux and uncertainty, a state which Pickersgill contends is productive and 
necessary for driving science forward.32 This state, while carrying the danger 
of public misunderstanding, also offers an opportunity to recognize and to 
explore what Mary Midgley calls the ‘imaginative visions’33 upon which science 
is based, and it is my contention that contemporary fiction might contribute 
to, and illuminate, those visions, actively and productively informing the 
inevitable biofictional formation of race in an equally biofictional epigenetic 
science. Indeed, Meloni has suggested that it might be possible to move beyond 
‘debates about determinism and anti-determinism in epigenetics’ by looking at 
the long histories of theories of plasticity, histories in which literary studies has 
played a significant part.34 Meloni’s contention, which he develops by drawing 
on canonical works of European philosophy and literature, is that such histories 
reveal plasticity to be an ambiguous concept, a concept that while ‘capable of 
undermining atomistic and insulated models of the body’ is also historically 
‘deeply racialised and gendered’ and therefore not necessarily emancipatory.35 
This chapter focuses instead on the import of writing concerned with the 
mechanisms, experience and effects of racism, and in so doing uncovers an 
alternative literary approach to plasticity which, while acknowledging the ways 
in which it may be racialized, understands that it is also something that people 
subject to racialization have had to learn to live with. Kindred and The Satanic 
Verses each interrogates how and why, as Achille Mbembe puts it, ‘racism 
consists, most of all, in substituting what is with something else, with another 
reality’, and how those who live in racist environments might not only adapt and 
survive, but gain new knowledge from racism’s ‘power to distort the real and to 
fix affect’.36 These fictional portrayals offer alternative pathways for conceiving 
of an epigenetics of race, moving beyond debates about determinism and anti-
determinism and towards an understanding of race as biofiction.
Kindred as post-genomic novel
Kindred is the tale of Dana, a twenty-six-year-old African American woman 
living in Los Angeles, who, on 9 June 1976, is ‘called’ back in time by her ancestor, 
Rufus Weylin. Rufus’s family owns a plantation in antebellum Maryland, and 
among the enslaved people who work on the plantation is another of Dana’s 
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ancestors, Alice. Dana is called back in time to save her white ancestor, Rufus, 
from harm and illness at various points across the course of his life. Early on in 
the novel Dana realizes that her own survival is dependent on her ability to save 
Rufus; she must endeavour to keep him alive until he has raped Alice, whose 
subsequent child, Hagar, Dana knows to be her several times great-grandmother. 
As Dana ambivalently tends to Rufus, becoming a part of the plantation’s black 
population, she is subject to the horrific violence and trauma of being enslaved. 
While Rufus heals from each accident or illness, Dana is by turns beaten and 
whipped, forcing her to experience life as a slave first-hand; only when she truly 
fears that she might be killed does Dana return to the 1970s, and to her new 
husband Kevin, who joins her on some of her trips back in time to the Weylin 
plantation, a place that she comes to call ‘home’.37 While Dana’s visits to Rufus in 
the past are often years apart, and she can be stuck in Maryland for months, time 
works differently in the 1970s present, where only minutes, hours or days have 
passed, giving Dana very little time to recover from her wounds and to prepare 
for Rufus’s next ‘call’. She is only freed from moving back and forth in time when, 
knowing that Hagar has been born, she finally kills Rufus as he tries to rape her. 
However, she returns to the 1970s permanently mutilated through the loss of an 
arm, a loss which she is unable to explain to anyone other than Kevin, and which 
she must learn to live with permanently.
Butler described her novel as ‘a grim fantasy’,38 a departure from the science 
fiction writing for which she was (and would be) predominantly known, 
because despite the fact that the novel involves the protagonist travelling 
through time, as Butler asserts, ‘with Kindred there’s absolutely no science 
involved. Not even the time travel’.39 Instead, for Butler the novel is ‘the kind of 
fantasy that nobody had really thought of as fantasy’,40 a consciously fantastical 
representation of enslavement which contrasts sharply with the emphasis on 
truth and authenticity to be found in the nineteenth-century slave narratives 
upon which Butler drew.41 Yet while the novel is clearly not science fiction in 
that, much like Ishiguro’s approach to cloning in Never Let Me Go, there is no 
discussion of or interest in the scientific ideas which may have enabled Dana 
to travel through time, Kindred does, I want to suggest, bear the imprint of 
Butler’s wider interest in bioscience, evident in her science fiction published 
both before and after Kindred. Butler’s oeuvre is full of engagements with 
genetics, from the selectively bred and mutated humans of her first novel 
Patternmaster (1976) to her Xenogenesis series (1987–1989), which depicts 
an alien race called the Oankali, who have the ability to genetically engineer 
themselves and the DNA of others. The latter series in particular has been read 
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as in part a response to sociobiology, a field (considered pseudoscientific by 
some) concerned with the way social behaviour is determined by biology.42 
Butler’s approach to the biological is, however, not deterministic, but evinces 
the kind of approach that is now emerging in humanities’ scholarship on 
post-genomic biology, as encapsulated in the following exchange with an 
interviewer:
ALK: So you’re saying that knowledge of the body can be used to empower and 
not necessarily to determine? OB: Yes. Sure! ALK: Well, the determinism is what 
scares me about sociobiology. OB: Don’t worry about it. ALK: How can you 
not worry about that? OB: Don’t worry about the real biological determinism. 
Worry about what people make of it. Worry about the social Darwinism. After 
all, if sociobiology, or anything like it (people don’t really use that term much 
any more for obvious reasons), is true, then denying it is certainly not going to 
help. What we have to do is learn to work with it and to work against people 
who see it as a good reason to let the poor be poor, that kind of thing-the social 
Darwinism: ‘They must be poor because of their genes,’ that kind of foolishness.43
Butler embraces the biological body, but not biological determinism, situating 
the biological as integral to knowledge of the self and of society because ‘the 
body is all we really know that we have. We can say that there’re always other 
things that are wonderful. And some are. But all we really know that we have 
is the flesh’.44 This is a position which, as her interviewer notes, is at odds with 
‘postmodern thinking and writing which calculates the human body as primarily 
a discursive entity-perhaps in defensive response to the ways genetics studies 
have often allocated political power and influence according to hierarchies of 
raced and gendered bodies’.45 However it is also a position which prefigures the 
more recent new materialist turn towards biology which Sarah Ahmed argues 
has been built on the erasure of earlier feminist engagements with biology,46 
engagements of the kind Butler demonstrates here and has developed in her 
wider fictional writing. Butler’s insistence on the significance of embodied 
knowledge, on ‘body-knowledge’ as ‘what’s made of genetics’,47 instead offers a 
proto-epigenetic understanding of how the dynamic relationship between genes 
and their environment shapes what and how we know ourselves to be, a vision 
which, rather than shying away from the biological, examines what it might 
mean to understand ourselves in these terms, while moving beyond biological 
determinism. It is this form of embodied knowledge and what we might now 
understand as epigenetic embodiment which Butler explores in the context of 
the racism and racialization of US slavery in Kindred.
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The environment of the Weylin plantation to which Dana is transported in 
Kindred is the kind of past environment identified in epigenetic studies of the 
intergenerational effects of slavery as the cause of disparities in health in the 
present. The novel depicts how this environment shapes the bodies of those who 
live within it, but also the bodies of their ancestors, as Dana’s trips back to the 
past come to be defined by the pain and injuries which she permanently sustains 
as a result. Dana’s first meeting with Rufus occurs when she rescues him from 
drowning, but is overwhelmingly defined by her experience of being beaten 
by his mother Margaret, as Dana tries to resuscitate him, before returning – at 
the threat of being shot – wet and muddy to the present with ‘an ache in my 
back and shoulders where Rufus’s mother had pounded with her fists’.48 Such 
injuries only increase as Dana first witnesses the flogging of an enslaved person; 
‘I could literally smell his sweat, hear every ragged breath, every cry, every cut 
of the whip. I could see his body jerking, convulsing, straining against the rope 
as his screaming went on and on. My stomach heaved … .’,49 before experiencing 
something similar herself shortly afterwards, ‘the man tackled me and brought 
me down hard … he began hitting me, punching me with his fists’.50 As she 
becomes accustomed to life on the plantation on one visit, she begins to live like 
other enslaved people, eating ‘corn meal mush’ alongside other slaves, waiting 
to ‘get better food later on after the white folks eat’.51 When sent to work in the 
fields she relates how ‘I didn’t think my shoulders could have hurt much worse if 
they’d been broken. Sweat ran down into my eyes and my hands were beginning 
to blister’.52 Even when she is stationed in the house, tending to Rufus, she cannot 
escape the violence of the Weylins, whether it be from Margaret who ‘threw 
scalding hot coffee at me’53 or her husband Tom Weylin who attacks Dana after 
he discovers that she has been teaching Nigel, an enslaved boy, how to read, ‘I 
never saw where the whip came from, never even saw the first blow coming. But 
it came – like a hot iron across my back, burning into me through my light shirt, 
searing my skin … I screamed, convulsed. Weylin struck again and again, until I 
couldn’t have gotten up at gunpoint’.54 On each visit, Dana is forced to withstand 
the harsh and violent conditions of the plantation, and on each occasion is left 
in the present exhausted and in pain, her injuries getting worse and worse until 
she finally loses her left arm.
Dana comes to understand that there is a marked difference in the impact 
of the racist environment of the Weylin plantation on its black inhabitants and 
the white people whom they live alongside. Dana and Kevin each try to account 
for, and sometimes excuse, Rufus’s behaviour, by thinking of it in environmental 
terms; reflecting on Rufus as a child, Dana thinks that ‘his environment had left 
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its unlikeable marks on him’55 and Kevin counsels her that she will ultimately be 
unable to change Rufus’s behaviour because ‘his environment will be influencing 
him every day you’re gone’.56 The environmental effect of the plantation on 
white people is a psychological one, the ‘marks’ it leaves are on attitudes and 
behaviour, rather than the body, an effect which Dana worries might impact 
upon Kevin when he is also brought back to the past; ‘if he was stranded here for 
years, some part of this place would rub off on him. No large part, I knew. But 
if he survived here, it would be because he managed to tolerate the life here’.57 
Kevin’s ability to survive depends upon his ability to adjust psychologically, 
neither his nor any white bodies are under real threat. However for Dana and 
the other slaves the psychological cannot be separated from the physical; it is 
the terror of violence and pain which shapes their behaviour, something which 
Dana has to experience in order to understand. Prior to being called back, 
Dana’s understanding of slavery is little different to Kevin’s; she ‘has seen people 
beaten on television and in the movies’58 and waiting to be called back again she 
manages to find ‘a compact paperback history of slavery in America’59 which she 
thinks might be useful. She uses her time at home in the 1970s to ‘read books 
about slavery, fiction and nonfiction … I read everything I had in the house that 
was even distantly related to the subject’,60 yet none of it can prepare her for the 
reality. As Sherryl Vint contends, for Dana, ‘being black and knowing “the facts” 
is not enough’, and instead she must come to know what slavery was like through 
her own body, for ‘as long as Dana envisions herself as a disembodied subject, 
she deludes herself that the experience of slavery is safely contained in the past’.61 
For Butler, the trauma of enslavement is something which African Americans 
must learn to live with; it is an embodied intergenerational history which black 
people carry with them, biologically.
Dana has little choice in the matter; she is powerless to prevent herself going 
back in time and returning home without her left arm, and is left to live with a 
significant physical disability that marks her body in the manner comparable to 
the inheritance of health-damaging epigenetic marks. Her life becomes in some 
sense determined by her ancestry in a way which critics of epigenetic science 
have identified as problematic. Meloni writes that ‘the inheritance of acquired 
characters is a double-edged sword … bad habits can become bad biology, 
and the scars of past exposures and traumas can give rise to ideas of specific 
groups being “too damaged” to be rescued’.62 When these purportedly damaged 
groups correspond to racial groupings, there are concerns that a different form 
of biological determinism might ensue; ‘claims of degeneration of specific 
populations for their too long exposure to pathogenic environments have been 
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a significant part of the eugenic experience’,63 Meloni contends, so that rather 
than extinguishing racialization, epigenetic understandings of race risk a kind 
of re-racialization of social debates and are in danger of replicating oppressive 
biologistical projects that have drawn on the science of unfixed characteristics.64 
In this view, Dana’s biological inheritance – represented by her bodily scars and 
mutilation – is determining and limiting, an affirmation, rather than disavowal, 
of the racial forms of categorization which led her ancestors to be treated as slaves 
and created the racist environment which marked their, and Dana’s, bodies.
Yet the novel suggests that, on the contrary, a kind of freedom is in fact 
achieved for Dana through her acquired, intergenerational body knowledge, 
an inheritance which, while physiologically limiting, is also on some level 
empowering and healing when it is fully known and understood. For, before she 
is called back in time, Dana’s life is already bound and ruled by an environment 
saturated with subtle forms of racism and sexism, to which she only becomes 
attuned once she experiences a bodily connection to her ancestors. The past in 
the novel is not only that of the early nineteenth century, but also the much more 
recent past of Dana’s life: as the narrative moves back and forth in time, it often 
returns not to the present but to Dana’s descriptions of her life with Kevin in the 
months before she began to time travel. It is in these descriptions of the more 
recent past that Butler draws parallels between Dana’s life in the present and 
the experience she will have on the Weylin plantation. Dana’s relationship with 
Kevin, around which her immediate past centres, is largely unextraordinary. 
They meet while they are both ‘working out of a casual labor agency’,65 drawn 
together by the fact that they are both writers (and using agency work to 
supplement their income). While Dana narrates her burgeoning love for Kevin, 
it is punctuated by small, subtle, uncomfortable insights into his character: when 
they first meet, Kevin assumes that Dana flunked out of high school, then when 
they start thinking of living together Dana recalls how ‘Kevin did suggest once 
that I get rid of some of my books so that I’d fit into his place’66 and encourages 
her to quit her job. While Dana pushes back, Kevin gets annoyed then angry 
when Dana refuses to type his manuscripts; ‘he said if I couldn’t do him a little 
favour when he asked, I could leave’.67 Kevin’s microaggressions, both racial and 
patriarchal, demonstrate that beneath his relaxed, liberal exterior, he holds little 
regard for Dana’s needs, independence or intellectual life.
Dana has been conditioned to put up with his attitude, but as she begins to 
travel back and forth in time, she begins to relate to his behaviour differently. 
Dana’s first trip to the past occurs when she and Kevin have just moved and 
begins while ‘we were still unpacking – or rather, I was still unpacking. Kevin 
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had stopped when he got his office in order’.68 As she spends more time in the 
nineteenth century, she begins to see small parallels between her petulant, 
needy and narcissistic ancestors Rufus and his father Tom, and Kevin, who 
while maintaining an abhorrence for slavery and defending Dana, cannot 
quite comprehend her experiences. His initial reactions to her inexplicable 
disappearance and reappearance are clumsy; in pain after being beaten by 
Margaret, ‘Kevin hadn’t helped’69 by squeezing Dana’s shoulders, and he declares 
‘that’s a lot better’ when she has cleaned herself up, when for Dana, ‘it wasn’t’.70 
When Dana says ‘I don’t feel secure here’,71 it isn’t only being pulled back to the 
past which is making her uneasy. Fighting off a patroller trying to rape her, Dana 
returns to the present with Kevin on top of her, who before allowing her to rest 
and recover wants to know ‘Did he rape you?’,72 a question he asks her again 
at the end of the novel about Rufus, ‘What’s he done to you?’.73 While Dana 
explains that she hasn’t been raped, Kevin doesn’t quite believe her and his 
attitude betrays the sense of ownership he feels he has over her body; ‘he looked 
at me uncertainly. “Look, if anything did happen, I could understand it. I know 
how it was back then.”’ To which Dana replies, ‘You mean you could forgive 
me for having been raped?’.74 While Dana tries to be as clear as possible, ‘I’m 
not property, Kevin’, he ‘only half understood’.75 The sexual possessiveness Kevin 
feels towards Dana mirrors Rufus’s proprietorship of Alice. Alice has no choice 
but to succumb to Rufus, who threatens to whip her if she resists, and while 
Dana’s relationship with Kevin is chosen, it follows a more subtle patterning that 
Dana can only see clearly once she has been to the past; as she tries to comfort 
Kevin, ‘he pulled away from me and walked out of the room. The expression 
on his face was like something I’d seen, something I was used to seeing on Tom 
Weylin. Something closed and ugly’.76
Thus when Dana narrates at the start of the novel that ‘the trouble began 
long before 9 June 1976, when I became aware of it’,77 she signals her narrative as 
being written with a newly acquired understanding of her (recent) past of which 
she has only become aware through her visits to the nineteenth century and 
her subsequent injuries. Her embodiment of ‘the trouble’ which is the history 
of enslavement and its unacknowledged legacies in the present is necessary for 
her survival as a black woman in the 1970s; for, as Butler suggests, ‘sometimes 
we can work around our programming if we understand it’.78 Dana’s biological 
inheritance – the trauma of racialization and its consequences – cannot be 
ignored but must instead be understood in order to both live with and move 
beyond it, and Dana’s multiple trips back in time offer some suggestion of how 
this might be done. For it is in adopting an altered relation to time and space 
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that Butler suggests that Dana, and by extension African Americans, might 
begin to understand the nature of race and racism differently, to understand 
that the novel’s ‘grim fantasy’ is not the fantastical ability to live in and with 
two moments in time and two different environments at once, but the white 
supremacy and patriarchy which distort and warp the real. Unlike the temporally 
linear, teleological narrative of enslavement presented by Haley in Roots, the 
narrative structure of Kindred moves back and forth in time, until what initially 
feels to Dana like a temporal disjunction becomes familiar and homely; on one 
of her later trips to rescue Rufus, Dana narrates how ‘finally, after more woods 
and fields, the plain square house was before me, its downstairs windows full of 
yellow light. I was startled to catch myself saying wearily, “Home at last”’.79 From 
the first line of the novel, ‘I lost an arm on my last trip home’, Dana signals that 
the plantation is for her as much her home as her new house with Kevin. At the 
Weylins’ ‘Kevin and I became more a part of the household, familiar, accepted, 
accepting’80 and while this acclimatization disturbs Dana she is also aware that ‘I 
had begun to feel – feel, not think – that a great deal of time had passed for me 
too … Some part of me had apparently given up on time-distorted reality and 
smoothed things out’.81 As the novel progresses, Dana’s experience becomes less 
and less fantastical and more real.
On one level, the apparent ease with which Dana can exist across time is 
another way in which she is forced to confront the uncomfortable parallels 
between the past lives of her ancestors and her existence in the present. Yet her 
inability to remain an observer and to ‘maintain the distance’82 between past 
and present, however uncomfortable, is also how she learns to feel ‘at home’ 
with the truth of her family history. Her ancestry is one which, as Philip Miletic 
contends, problematizes ‘the cultural wholeness of an African black identity’ 
that was being promoted by the Black Power movement in the 1970s.83 Dana’s 
discovery that she has a white ancestor, whom she must repeatedly save, 
undermines an idea of race premised on genetic difference by emphasizing 
the entangled genealogies of white and black Americans. Instead, race is made 
through an embodied knowledge in and of the black body, the locus of multiple 
temporal and environmental junctures which coexist; Dana’s body is a site where 
binary distinctions between the fantastic and the real are dissolved, as being 
black becomes – as in Whitehead’s Apex Hides the Hurt – about how, through 
embodiment, to live with, but not be determined by, the (very real) pain and 
trauma of the past. If epigenetics, as Becky Mansfield and Julie Guthman 
contend, ‘moves toward a notion of biological difference as part of the warp 
and weave of space and time’,84 then we might consider Butler’s time travelling 
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tale as a form of post-genomic writing, a novel which models, in its narrative 
structure, a way of living with ‘a new form of racialization based on processes of 
becoming rather than on pre-given nature’.85 Mansfield and Guthman caution 
that research into these processes of racialization, while appearing anti-racist, 
is in danger of pathologizing epigenetic plasticity by seeking to improve and 
‘normalize’ epigenetic variation, which is increasingly conceived of as ‘abnormal’ 
and categorized as disease.86 Kindred, however, attempts no such correction: 
Dana never attempts to alter history and there is no attempt to change her body 
from being marked and scarred. Instead, Butler presents Dana’s new-found body 
knowledge as a form of empowerment, a means of understanding what it means 
to be African American – which is to live with racialization across space and 
time and with the fantasy of racial categorization.
Acquiring race in The Satanic Verses
Where Kindred is primarily interested in the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics, The Satanic Verses is more concerned with how biological 
markers might be acquired from certain environmental exposures during an 
individual’s lifetime. A dense and complex novel, The Satanic Verses is about the 
experiences of immigrants in Britain in the  1980s under Margaret Thatcher’s 
conservative government. The novel follows the lives of two Indian immigrants, 
actors Saladin Chamcha and Gibreel Farishta, as they struggle to make their way 
in London following their abrupt arrival in England; in one of many fantastical 
moments, the narrative opens with Saladin and Gibreel falling to earth from an 
exploded jumbo jet which has been hijacked by terrorists. In London, Gibreel 
struggles with mental illness, while Saladin becomes part of the multicultural 
community of Brickhall (an amalgam of Brick Lane and Southall) before they 
eventually both return to Bombay. The novel became famous for the controversy 
which surrounded Rushdie’s depictions of Gibreel’s visions, and the resulting 
fatwa calling for Rushdie’s death which was issued on  14  February  1989. Yet 
this focus obscured Rushdie’s detailed portrayal of experiences of racism in late-
twentieth-century England, a portrayal which, I want to suggest, like Kindred, 
offers a proto-epigenetic understanding of the impact of racism upon the body.
Rushdie is a writer who has become increasingly interested in biological 
science and its relationship to fiction. In  2009, the twentieth anniversary of 
the fatwa against his life, Rushdie became a member of the advisory board 
of Project Reason, a not-for-profit organization (now no longer in existence) 
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set up with the purpose of spreading secular values and scientific knowledge 
in society. The project, whose board members included writers Ian McEwan 
and Ayann Hirsi Ali, as well as several prominent contemporary biologists and 
geneticists including Richard Dawkins, Steven Pinker and Craig Venter, brought 
together thinkers from the literary and scientific worlds who share in the belief 
that rational thinking, science and secularism need to be asserted in the face 
of the irrationality and fundamentalism of religious belief, particularly as it is 
manifested in Islam and the strands of American Christianity which promote 
creationism. Rushdie’s involvement is perhaps not surprising given his increasing 
participation in public debates about Islam following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 
and 7 July 2005, debates which have often sought to construct Islamic belief as a 
pre-modern dogma irreconcilable with the West which, in contrast, is heralded 
as the embodiment of rational, progressive thought.87 Yet what Project Reason 
added to the debate, and made explicit, was the specifically scientific character 
of the reason it promoted; the project placed biological science and evolutionary 
theory at the centre of its response to religious belief, as the ultimate answer to 
it. Rushdie has increasingly adopted the logic of evolutionary biology as a means 
of explaining – and defending – storytelling, as a way of foreclosing objections 
to literary expression, such as those put forward at the publication of The Satanic 
Verses. In recent interviews Rushdie claims that the ‘story instinct is hardwired 
in our DNA’88 and that ‘any external limitations on our ability to speak, or on 
the content of our speech, therefore, interferes with something essential to us 
all, whether we are writers or not’.89 Stressing the innateness and universality 
of storytelling through a neo-Darwinian framework in which we are all ‘story-
telling animals’,90 Rushdie appears to align himself with the evolutionary 
explanations of literature to be found in sociobiology and the Literary Darwinist 
movement.
In this context it might seem unlikely that Rushdie’s writing could engage 
with the fluidity, plasticity and non-deterministic character of epigenetics – the 
opposite of the deterministic worldview which characterizes neo-Darwinian 
approaches to biology and literature. Yet as several critics have noted, Rushdie’s 
non-fictional writing and journalism are consistently more polemical than his 
fiction, the ideological clarity of the former at odds with the more ambivalent, 
contradictory character of the latter.91 Moreover there has been a ‘profound 
ideological shift’92 in Rushdie’s thinking, which began with the fatwa against him 
in 1989, but was cemented by the events of 9/11.93 Indeed, Rushdie’s engagement 
with evolutionary biology prior to this ‘shift’, in The Satanic Verses itself, is of 
a more complex kind than the neo-Darwinian view he would later come to 
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adopt. The novel does reflect Rushdie’s scepticism towards the kinds of religious 
fundamentalism which deny Darwinian evolution: waking from a nap during 
his flight to the UK, Saladin finds himself sitting next to Eugene Dumsday, an 
American creationist who introduces himself as ‘a man of science’ and explains 
that he has been in India
warning your fellow men … against Mr Darwin and his works. With the assistance 
of my personal fifty-seven slide presentation. I spoke of my own country, of its 
young people … I see them in despair, turning to narcotics … If I believed that 
my great-granddaddy was a chimpanzee, why, I’d be pretty depressed myself.94
As his name suggests, Dumsday is dumb, his blinkered religious fundamentalism 
can only be laughed at – Saladin’s response is to ‘giggle’95 – and Dumsday’s 
sermonizing is comically undermined when later in the novel Saladin hears him 
on the radio and he now embodies the things which he abhors; the devil (having 
‘lost the half of his tongue’96 in the hijacking incident) and modern biomedical 
science, which has enabled his tongue to be rebuilt ‘with flesh taken from his 
posterior’.97
Yet the novel resists taking its own fundamentalist stance towards biology and 
instead draws upon a pre-Darwinian theory of evolution, Lamarckism, as a means 
of addressing one of its foremost themes – the condition of migrancy. As Saladin 
and Gibreel fall through the sky they encounter ‘the debris of the soul, broken 
memories, sloughed-off selves, severed mother-tongues, violated privacies, 
untranslatable jokes, extinguished futures, lost loves, the forgotten meaning of 
hollow, booming words, land, belonging, home’.98 These are the changes wrought 
on the individual by migration, Rushdie suggests, and to emphasize their force, 
such change is depicted as being manifested in a physical change in the body of 
the migrant. Saladin and Gibreel metamorphose as they fall, the ‘processes of 
their transmutation’99 playfully explained by the narrator through reference to 
the early-nineteenth-century botanist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck:
Mutation?
Yes sir, but not random. Up there in air-space, in that soft, imperceptible 
field which had been made possible by the century and which, thereafter, 
made the century possible, becoming one of its defining locations, the place of 
movement and of war, the planet- shrinker and power-vacuum, most insecure 
and transitory of zones, illusory, discontinuous, metamorphic, -because when 
you throw everything up in the air anything becomes possible – wayupthere, at 
any rate, changes took place in delirious actors that would have gladdened the 
heart of old Mr Lamarck: under extreme environmental pressure, characteristics 
were acquired.100
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Rushdie comically invokes Lamarckian evolution as the magical science which 
explains the immigrants’ equally magical transmutation by migration: just as 
Lamarck ‘draws on mythic concepts of metamorphosis and transformation and 
explains them causally’,101 Rushdie’s narrator and his characters offer Lamarck 
as the explanation for the migrants’ newly acquired characteristics. Later in 
the novel, when Muhammad Sufyan, a landlord of the rooming house above 
the Shaandaar Café, tries to account for Saladin’s mutation to the Shaandaar 
residents, it is Lamarck to whom he turns:
The theories of Lamarck, I am pleased to report, were quoted by the exiled 
schoolteacher, who spoke in his best didactic voice. When Jumpy had recounted 
the unlikely story of Chamcha’s fall from the sky … Sufyan, sucking teeth, 
made reference to the last edition of The Origin of Species. ‘In which even 
great Charles accepted the notion of mutation in extremis, to ensure survival 
of species; so what if his followers – always more Darwinian than the man 
himself!  – repudiated, posthumously, such Lamarckian heresy, insisting on 
natural selection and nothing but, – however, I am bound to admit, such a 
theory is not extended to survival of individual specimen but only to species as 
a whole;- in addition, regarding nature of mutation, problem is to comprehend 
actual utility of the change.’102
Here, Sufyan recognizes – in the manner of some contemporary commentators 
on epigenetics – that Lamarckism is limited in its ability to explain the acquisition 
of characteristics which aren’t adaptive but are instead damaging. For it is 
apparent to the migrants that it is the socially and culturally hostile environment 
of England which dictates the nature of the characteristics they go on to acquire.
Picked up by the police and immigration officers, who abuse him in the 
back of their van, dragging off his clothes, beating him and making him eat his 
own excrement, Saladin becomes the ‘animal’103 they call him, growing horns, 
hairy thighs and hoofs, ‘squealing like a pig’104 before being beaten unconscious. 
Saladin’s literal dehumanization is a direct result of the racism to which he is 
subject, and he is taken to a medical facility at the detention centre where he 
is surrounded by other immigrants who, the manticore in the bed next to him 
explains, have undergone similar transformations; ‘“there’s a woman over that 
way,” it said, “who is now mostly water-buffalo. There are businessmen from 
Nigeria who have grown sturdy tails. There is a group of holidaymakers from 
Senegal who were doing no more than changing planes when they were turned 
into slippery snakes”’.105 The experience of racism manifests itself in physical, 
bodily changes which the immigrants themselves can hardly believe are true: 
in the face of the impossible, Saladin is forced to remind himself that ‘he was 
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a member of the real world’,106 that ‘I am a real man’,107 and is particularly 
confounded by the fact that the police officers who abuse him are not alarmed 
by his mutation; ‘what puzzled Chamcha was that a circumstance which struck 
him as utterly bewildering and unprecedented – that is, his metamorphosis into 
this supernatural imp – was being treated by the others as if it were the most 
banal and familiar matter they could imagine’.108 Yet the police officers are not 
surprised by Saladin’s appearance because for them it is not unreal or impossible; 
they see immigrants as animals and as less than human, and that becomes their 
reality. The enduring effect of racism is to make the imaginary real, as Saladin 
finally discovers in hospital; ‘“they describe us,” the other whispered solemnly. 
“That’s all. They have the power of description, and we succumb to the pictures 
they construct.”’109
Rushdie’s insistence that it is racism which creates race, that the immigrants’ 
difference is constructed and made rather than biologically fixed or inherited, 
has clear parallels with epigenetic studies which locate seemingly racial 
characteristics as the biological embodiment of cultural and environmental 
circumstances. Rushdie’s (like Butler’s) representation of these processes, 
however, is of course ‘unrealistic’: changes to genetic structures are not the 
same as physical human–animal metamorphosis. This raises the question of 
what value such a magical–realist fictional representation can have for how we 
think about epigenetics; can Rushdie’s fantastic depictions of humanity shed any 
light on a scientific (epigenetic) understanding of life and of race? A similar 
question is posed by Ian McEwan in his  2005 novel Saturday, in which the 
novel’s neuroscientist protagonist, Henry Perowne, questions the efficacy of the 
magical–realist style of contemporary writers, including Rushdie:
What were these authors of reputation doing – grown men and women of the 
twentieth century – granting supernatural powers to their characters? He never 
made it all the way through a single one of those irksome confections. And 
written for adults, not children. In more than one, heroes and heroines were 
born with or sprouted wings … Others were granted a magical sense of smell, or 
tumbled unharmed out of high-flying aircraft.110
Perowne objects to fictions such as The Satanic Verses because they are not 
grounded in a ‘recognizable physical reality’; their magical or supernatural 
forms evidence, in Perowne’s view, of an ‘insufficient imagination’ because ‘the 
actual, not the magical, should be the challenge’.111 However what The Satanic 
Verses works to show is precisely that the actual and the magical are not as 
easily separable as Perowne imagines them to be. The value of Rushdie’s magical 
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representation of the formation of race lies in its very ability to reveal the dynamic 
relationship between the imaginary and the real; the immigrants’ unprecedented 
animalistic transformations work to show the arbitrariness, absurdity, but also 
the ultimate power of the racist belief which shapes their reality. When Jumpy 
Joshi offers racism as an explanation of Saladin’s transmutation – an alternative 
to Sufyan’s invocation of Lamarck – this is a truth which the immigrants can 
accept: ‘“what has happened here? A: wrongful arrest, intimidation, violence. 
Two: Illegal detention, unknown medical experimentation in hospital,” – 
murmurs of assent here, as memories of intra-vaginal inspections, Depo-
Provera scandals, unauthorized post-partum sterilizations, and further back, 
the knowledge of Third World drug-dumping arose in every person present to 
give substance to the speaker’s insinuations’.112 Saladin’s physical transformation 
can be accepted because ‘what you believe depends on what you’ve seen, – 
not only what is visible, but what you are prepared to look in the face’.113 In a 
manner comparable to Dana’s gradual understanding of the realities of slavery 
in Kindred, once the migrants of The Satanic Verses acknowledge the force of 
their racist environment upon them, their bodies’ physiological responses are no 
longer inexplicable or strange. In the context of an emerging epigenetic science, 
Rushdie’s magical representation of processes of racial formation highlights 
what is latent in emerging epigenetic studies; namely that race is no more than a 
powerful biofiction made real by racism.
Towards a literary epigenetics
Writing in 2005, five years after the mapping of the human genome, geneticist 
Johnjoe McFadden noted that the idea that there are ‘genes for’ certain 
diseases and conditions was already beginning to crumble. Systems biology, 
he argued, has revealed that ‘rather than having a single major function, most 
genes … probably play a small part in lots of tasks within the cell’.114 Genes can 
no longer be considered ‘discrete nuggets of genetic information’ but are ‘diffuse 
entities whose functional reality may be spread across hundreds of interacting 
DNA segments’.115 The complexity of the system, in contrast to the reductionism 
of the gene-centric biology that dominated the latter half of the twentieth century, 
is comparable, in McFadden’s view, to the ‘holistic approaches’ which have 
‘always dominated the humanities and social sciences’.116 He ends his article with 
the following example: ‘The first eight chapters of Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s 
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Children describes the lives of the narrator’s grandparents, parents, aunts, uncles 
and friends against the backdrop of the tumultuous politics of  20th-century 
India and Pakistan. The reason, according to the narrator, is that “to understand 
just one life, you have to swallow the world”. Perhaps biologists ought to have 
read more’.117 McFadden’s suggestion, that fiction has already imagined the kinds 
of complexity that post-genomic biology is only now beginning to uncover, 
and that biologists might learn from literary ways of knowing the world, is a 
provocative one. Few scholars, whether literary or scientific in background, have 
suggested that literature might offer models or approaches which science might 
look towards, undoubtedly wary of reviving the clashes of the culture wars of 
the 1990s. Although McFadden’s call for biologists to read more is perhaps made 
somewhat flippantly, in inviting the literary into the realm of the biological, 
positioning it as a discipline of comparable epistemological weight with the 
capacity (even when not addressing science directly) to influence how genetics is 
conceptualized and understood, McFadden’s article raises interesting questions 
about the role that fiction might play in post-genomic biology as it moves 
towards a complex, non-deterministic conception of the gene. If new genetic 
understandings of the body have been in some way previously conceived of in 
fiction, then how can fiction guide understanding of these emerging scientific 
insights?
In the case of both Kindred and The Satanic Verses, fiction highlights what 
might be necessary for the creation of an anti-racist epigenetics; that is, an 
understanding of the inextricability of the body and its environment in which 
‘the environment’ is understood to encompass both historical and contemporary 
racist practices. Evelyn Fox Keller, writing on the ‘cellular complex’ around 
the gene which ‘not only reads, translates, and interprets that sequence, but 
also defines it’,118 claims that ‘when scientists attempt to score the effects of 
nurture, that concept has already been substantially trivialized, focusing almost 
exclusively on physical resources. Heritability studies, for example, rarely if ever 
include such factors as maternal love, community values, or racist expectations 
in their measures. The same must be said of the new sociogenomics’.119 The 
potential danger of epigenetics, and the sociological discourses taking shape 
around it, is that a limited understanding of the environment might in turn limit 
the scope of investigation and possibility. Biologists need, according to Keller, ‘a 
language capable of expressing how the beliefs, expectations, and behaviour of 
others constitutes an individual’s environment and, in turn, work to shape both 
the body and the behaviour of that individual’.120 While Keller looks towards 
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cultural anthropology for this language, the language of literature can also offer 
a point of entry for comprehending this process. Kindred and The Satanic Verses 
offer visions of a body–environment dynamic which foregrounds racism as a 
central factor in biological inheritance and development, offering fantastical 
representations of bodily transformation which underscore how cultural fantasies 
and fictions determine real, environmental conditions. The dissolution of the 
boundaries between reality and fiction in these texts not only parallels but also 
pushes further the collapse of nature/nurture and biology/culture distinctions 
in post-genomic biology. They create space for the possibility that fiction itself 
might be taken seriously as a significant shaper of human environments, for if 
racist fantasies can have such power, then why not anti-racist literary fictions? 
While these novels represent the problematic marks left on bodies by racist 
environments, they also express the potential that there might be in knowing the 
body in this way – a potential for an altered understanding of reality and truth 
based on an acknowledgement of the fact that ‘absent environmental factors, 
genes have no more power to shape the development of an individual than do 
environmental factors in the absence of genes’.121
As the initial ‘hype’ around epigenetics dies down, more and more concerns 
are being raised about the potential of this science to do harm. For Mansfield 
and Guthman, ‘epigenetics produces an intensified racialization because it 
redefines difference as epigenetic damage’122 and ‘if epigenetics is about how 
racism and disadvantage get under the skin, it normalizes white bodies and 
behaviors and reinforces the idea that people of color need to emulate the 
environments and behaviors of rich white people in order to protect themselves 
and their offspring’.123 These concerns should certainly be taken seriously, but 
in the face of continuing attempts to define race more traditionally as simply 
‘in the genes’, epigenetics provides a radical opportunity for the re-thinking of 
race. It enables a much-needed reassertion of the importance of both historical 
and contemporary forms of racial discrimination, factors often excluded from 
identity-focused theorizations of race in the biosciences. There is no denying the 
harm that ensues from racist environments, and epigenetics does not necessarily 
enable us to move past racial thinking altogether, but it does call for a change 
in our understanding of processes of racialization, a change in our notion of 
the boundaries between reality and fiction. Novels such as Kindred and The 
Satanic Verses can help us to navigate this new understanding of the formation 
of race, but also offer ways of overcoming the potential pitfalls that it presents. 
By demonstrating that the imagined must be acknowledged, accounted for and 
ultimately accepted as part of ‘the real’ in a science which itself was not long 
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ago considered ‘magical’, they create space for their own fictions to be taken 
seriously in a genetic culture, as sites of knowledge about how people living with 
the experience of racialization, while they may be harmed by their biological 
inheritance or development, also have to learn to live with the knowledge of 
how it is formed. These novels are repositories of embodied knowledge which 
can inform a scientific reality which is constantly changing and incorporating 
what was previously unreal. They evidence the ‘power of description’, be it in the 
racist thought of slave owners and immigration officials or in fictional works 
themselves, in shaping the environments in which we live.
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On 2 January 2019, PBS premiered a documentary on the life of Nobel Prize–
winning geneticist and co-discoverer (with Francis Crick, Rosalind Franklin 
and Maurice Wilkins) of the structure of DNA – James Watson. In  2007, 
Watson, the one-time head of the Human Genome Project, had claimed in a 
newspaper interview that he was ‘inherently gloomy about the prospect of 
Africa’ because ‘all our social policies are based on the fact that their intelligence 
is the same as ours – whereas all the testing says not really’.1 In the wake of his 
comments a number of his planned speaking engagements were cancelled, and 
his employers, the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory in Long Island, suspended 
him as their Chancellor. In 2014 he auctioned off his Nobel medal, citing his 
ostracization from the scientific community as a result of his remarks on race 
as the reason. Asked by the interviewer of the 2019 PBS documentary whether 
his views on genetics, intelligence and race had changed, Watson replied, ‘No, 
not at all … There’s a difference on the average between blacks and whites on IQ 
tests. I would say the difference is genetic’.2 These comments led to him being 
stripped of the last of his honorary titles, the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory 
describing his comments as ‘unsubstantiated and reckless personal opinions’, 
‘reprehensible’ and ‘unsupported by science’.3
In many ways, Watson’s deterministic conception of genetics, his insistence 
on the separation of nature from nurture, is out-of-step with the latest scientific 
developments and thinking in his field, an old-fashioned view of the gene which 
parallels what biologist Joseph Graves claims is an old-fashioned understanding 
of race: writing in response to the PBS documentary, Graves argues that Watson’s 
views are a ‘product of his time’, of the fact that he ‘was born into a rigidly 
segregated society. For much of his life, most biologists and anthropologists 
perpetuated the notion of race science’, a background which leaves Watson 
unable to process more recent genetic findings that ‘socially-defined races do 
not correspond to the underlying genetic variation within our species’.4 While 
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Graves acknowledges the toxicity of Watson’s views, and their contribution 
to racism in the United States, Graves implies that such genetic views of race 
are confined to an older generation of scientists as he presents contemporary 
genetics as having moved on from such ideas. It is true that Watson’s extreme 
and overtly racist views have been widely condemned within the scientific 
community, a community which is now largely anti-racist in intent.5 However 
as the case studies in this book highlight, contemporary genetics cannot be 
characterized as a science which has entirely separated itself from racial or 
indeed sometimes racist ways of thinking. Not only have developments such 
as the Human Genome Diversity Project and BiDil continued to promote 
racialized forms of categorization alongside the wider scientific denial of the 
genetic reality of race, but the rejection and attempted disruption of genetic 
conceptions of race, apparent in the African Eve hypothesis and the HGP, have, 
as is evident in the Graves’s example here, often occurred through the scientific 
separation of the social from the genetic. Race is framed as a social problem 
while current genetic science is framed as distinct from that which went before. 
I have argued that these separations, while not overt expressions of racism of 
the kind espoused by Watson, have combined with the dismissal of the genetic 
reality of race to enable the recurrence of racial patterns of thinking and racist 
outcomes in a science which otherwise declares itself to be anti-racist. The anti-
racist stance of contemporary genetics has occurred in the absence of a scientific 
consensus on what race is, and it is what Rob DeSalle and Ian Tattersall call the 
‘widespread confusion’ that ‘still exists about the nature of the evidence on which 
the human species is subdivided’6 which creates the void in which people like 
James Watson – a real-life Dr Sick – can promote genetic racism.
This book has argued for a new, literary intervention into these debates, 
premised on the fact that contemporary fictions refuse the biology/culture, 
science/society binaries that are still promoted by scientists and literary scholars 
alike. Rather than accepting one scientific stance over another, or endorsing 
some science as straightforwardly factually correct (as some literary scholars 
of race have done), the contemporary novels discussed in this book compel us 
never to lose sight of the ways in which all ideas about race are formed from 
complex entanglements across the biological and cultural realms. The novels 
demonstrate how literature itself is bound up, in different ways, in these racial 
biofictions, whether it be in the influence of Alex Haley’s Roots on the creation 
of popular narratives of African ancestry in bioanthropology, or in the literary 
metaphors and language used by the scientific community as explored in White 
Teeth and Apex Hides the Hurt. In articulating how facts and fantasies of race 
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cannot be comprehended individually, how fiction and science share forms, 
methodologies, language and imagery, the novels offer a new understanding of 
race as biofictional, regardless of whether a particular racial idea or development 
is presented as anti-racist in formation and effect. What the novels offer at a 
moment when genetic science is widely understood to be anti-racist is an 
understanding of how this anti-racism is narratively constructed, of how the 
contemporary cogeneration of ideas about race across the boundaries of biology 
and culture means that the genetics of race is not impermeable to racism and that 
older racial thinking is always latent in the new. While Whitehead demonstrates 
this by evoking the absurd racist theories of nineteenth-century surgeon Samuel 
Cartwright as a precursor to pharmacogenetics’ reliance on language to make 
race signify, Ishiguro and Rushdie evoke Darwinian and Lamarckian theories, 
respectively, as they imagine how earlier theories of biological similarity and 
change might continue to shape race’s biofictional formations in the present.
In so doing, the novels resist the break with history emphasized in much 
contemporary genetic discourse, and instead encourage us to imagine how the 
continuities between bioscience past and present might not only result in the 
repetition of certain racial modes of thought, but might also offer an alternative 
to the certainties about race that genetic science attempts to assert. For by 
invoking the precedents for contemporary genetic ideas of race, and in so doing 
demonstrating how race has always been biofictional, the novels ultimately 
suggest that the meaning of race will never be fixed, that the biofictional nature 
of race means it will always be subject to change and revision as it is formed 
and reformed across the cultural, social and scientific spheres. Indeed, this is 
the suggestion of the book’s final chapter; epigenetic science, in foregrounding 
how bodies are in a fluid, dynamic relationship with their environments, offers 
us a way of understanding the fluidity of race itself, which is made and re-made 
at the intersections of scientific fact and fiction, of the biological body and its 
environment (where the environment, as Butler and Rushdie demonstrate, 
is often shaped by the racist imaginaries of the dominant political culture). 
Understanding race in this way might, I argue, offer the opportunity for a 
renewed anti-racism in science and literary studies based on an understanding 
of the permeability, rather than fixity, of racialized bodies.
The global political climate in the final years of the 2010s makes it in some 
ways understandable that scientists have attempted to create a narrative around 
race which, despite (or perhaps because of) frequent interventions of the kind 
made by Watson, presents contemporary genetics as largely unified in its anti-
racism and in its refusal of a biological basis for race. For we are living through 
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a moment at which scientific expertise and facts are being brought into question 
by conservative politicians in the United States and UK who have sought to 
win popularity and votes through degrading expert scientific knowledge and 
academic expertise.7 Partly in response to President Donald Trump’s denial of 
the phenomena and effects of climate change and his apparent anti-vaccination 
stance among other positions, a worldwide March for Science was held in 
April 2017, ‘inspired by a growing concern about the lack of science in policy’ 
and calling for a ‘science that upholds the common good, and for political 
leaders and policymakers to enact evidence-based policies in the public interest’.8 
In the context of the political downplaying of the efficacy of science, and the 
questioning and misuse of scientific ideas by right-wing politicians and groups, 
it is unsurprising that scientists have sought to double down on the importance 
of scientific fact, and of science as an objective set of disciplinary procedures 
based strictly on verifiable evidence. When it comes to race, the global political 
climate has resulted in the increasing misuse of science for racist ends. As Andrea 
Morris, who worked on the film about James Watson, has pointed out, ‘It’s not 
an old story of an old guy with old views’ but instead the correlation between 
race, genetics and intelligence which Watson postulates, ‘feels very current’.9 
Many scientists are concerned by the ways in which their work is being misused 
and misinterpreted by white supremacists, who increasingly draw on a variety of 
genetic technologies such as DNA ancestry tracing, and discuss scientific papers 
on far-right online forums as they search for scientific backing for their racist 
views.10 The situation has become of so much concern that in November 2018 the 
American Society of Human Genetics issued a statement denouncing attempts 
to link genetics and racial supremacy, affirming that ‘genetics demonstrates that 
humans cannot be divided into biologically distinct subcategories’.11
In this context the definite and definitive language used by geneticists who 
affirm the non-genetic basis of race is comprehensible, their insistence that 
science offers the final word on race a defence against those within science 
and without who are increasingly questioning this ‘fact’. Literary scholars have 
adopted similar positions on the scientific facts of race. Not only have scholars 
of race largely accepted the anti-racist outlook of contemporary genetics, but 
on the relatively few occasions when literature and science scholarship has 
addressed the question of race in science, a comparable approach to science 
emerges: Sabine Sielke, for example, asks why ‘curiously enough, while 
biology encourages us to “forget about” race, literary and cultural studies keep 
celebrating – and selling – ethnic difference. Was C.P. Snow right, after all, 
when he deemed the “literary intellectual” a racist while cheering the scientist 
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as truly liberal, envisioning a bright future?’12 While she acknowledges that 
‘matters are, of course, a bit more complicated’,13 here, it is literary studies, 
with its insistence on classifying writers according to race, indeed even in its 
emphasis on debating and discussing race, which, rather than science, is framed 
as responsible for the continuation of racial thinking within the academy.14 Yet 
it is in the very lack of attention given to black and minority ethnic writers 
within literature and science studies that we can discern the problems with 
both the avoidance of race as a subject of enquiry and with the critical belief 
that science has once and for all solved the problem of race, tempting as it 
might be to accept this as fact.
In interrogating the ‘facts’ of anti-racist science in this book, there is a danger 
that my own critical stance could be aligned with those who seek to undermine 
science, that in questioning the objectivity and neutrality of the anti-racist 
discourses of contemporary genetics and the literary critical acceptance of these 
discourses, my approach could be interpreted (although it certainly is not) as 
an endorsement of their opposite – a conception of race as grounded in the 
genes. This is a bind which Bruno Latour addresses in relation to climate change 
denial, one of the things which he argues has been made possible by postmodern 
forms of critique in the humanities, which in the 1990s could be characterized, 
he contends, by the argument that ‘facts are made up, that there is no such thing 
as natural, unmediated, unbiased access to truth, that we are always prisoners of 
language’.15 For Latour, and those he has inspired in literary studies, emphasizing 
a lack of scientific certainty has deleterious effects: the critical questioning of 
scientific truth becomes just another form of the kind of popularism from which 
conspiracy theories arise, no matter how much the latter deforms the former.16 
The solution he proposes is to flip critique so that rather than questioning 
objectivity, the task is to reveal ‘the real objective and incontrovertible facts 
hidden behind the illusion of prejudices’.17 When it comes to race, this would 
mean the upholding of the incontrovertible fact that race is not genetic, in order 
to counter racist prejudice. In focusing on analysing science and scientists, 
humanities scholars may have chosen ‘the wrong enemies’ according to Latour, 
and the problem with critique is that ‘when we try to reconnect scientific objects 
with their aura, their crown, their web of associations, when we accompany them 
back to their gathering, we always appear to weaken them, not to strengthen their 
claim to reality’.18 The solution he proposes is for the critic to reposition herself 
as one who assembles and one who gathers together (rather than rips apart).19
The aim of this book has been not to destroy or break apart the scientific 
finding that race has no biological basis. I believe that racial categorizations, 
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divisions between ‘black’ and ‘white’, do not correlate to specific genetic markers 
and that there is more genetic diversity within populations demarcated by race 
than there is between them. This book is also driven by the desire for an anti-
racist science and literary culture equipped with the tools to fight the falsehoods 
and stories about race being increasingly promoted by racist white supremacists. 
But it is precisely because of this anti-racist aim that I have been concerned to 
explore the political, cultural and scientific conditions which have made the 
apparent anti-racist stance of contemporary genetics possible. While such an 
analysis of the threads that make up this scientific position may appear to ‘weaken’ 
the reality that race is not genetic by uncovering the biofictional assemblages of 
which it is made, the consequence of not investigating the formation and effects 
of the anti-racist tenor of genetics is the reproduction of the very racism which 
this scientific stance seeks to avoid. From the apparently raceless clones of Never 
Let Me Go, to Marcus Chalfen’s insistence that his genetic experimentation is 
post-racial in White Teeth, to the stereotypes of African and black people which 
emerge in Roots and which informed bioanthropological narratives on the unity 
of humankind, the contemporary novels in this book demonstrate how racial 
configurations emerge at moments when science appears to move beyond race. 
They show how the political post-racialism and colourblind ideologies which 
would deny the very existence of racism itself have gained strength from the 
scientific finding that race is not genetic, and explore what the consequences 
of this might be. Understanding how the anti-racist import of science has in 
fact been enabled and driven at times by a lack of concern about racism is 
essential if we are to move towards the alternative, anti-racist conceptions of race 
and racism put forward in the final chapter – an understanding of race as the 
biological impact of racist belief, as fiction made real through bodies’ exposure 
to environments shaped by racist fantasies.
This book has proposed a methodology through which such configurations 
might be uncovered and analysed, a methodology which draws upon, rather than 
unthinkingly critiques, scientific ideas, in particular new post-genomic ideas 
about the permeability of bodies in relation to their (cultural) environments, 
environments which I have argued might be expanded in conception to 
include the fictional, the imaginary and the made-up. Yet this interdisciplinary 
approach has also had at its core a desire to seek out literary engagements with 
science, and intersections between science and fiction, which are otherwise 
overlooked by a field dominated by the analysis of literature written by white, 
Anglophone authors. While the racial backgrounds of the authors in this study 
has not been an organizing principle, it is perhaps unsurprising that it is in the 
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work of writers of colour that ideas about race and science emerge, and it is 
in their work that alternatives to the Latourian view of the world (steeped as 
it is in European philosophy) might be found. Creating an interdisciplinarity 
based upon exchange and openness between literary studies and bioscience 
is not enough; what this book calls for is a decolonized approach to literature 
and science, an approach that does not simply encompass the analysis of work 
by non-white writers, but demands that the forms of knowledge found within 
their works and beyond be brought to bear on the methodologies that scholars 
in this field employ. Calls for decolonized forms of knowledge – a knowledge 
which foregrounds the intellectual and critical work of non-European thinkers 
while acknowledging the racist roots of some canonical scholarship – currently 
abound in the academy, in both the sciences and the humanities. That these 
demands for ‘alternative facts’ have occurred at the same moment at which 
academic knowledge is being questioned and distorted by popularist politicians 
and fascist groups has caused some confusion, and in some cases only added to 
academics’ sense that their work is under attack. Yet the two are quite different, 
and in the case of calls for a decolonized knowledge, I think that this movement 
might actually assist scholars interested in how the traditional boundaries of 
the humanities and science are being, and might be, reconfigured. For what the 
decolonization movement calls for—and where I believe that it might inform 
approaches to, and understanding of, the field of literature and science—is an 
analysis and acknowledgement of the critical role that classification plays in 
shaping knowledge: both literature and science scholars and decolonization 
scholars are concerned with the constitution of and relationships between 
disciplines, in how some knowledge is variously ordered and valued in relation 
to other forms of knowledge.20 Interdisciplinarity itself emerged through 
ethnic studies, black studies and women’s studies in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s 
as a means of critiquing power in the face of disciplinary mechanisms that 
reproduced certain relations of power.21
Yet interdisciplinary research today, at least that concerned with the sciences 
and the humanities, has largely overlooked this fact, and as a result is still often 
shaped and determined by the very disciplinary structures that it is seeking to 
move beyond. The field of literature and science studies has arguably been built 
upon an approach which places canonical writers and works in conversation 
with science (which, conversely, is often lesser known or peripheral) and 
leaves the structures of English studies – including the prioritization of writers 
traditionally considered important or significant – intact.22 The works of black 
and minority ethnic writers are, it can be assumed, thought to be the province of 
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postcolonial scholars, as is the issue of race. Thus little attention has been given 
to the fact that English studies as a discipline as well as the publishing industry 
continue to categorize and classify literature based on modes of thought which 
have their origins in the biological (and therefore racial) sciences. Inspired by 
the organizational principles of biology, attempts were made in the nineteenth 
century (under the aegis of genre theory) to arrange literary texts in taxonomic 
order.23 The legacy of such historical exchanges, Sielke argues, can be seen today 
in ‘technical terms (such as origin, genus, genre, gender, reproduction and 
mimicry) and cultural practices (like classification and taxonomy) which both 
biology and literary studies employ to their own particular ends’,24 literary and 
cultural studies having ‘evolved some of their central questions and concerns, 
privileged theories, methods and concepts from a dialogue with the discourses 
of biology’.25 The taxonomic patterns of literary studies have their roots in 
nineteenth-century biology which in turn, as I argued in the introduction, 
formed and shaped ideas about race through processes of exchange with the 
humanities at the height of imperialism. Thus while as Levine notes, ‘despite 
the fact that many – if not most – of us practicing literary criticism have a 
distaste for nationalist and imperialist agendas, and understand literatures as 
transnational formations that include multiple languages and geographies’, 
nevertheless ‘the institutional patterns of nineteenth and early twentieth century 
English departments persist’.26 In this way the situation of contemporary literary 
studies appears much like that of anti-racist science – mine is a discipline whose 
practitioners profess to be anti-racist but have done too little to question the 
underpinning assumptions that organize scholarship. The academy, at least 
in the UK, remains preoccupied with how British writers of ethnic minority 
backgrounds can be described and classified, and it is the way that such writing 
and scholarship is often separated from English (read white) literature that has 
led scholars interested in interdisciplinarity to overlook how the work of writers 
of colour might inform approaches to literature and science.
This book is an attempt to re-think the boundaries between science and 
literary studies, but also the artificial divisions within literary studies itself, 
to demonstrate how engaging with the idea of race, and with writers who 
have examined the dimensions and afterlives of this concept, can transform 
understanding of the relations between science and literature. The novels 
examined in this book each, in different ways, offer biofictional understandings 
of race in the contemporary era which might begin to change and to challenge 
approaches to race in literature and science studies, literary studies more broadly 
and in genetic science. They show us how our disciplinary objects cannot be 
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neatly contained, how the co-production of race across scientific and fictional 
borders dissolves the classifications and distinctions between disciplines, 
practices and indeed racial groups that shape academic and public discourse. 
At a moment when the meanings of race in genetics are as contested and as 
fractured as ever, when institutions, political, social and educational, refuse 
to speak the language of race and racism, the racial formations represented in 
contemporary fiction offer a mode of comprehending the biofictional nature 
of race that speaks both to bioscience and to literary studies; a mode in which 
what is fact and what is fiction cannot be aligned with traditional disciplinary 
distinctions between science and literature.
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